The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laërtius [the gingerbread man read aloud TXT] 📗

Very often, when he was inveighing against the Athenians, he would say that they had invented both wheat and laws, but that they used only the wheat and neglected the laws.

It was a saying of his that the roots of education were bitter, but the fruit sweet.

Once he was asked what grew old most speedily, and he replied: “Gratitude.”

On another occasion the question was put to him, what hope is? and his answer was: “The dream of a waking man.”

Diogenes once offered him a dry fig, and as he conjectured that if he did not take it the cynic had a witticism ready prepared, he accepted it, and then said that Diogenes had lost his joke and his fig too; and another time when he took one from him as he offered it, he held it up as a child does, and said, “O great Diogenes;” and then he gave it to him back again.

He used to say that there were three things necessary to education: natural qualifications, instruction, and practice.

Having heard that he was abused by someone, he said: “He may beat me too, if he likes, in my absence.”

He used to say that beauty is the best of all recommendations, but others say that it was Diogenes who gave this description of it; and that Aristotle called beauty “The gift of a fair appearance,” that Socrates called it “A short-lived tyranny;” Plato, “The privilege of nature;” Theophrastus, “A silent deceit;” Theocritus, “An ivory mischief;” Carneades, “A sovereignty which stood in need of no guards.”

On one occasion he was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated. “As much,” said he, “as the living are to the dead.”

It was a saying of his that education was an ornament in prosperity, and a refuge in adversity. And that those parents who gave their children a good education deserved more honor than those who merely beget them: for that the latter only enabled their children to live, but the former gave them the power of living well.

When a man boasted in his presence that he was a native of an illustrious city, he said: “That is not what one ought to look at, but whether one is worthy of a great city.”

He was once asked what a friend is; and his answer was: “One soul abiding in two bodies.”

It was a saying of his that some men were as stingy as if they expected to live forever, and some as extravagant as if they expected to die immediately.

When he was asked why people like to spend a great deal of their time with handsome people: “That,” said he, “is a question fit for a blind man to ask.”

The question was once put to him, what he had gained by philosophy; and the answer he made was this: “That I do without being commanded, what others do from fear of the laws.”

He was once asked what his disciples ought to do to get on; and he replied: “Press on upon those who are in front of them, and not wait for those who are behind to catch them.”

A chattering fellow, who had been abusing him, said to him: “Have not I been jeering you properly?”⁠—“Not that I know of,” said he, “for I have not been listening to you.”

A man on one occasion reproached him for having given a contribution to one who was not a good man (for the story which I have mentioned before is also quoted in this way), and his answer was: “I gave not to the man, but to humanity.”

The question was once put to him, how we ought to behave to our friends; and the answer he gave was: “As we should wish our friends to behave to us.”

He used to define justice as “A virtue of the soul distributive of what each person deserved.”

Another of his sayings was that education was the best viaticum for old age.

Phavorinus, in the second book of his Commentaries, says that he was constantly repeating: “The man who has friends has no friend.” And this sentiment is to be found also in the seventh book of the Ethics.

These apothegms then are attributed to him.

He also wrote a great number of works; and I have thought it worth while to give a list of them, on account of the eminence of their author in every branch of philosophy. Four books on Justice; three books on Poets; three books on Philosophy; two books of The Statesman; one on Rhetoric, called also the Gryllus; the Nerinthus, one; the Sophist, one; the Menexenus, one; the Erotic, one; the Banquet, one; on Riches, one; the Exhortation, one; on the Soul, one; on Prayer, one; on Nobility of Birth, one; on Pleasure, one; the Alexander, or an Essay on Colonists, one; on Sovereignty, one; on Education, one; on the Good, three; three books on things in the Laws of Plato; two on Political Constitutions; on Economy, one; on Friendship, one; on Suffering, or having Suffered, one; on Sciences, one; on Discussions, two; Solutions of Disputed Points, two; Sophistical Divisions, four; on Contraries, one; on Species and Genera, one; on Property, one; Epicheirematic, or Argumentative Commentaries, three; Propositions relating to Virtue, three; Objections, one; one book on things which are spoken of in various ways, or a Preliminary Essay; one on the Passion of Anger; five on Ethics; three on Elements; one on Science; one on Beginning; seventeen on Divisions; on Divisible Things, one; two books of Questions and Answers; two on Motion; one book of Propositions; four of Contentious Propositions; one of Syllogisms; eight of the First Analytics; two of the second greater Analytics; one on Problems; eight on Method; one on the Better; one on the Idea; Definitions serving as a preamble to the Topics, seven; two books more of Syllogisms; one of Syllogisms and Definitions; one on what is Eligible, and on what is Suitable; the