The Art of War, Zi Sun [best short novels .txt] 📗

SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR

 

THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD

 

Translated from the Chinese

By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910)

 

I. LAYING PLANS

 

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance

to the State.

 

2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either

to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry

which can on no account be neglected.

 

3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant

factors, to be taken into account in one’s deliberations,

when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.

 

4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth;

(4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

 

5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete

accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him

regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

 

7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat,

times and seasons.

 

8. Earth comprises distances, great and small;

danger and security; open ground and narrow passes;

the chances of life and death.

 

9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom,

sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness.

 

10. By method and discipline are to be understood

the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions,

the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance

of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the

control of military expenditure.

 

11. These five heads should be familiar to every general:

he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them

not will fail.

12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking

to determine the military conditions, let them be made

the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—

 

13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued

with the Moral law?

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?

(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven

and Earth?

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

(5) Which army is stronger?

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy

both in reward and punishment?

 

14. By means of these seven considerations I can

forecast victory or defeat.

 

15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts

upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command!

The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it,

will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!

16. While heading the profit of my counsel,

avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances

over and beyond the ordinary rules.

17. According as circumstances are favorable,

one should modify one’s plans.

 

18. All warfare is based on deception.

 

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;

when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we

are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;

when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

 

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder,

and crush him.

 

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him.

If he is in superior strength, evade him.

 

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to

irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

 

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

If his forces are united, separate them.

 

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where

you are not expected.

25. These military devices, leading to victory,

must not be divulged beforehand.

 

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many

calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.

The general who loses a battle makes but few

calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations

lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat:

how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention

to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

 

II. WAGING WAR

 

1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war,

where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots,

as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand

mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them

a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front,

including entertainment of guests, small items such as

glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor,

will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.

Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

 

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory

is long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and

their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town,

you will exhaust your strength.

 

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources

of the State will not be equal to the strain.

 

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped,

your strength exhausted and your treasure spent,

other chieftains will spring up to take advantage

of your extremity. Then no man, however wise,

will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

 

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,

cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

 

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited

from prolonged warfare.

 

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted

with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand

the profitable way of carrying it on.

 

8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy,

neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

 

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage

on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough

for its needs.

 

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army

to be maintained by contributions from a distance.

Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes

the people to be impoverished.

 

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes

prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s

substance to be drained away.

 

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry

will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

 

13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion

of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare,

and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;

while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,

breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,

protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons,

will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

 

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging

on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions

is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise

a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty

from one’s own store.

 

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must

be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from

defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

 

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots

have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.

Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy,

and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours.

The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

 

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment

one’s own strength.

 

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory,

not lengthy campaigns.

 

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies

is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it

depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

 

III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM

 

1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best

thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact;

to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is

better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it,

to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire

than to destroy them.

 

2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles

is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists

in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.

 

3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to

balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent

the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in

order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field;

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

 

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it

can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets,

movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take

up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over

against the walls will take three months more.

5. The general, unable to control his irritation,

will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,

with the result that one-third of his men are slain,

while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous

effects of a siege.

6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s

troops without any fighting; he captures their cities

without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom

without lengthy operations in the field.

 

7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery

of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph

will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

 

8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten

to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one,

to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army

into two.

 

9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

 

10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made

by a small force, in the end it must be captured

by the larger force.

 

11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State;

if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will

be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will

be weak.

 

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring

misfortune upon his army:—

 

13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat,

being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey.

This is called hobbling the army.

 

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the

same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant

of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes

restlessness in the soldier’s minds.

 

15. (3) By employing the officers of his army

without discrimination, through ignorance of the

military principle of adaptation to circumstances.

This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

 

16. But when the army is restless and distrustful,

trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes.

This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging

victory away.

 

17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials

for victory:

(1) He will win who knows when to fight and when

not to fight.

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior

and inferior forces.

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same

spirit throughout all its ranks.