The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗

composed of very many parts of different

nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so

that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything

that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the

mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.

XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of

each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one

another mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token for

everything : hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind

of the multitude is chiefly engrossed : nay, it can hardly

conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the

idea of money as cause.

XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek

money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but

because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring

themselves to great splendour. Certainly they nourish their

bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they

lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of

their body. But they who know the true use of money, and who fix

the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,

live content with little.

XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the

various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their

functions ; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid

to, man’s power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body ;

it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.

But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us

pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit

our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred

to one part of the body more than to the other parts ; therefore

most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at

hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become

excessive. Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most

regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate

what is future with emotions equally vivid. (IV. xliv. note, and

lx. note.)

XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as

good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure.

However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious

take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the

pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection

whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the

divine nature : no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated

by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is

led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by

reason.

XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and is

infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes ; we have

not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those

things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an

equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims

of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have

done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not

sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely ;

remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we

follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding

of this, that part of our nature which is defined by

intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will

assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence

will endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent

beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,

nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which

is true : wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding

of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is

in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.

 

PART V :

Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom

PREFACE

At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which

is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore

treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the

reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental

Freedom or Blessedness ; we shall then be able to see, how much

more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part

of my design to point out the method and means whereby the

understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the

body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of

its functions. The latter question lies in the province of

Medicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here, therefore,

I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of

reason ; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its

dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.

That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have

already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions

depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely

govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the

protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,

that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and

moderate them : and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the

example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog

and the other a hunting-dog. For by long training it could be

brought about, that the house-dog should become accustomed to

hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares. To

this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained,

that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of

the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the

aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which

are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which

the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various

ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst

of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of

the animal spirits : further, that this gland is suspended in the

midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal

spirits can impinge thereon ; and, again, that as many different

marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different

external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it ;

whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the

gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once

before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the

gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and

determining them to the condition wherein they were, when

repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further

asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature

to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever

anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition

causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in

question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the

mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,

inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the

animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would

dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with

the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to

look at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he maintained that,

although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been

united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole

number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet

it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with

other thoughts ; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de

l’�me, I.50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,

that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power

over its passions. For passions as defined by him are

“perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are

referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)

are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement

of the spirits.” (Passions de l’�me, I.27). But, seeing that we

can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,

to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely

on our own powers ; if, therefore, we determine our will with

sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our

actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which

we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an

absolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of

this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his

own words) ; it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could

hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I

am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,

that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from

self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not

clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to

task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through

occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which

occult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I

ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and

distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union

with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like

him to explain this union through its proximate cause. But he

had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,

that he could not assign any particular cause of the union

between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have

recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.

Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the

mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it

hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can

be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the

animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we

have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again

disjoined therefrom by physical causes ; in which case it would

follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given

danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,

yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended

in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything

except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of

volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between

the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body ;

consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined

by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no

gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it

can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that

all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the

brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes

concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have

abundantly proved that his premisses are false. Therefore, since

the power of