The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗

from the

thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.

ii. and V. iv. note).

III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions

referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those

referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner

(V. vii.).

IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications17

are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of

things or to God (V. ix. xi.).

V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and

associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and

xii. xiii. xiv.).

But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions

may be better understood, it should be specially observed that

the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion

of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is

more troubled than another by the same emotion ; or when we are

comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,

and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than

by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a

comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.

Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its

infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge

only : it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,

whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it

may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by

its activities : on the other hand, that mind is most active,

whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,

although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former

mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas

attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human

infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual

unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to

excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,

and which we can never become masters of. For no one is

solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it ;

neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in

regard to things whereof no one can be really master.

We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and

distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge

(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,

possesses over the emotions : if it does not absolutely destroy

them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note) ; at

any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind

(V. xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable

and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession

(II. xlv.) ; neither can it be defiled with those faults which

are inherent in ordinary love ; but it may grow from strength to

strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and

deeply penetrate it.

And now I have finished with all that concerns this present

life : for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have

briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And

this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has

attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the

definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to

Propositions i. and iii. of Part III. It is now, therefore, time

to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of

the mind, without relation to the body.

 

PROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what

is past, while the body endures.

Proof.-The mind does not express the actual existence of its

body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as

actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.) ; and,

consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine

any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.

Thus it

cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.

xvii. note),

or remember things past, except while the body endures (see

definition of Memory, II. xviii. note). Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,

which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the

form of eternity.

Proof.-God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or

that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.). This

essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the

very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a

certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.) ; and this conception must

necessarily exist in God (II. iii.). Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with

the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

Proof.-There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which

expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,

therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence

of the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have not assigned to the

human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as

it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained

through duration, and may be defined by time-that is (II. viii.

Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body

endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is

conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence

of God (last Prop.) ; this something, which appertains to the

essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.-This idea, which expresses the essence of the body

under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode

of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is

necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should

remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear

no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in

terms of time, or have any relation to time. But,

notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the

mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no

less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the

mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than

proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before

the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the

essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and

that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or

explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to

endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in

so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far

only has it the power of determining the existence of things by

time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.

 

PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more

do we understand God.

Proof.-This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.

 

PROP. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest

virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

Proof.-The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate

idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the

essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.) ; and,

in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better

understand God (by the last Prop.) ; therefore (IV. xxviii.) the

highest virtue of the mind, that is IV. Def. viii.) the power, or

nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to

understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of

understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires

more to understand things by that kind.

Proof-This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the

mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of

knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to

conceive things ; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),

the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable

thereof. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the

highest possible mental acquiescence.

Proof.-The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.

xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge

(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind

knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.) :

consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge

passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.

of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such

pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own

virtue ; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of

knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the

third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the

second kind of knowledge.

Proof.-This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we

understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through

itself, or through that which is conceived through itself ; that

is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are

referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)

cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and

are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from

adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of

knowledge ; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of

knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from

the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of

eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the

present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving

the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

Proof.-In so far as the mind conceives the present existence

of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be

determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of

conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But

eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.

and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the

power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it

possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to

conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.

ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to

conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.

xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to

the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of

conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the

mind in virtue of the mind’s conceiving the essence of the body

under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.

Note.-Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways ;

either as existing

in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and

following

from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive

in this

second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of

eternity, and

their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as

we showed

in II. xlv. and note, which see.

 

PROP. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body

under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a

knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived

through God.

Proof.-Eternity is the