The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laërtius [the gingerbread man read aloud TXT] 📗

And this is the nature of things eternal, which is always similar and the same. And, indeed, Epicharmus speaks intelligibly on the subject of what is perceived by the senses and by the intellect: A

But the great Gods were always present, nor
Did they at any moment cease to be;
And their peculiar likeness at all times
Do they retain, by the same principles.

B

Yet chaos is asserted to have been
The first existent Deity.

A

How can that be?
For ’tis impossible that we should find
Any first principle arise from anything.

B

Is there then no first principle at all?

A

Nor second either in the things we speak of;
But thus it is⁠—if to an even number,
Or e’en an odd one, if you so prefer it,
You add a unit, or if you deduct one,
Say will the number still remain the same?

B

Certainly not.

A

So, if you take a measure
A cubit long, and add another cubit,
Or cut a portion off, the measure then
No longer is the same?

B

Of course it is not.

A

Now turn your eyes and thoughts upon mankind⁠—
We see one grows, another perishes
So that they all exist perpetually
In a condition of transition. That
Whose nature changes must be different
At each successive moment, from the thing
It was before. So also, you and I
Are different people now from what we were
But yesterday; and then, again, tomorrow
We shall be different from what we’re now;
So that, by the same rule, we’re always different.

And Alcimus speaks as follows: “The wise men say that the soul perceives some things by means of the body, as for instance when it hears and sees, but that it also perceives something by its own power, without availing itself at all of the assistance of the body.” On which account existent things are divisible into objects of sensation and objects of understanding. On account of which Plato used to say that those who wished to become acquainted with the principles of everything, ought first of all to divide the ideas as he calls them, separately, such as similarity, and unity, and multitude, and magnitude, and stationariness, and motion. And secondly, that they ought to form a notion of the honorable and the good, and the just, and things of that sort, by themselves, apart from other considerations. And thirdly, that they ought to ascertain the character of such ideas as are relative to one another, such as knowledge, or magnitude, or authority; considering that the things which come under our notice from partaking of their nature, have the same names that they have. I mean that one calls that just which partakes of the just; and that beautiful which partakes of the beautiful. And each of these primary species is eternal, and is to be understood by the intellect, and is not subject to the influence of external circumstances. On which account he says that ideas exist in nature as models; and that all other things are like them, and, as it were, copies of them. Accordingly Epicharmus speaks thus about the good, and about the ideas.

A

Tell me, is flute-playing now a thing at all?

B

Of course it is.

A

Is man then flute-playing?

B

No, nothing of the sort.

A

Well, let us see⁠—
What is a flute-player? what think you now
Of him⁠—is he a man, or is he not?

B

Of course he is a man.

A

Think you not then
The case is just the same about the good.
That the good is something by itself, intrinsic
And he who’s learnt, does at once become
Himself a good man? just as he who’s learnt
Flute-playing is a flute-player; or dancing,
A dancer; weaving, a weaver. And in short,
Whoever learns an art, does not become
The art itself, but just an artist in it.

Plato, in his theory of Ideas, says, “That since there is such a thing as memory, the ideas are in existent things, because memory is only conversant about what is stable and enduring; and that no other thing is durable except ideas, for in what way,” he continues, “could animals be preserved, if they had no ideas to guide them, and if, in addition to them, they had not an intellect given to them by nature?” But as it is they recollect similitudes, and also their food, so as to know what kind of food is fit for them; which they learn because the notion of similarity is implanted naturally in every animal; owing to which notion they recognize those of the same species as themselves. What is it then that Epicharmus says?

Eumaeus’ wisdom?⁠—not a scanty gift
Appropriated to one single being;
But every animal that breathes and lives,
Has mind and intellect.⁠—So if you will
Survey the facts attentively, you’ll find,
E’en in the common poultry yard, the hen
Brings not her offspring forth at first alive,
But sits upon her eggs, and by her warmth,
Cherishes them into life. And all this wisdom
She does derive from nature’s gift alone,
For nature is her only guide and teacher.

And in a subsequent passage he says:

There is no wonder in my teaching this,
That citizens please citizens, and seem
To one another to be beautiful:
And so one dog seems to another dog
The fairest object in the world; and so
One ox seems to another, ass to ass,
And swine to swine.

And these and similar speculations are examined and compared by Alcimus through four books, where he shows how much assistance Plato has derived from Epicharmus. And that Epicharmus himself was not indisposed to appreciate his own wisdom, one may learn from these lines, in which he predicts that there will arise someone to imitate him:

But as I think, I surely foresee this,
That these my words will be preserved hereafter
In many people’s recollection. And
Another man will come, who’ll strip my reasons
Of their poetic dress, and, clothing them
In other garments and with purple broidery
Will show them off; and being invincible,
Will make all rivals bow the knee to him.

Plato also appears to have brought the books of Sophron, the farce-writer,31 to