Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, Henrik Lunde [new ebook reader TXT] 📗

positions…. The brigade still has maneuver possibilities in the area Nævertind-Isvann-Swedish border, provided we don’t lose our chance as the Germans move their positions eastward.” Berg and Vollan, Fjellkrigen, p. 257.

17 Berg and Vollan, Fjellkrigen, p. 241.

18 Hovland, Fleischer, p. 175.

19 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 124-125.

20 See, for example, extracts of reports dated 10, 12, and 21 May, in ibid, pp. 52, 124, and 140.

21 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 30.

22 Hovland, Fleischer, p. 173.

23 A report by the German war correspondent Karl Springenschmid is quoted in Berg and Vollan, Fjellkrigen, p. 314: “it was customary for the Norwegians to attack in inclement weather. They now fought harder than at any time. The mountain troops had already learned that they [Norwegians] were outstanding skiers, could fight on skis, and that there were excellent sharpshooters among them. However, the fact that they launched direct assault on fortified positions came as a surprise. Driven back, the reassembled, and time after time assaulted over their own fallen and forced their way into the positions. These stubborn Norwegian ‘peace soldiers’ had in the course of a short time, accustomed themselves to war and had become dangerous opponents.”

24 Munthe-Kaas, Krigen, p. 154.

25 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, pp. 134-135.

26 As quoted in ibid, p.140.

27 Munthe-Kaas, Krigen, p. 151.

Chapter 14

1 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 185. Adams (The Dooomed Expedition, p. 76) states that the Germans attacked with 1,700 men. David Erskine (The Scots Guards 1919-1955 [(London: William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 1956]), p. 38,) gives 1,750 as the estimated strength of the German force.

2 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. 108, n. 137.

3 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 186. He writes: “The Germans also dropped paratroops on the mountainside nearer Mo, who developed a subsidiary flank attack at Lundenget.” Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 4, p. 198 also refers mistakenly to German paratroopers landing between Stien and Mo.

4 Alex Büchner, Kampf im Gebirge (München-Lochhausen: Schild-Verlag, 1957), pp. 22-23. Tamelander and Zetterling, however, claim that the Germans on Kobbernaglen engaged the British at midnight and this caused Sorko to attack frontally. They cite as their source M. Kräutler and K. Springen-Schmidt, Es war ein Edelweiss, Schicksal und Weg er zweiten Gebirgsdivision, pp. 53ff (Niende april, p. 250). Hans Breckan, Tapte skanser. IR 14 i april, mai, juni 1940 (Brønnøysund: Eget forlag, 1986), p. 45 also alludes to the fact that the flanking maneuver succeeded and that Sorko attacked after the enveloping force went into action. This is contrary to what Büchner, Sandvik, and Ruef write.

5 Lieutenant Colonel Roscher-Nielsen’s report on June 3, 1940, as quoted in Sandvik, Operasjone, vol. 2, p. 103.

6 As quoted in Connell, Auchinleck, p. 121.

7 Ibid, p. 126.

8 Norwegian News Company, Norway (Brooklyn: Arnesen Press, Inc. 1941), p. 2.

9 Feurstein, Irrwege der Pflicht, p. 85.

10 Ellinger, Den Forunderlige Krig, pp. 84-85.

11 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 129.

12 Loc. cit.

13 As quoted in Ash, Norway 1940, p. 268.

14 As quoted in Connell, Auchinleck, pp. 130-131 and 141.

15 Desmond J. L. Fitzgerald, History of the Irish Guards in the Second World War (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd, 1952), pp. 55-57 and Sandvik, Operasjone, vol. 2, pp. 233-234. Stockwell was a major who held the brevet rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He was later promoted to full general, knighted, and commanded ground forces in the 1956 Suez operation.

16 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 649.

17 Hubatsch, p. 218.

Chapter 15

1 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 207 and Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 2, p. :193, n.ote 12.

2 Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 218.

3 Munthe-Kaas, NarvikavsnittetKrigen, p. 180.

4 Lindbäck-Larsen, 6. division,, p. 154.

5 Sandvik, Operasjonen, vol. 2, p. :144 and note 50. A number of the Norwegian archives dealing with operations in the 6th Division area have disappeared. According to Colonel Tor Holm (captain and chief of staff of the 6th Brigade during the campaign), as recorded by Berg and Vollan (in Fjellkrigen, p.age 321), both the 6th Division and 6th Brigade archives were on hand when Major Lindbäck-Larsen began writing his book about the campaign (6th divisjon). Colonel Holm wrote a scathing review of Lindbäck-Larsen’s book in 1947 (in the professional periodical Hærens Offisers Forbund, nr. 9-10, 1947). My colleague, Dr. Haga, attempted to locate a copy of the periodical. The Armed Forces Museum’s Library, responsible for collecting and stocking all Norwegian Military periodicals, reported that the issue in question was missing from its archives and it had proved impossible to locate it anywhere in the Norwegian library system. It is unfortunate and puzzling how and why the archives–apparently not destroyed at the end of hostilities–became missing and why the critique of Lindbäck-Larsen’s account cannot be located.

6 Ziemke, German Northern Theater, p. 101.

7 Witold Biegański, Poles in the Battle of Narvik (Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, 1969), p. 39.

8 Ibid, p. 60.

9 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office Historical Branch, Notes on the Norwegian Campaign, Appendix 1, p. 61 and Appendix 2, p. 64.

10 Ibid, Appendix 2, p. 64.

11 As quoted in Irving, Hitler’s War, pp. 105-106.

12 3GDKTB, 05101200.

13 Fuehrer Conferences 1940, pp. 52-53

14 Ash, Norway 1940, p. 225.

15 Derry, 206.

16 Ruge, Felttoget, 72.

17 Ruge, Krigens dagbok, 370.

18 Lie, 189.

19 Kersuady, 169.

20 Moulton, 243.

21 Victor MacClure, Gladiators over Norway, 23.

22 Ash, 253 and 227.

23 As quoted in Hovland, 181.

24 As quoted in Sandvik, 2:154. Ruge wrote that, “Both the Government, Allied military commanders, and military attaches continually turned to me for decisions on matters that had to be resolved quickly and the distances were so great and communications so bad that I had to make decisions with increasing frequency without first having an opportunity to discuss them with General Fleischer. The reality that I could not avoid making decisions in the long run, forced me in the end to