The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗
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knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or
chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely
fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more
clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of
perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the
better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.
For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a
corpse, is called unhappy ; whereas it is set down to happiness,
if we have been able to live through the whole period of life
with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as
in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very
few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external
causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely
conscious of itself, or of God, or of things ; whereas, he, who
has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,
considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of
God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily
endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far
as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into
something else capable of very many activities, and referable to
a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things
; and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its
imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison
with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the
last Proposition.
PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of
perfection, so is it more active, and less passive ; and, vice
vers�, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.
Proof.-In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it
possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.
iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less
passive. This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove
that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more
perfect. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence it follows that the part of the mind which
endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.
For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the
understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.)
; the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.
xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.
and general Def. of the Emotions) ; therefore, the former, be it
great or small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.
Note.-Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set
forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without
relation to the body ; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other
places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,
is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another
eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to
infinity ; so that all taken together at once constitute the
eternal and infinite intellect of God.
PROP. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we
should still consider as of primary importance piety and
religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed
to be attributable to courage and highmindedness.
Proof.-The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule
of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one’s
own true interest. Now, while we determined what reason
prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind’s eternity,
which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part. Although
we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we
nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage
and highmindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even
if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the
aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place. Q.E.D.
Note.-The general belief of the multitude seems to be
different. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so
far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their
rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the
commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that
piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to
firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to
lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,
for their piety and religion ; it is not only by this hope, but
also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after
death, that they are induced to live according to the divine
commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry
them.
If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the
mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life
remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of
piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling
everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey
fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not
less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he
can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to
cram himself with poisons and deadly fare ; or if, because he
sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer
to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of
reason ; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth
refuting.
PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue
itself ; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our
lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able
to control our lusts.
Proof.-Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and
note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.
xxxii. Coroll.) ; therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be
referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active ;
therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself. This was our
first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in
this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand
(V. xxxii.) ; that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power
has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is
it subject to those emotions which are evil ; therefore, in
proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or
blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And,
since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in
the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in
blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,
contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this
blessedness itself. Q.E.D.
Note.-I have thus completed all I wished to set forth
touching the mind’s power over the emotions and the mind’s
freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how
much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his
lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various
ways by external causes without ever gaining the true
acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were
unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as
he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.
Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
acquiescence of his spirit.
If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result
seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs
must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be
possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without
great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men
neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are
rare.
End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza
1 “Affectiones”
2 “Forma”
3 “Animata”
4 A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
5 Conscienti� morsus-thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
6 By “men” in this and the following propositions, I mean men
whom we regard without any particular emotion.
7 So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read,
“an internal cause.” “Honor” = Gloria.
8 See previous endnote.
9 Ovid, “Amores,” II. xix. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses.
“Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes ;
Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.”
10 This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
intellect, as I have shown in II.xiii.note.
11 Gloria.
12 Ov. Met. vii.20, “Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.”
13 Honestas
14 Land reads : “Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur”-which I
have translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to
`quod’, ‘quo’ (= whereby) and ‘quodque’ (= and that).
15 “Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro.” (Van Vloten).
Bruder reads : “Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
alicujus mali.” The last word of the latter is an obvious
misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into “majoris
boni.” (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
16 Continuo. Rendered “constantly” by Mr. Pollock on the ground
that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be
obtained without doing violence to Spinoza’s scholarship.
17 Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus - emotions.
End of The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
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