The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗

are bad, are bad in so far as they impede

the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.). So long, therefore, as

we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the

mind’s power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.

xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear

and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.

note. ii. and II. xlvii. note) ; consequently we have in such

cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of

the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.

Note.-By this power of rightly arranging and associating the

bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily

affected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is

needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and

associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,

are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so

long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is

to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,

to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith16 to the

particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so

that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that

it may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid

down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred

should be overcome with love or highmindedness, and not required

with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be

always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think

over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and

in what manner and way they may be best warded off by

highmindedness : we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with

the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready

for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.). If we keep also

in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good

which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships ;

further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result

of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than

everything else, act by the necessity of their nature : in such

case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises

therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and

will be easily overcome ; or, if the anger which springs from a

grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be

overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner

than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As

is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii. We should, in the same

way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear ; the

ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and

imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of

resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.

But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions

we should always bear in mind that which is good in every

individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order

that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of

pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the

pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for

which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain

it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the

fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except

through a morbidness of disposition ; with thoughts like these do

the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of

gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving

vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is

certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of

honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily

covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common

to all who are illused by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.

For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the

misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich ; whereby he merely

torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not

only of his own poverty, but also of other people’s riches. So,

again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love

think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock

faults of the fair sex ; all of which they consign to oblivion,

directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.

Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the

love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of

the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy

which arises from the true knowledge of them : he will in no wise

desire to dwell on men’s faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to

revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently

observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not

difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for

the most part, to direct his actions according to the

commandments of reason.

 

PROP. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more

objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and

occupies the mind more.

Proof.-In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is

referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can

be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind

contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion

; therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in

full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XII. The mental images of things are more easily

associated with the images referred to things which we clearly

and distinctly understand, than with others.

Proof.-Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,

are either the common properties of things or deductions

therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are

consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.

Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate

other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with

something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of

the said things should be more often associated with the images

of these than with the images of something else. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as

it is associated with a greater number of other images.

Proof.-In proportion as an image is associated with a greater

number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes

whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily

modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of

God.

Proof.-There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind

may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.) ;

wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred

to the idea of God (I. xv.). Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and

his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he

more understands himself and his emotions.

Proof.-He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and

his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is

(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God ; therefore

(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the

same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more

understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in

the mind.

Proof.-For this love is associated with all the modifications

of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.) ;

therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.

Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by

any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Proof.-All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are

true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate ; and

therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without

passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a

lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.) ; therefore (by Def. of

the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of

pleasure or pain.

Corollary.-Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate

anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any

emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,

vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.

 

PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.

Proof.-The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect

(II. xlvi. xlvii.) ; wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,

we are active (III. iii.) ; consequently (III. lix.) there can be

no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of

the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.

Note.-It may be objected that, as we understand God as the

cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause

of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the

causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a

passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.) ; therefore,

in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to

that extent feel pleasure.

 

PROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should

love him in return.

Proof.-For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.

xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and

consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.) ; which is

absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion

of envy or jealousy : contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in

proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to

God by the same bond of love.

Proof.-This love towards God is the highest good which we can

seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common

to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice

therein (IV. xxxvii.) ; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),

it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of

jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note)

; but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in

proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice

therein. Q.E.D.

Note.-We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion

directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be

destroyed ; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God

is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as

it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the

body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is

referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.

I have now gone through all the remedies against the

emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can

do against them. Whence it appears that the mind’s power over

the emotions consists :-

I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).

II. In the fact that it separates the emotions