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The Ethics

(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)

 

by Benedict de Spinoza

 

Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes

 

PART I. CONCERNING GOD.

 

DEFINITIONS.

 

I. By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the

essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only

conceivable as existent.

 

II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be

limited by another thing of the same nature ; for instance, a

body is called finite because we always conceive another greater

body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a

body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

 

III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is

conceived through itself : in other words, that of which a

conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

 

IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as

constituting the essence of substance.

 

V. By mode, I mean the modifications1 of substance, or that

which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than

itself.

 

VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite-that is, a

substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each

expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

Explanation-I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its

kind : for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite

attributes may be denied ; but that which is absolutely infinite,

contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves

no negation.

 

VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the

necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is

determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is

necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by

something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of

existence or action.

 

VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is

conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of

that which is eternal.

Explanation-Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal

truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be

explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may

be conceived without a beginning or end.

 

AXIOMS.

 

I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in

something else.

 

II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be

conceived through itself.

 

III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows ;

and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is

impossible that an effect can follow.

 

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the

knowledge of a cause.

 

V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the

one by means of the other ; the conception of one does not

involve the conception of the other.

 

VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

 

VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence

does not involve existence.

 

PROPOSITIONS.

 

PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

Proof.-This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.

 

PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have

nothing in common.

Proof.-Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in

itself, and be conceived through itself ; in other words, the

conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

 

PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the

cause of the other.

Proof.-If they have nothing in common, it follows that one

cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,

therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).

Q.E.D.

 

PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from

the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the

substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

Proof.-Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in

something else (Ax. i.),-that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing

is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and

its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the

understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one

from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see

Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more

substances having the same nature or attribute.

Proof.-If several distinct substances be granted, they must

be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of

their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications

(Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it

will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an

identical attribute. If by the difference of their

modifications-as substance is naturally prior to its

modifications (Prop. i.),-it follows that setting the

modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is

truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one

substance different from another,-that is (by Prop. iv.), there

cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.

Q.E.D.

 

PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Proof.-It is impossible that there should be in the universe

two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have

anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop.

iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be

produced by the other. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that a substance cannot be

produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe

nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as

appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.). Now (by the last

Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,

therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.

Q.E.D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the

contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external

cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its

cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be

substance.

 

PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances.

Proof.-Substance cannot be produced by anything external

(Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause-that

is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence

belongs to its nature.

 

PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Proof.-There can only be one substance with an identical

attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.) ;

its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or

infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it

would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which

would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.) ; and there would be

two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd

(Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.

Note I.-As finite existence involves a partial negation, and

infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given

nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance

is necessarily infinite.

Note II.-No doubt it will be difficult for those who think

about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them

by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.

vii. : for such persons make no distinction between the

modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and

are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced ; hence

they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe

in natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make

complete confusion-think that trees might talk just as well as

men-that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed ;

and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,

also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,

readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long

as they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if

people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no

doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition

would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism. For, by

substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is

conceived through itself-that is, something of which the

conception requires not the conception of anything else ; whereas

modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a

conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the

thing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas of

non-existent modifications ; for, although they may have no

actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their

essence is so