The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗

very essence of God, in so far as this

involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to

conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things

in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as

real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the

essence of God ; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives

itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that

extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as

its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Proof.-The mind does not conceive anything under the form of

eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the

form of eternity (V. xxix.) ; that is, except in so far as it is

eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.) ; therefore (by the last Prop.), in so

far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which

knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.) ; hence the mind,

in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything

which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in

other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge

(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind

(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or

formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.

Note.-In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in

this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of

himself and of God ; in other words, he will be more perfect and

blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must

here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind

is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of

eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more

readily explained and better understood, we will consider the

mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to

understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have

done hitherto ; this we may do without any danger of error, so

long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our

premisses are plain.

 

PROP. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of

knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by

the idea of God as cause.

Proof.-From this kind of knowledge arises the highest

possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,

xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea

of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the

idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-From the third kind of knowledge necessarily

arises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge

arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is

(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God ; not in so far as

we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we

understand him to be eternal ; this is what I call the

intellectual love of God.

 

PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from

the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

Proof.-The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.

Ax. iii.) ; therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises

therefrom is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.-Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing

Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of

love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.

of the last Prop. Nor is there here any difference, except that

the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we

feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of

God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to

a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the

mind being endowed with perfection itself.

 

PROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject

to those emotions which are attributable to passions.

Proof.-Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind

contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note) ; yet this idea

indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than

the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).

Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,

in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body ;

therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,

subject to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that no love save intellectual

love is eternal.

Note.-If we look to men’s general opinion, we shall see that

they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that

they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the

imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after

death.

 

PROP. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual

love.

Proof.-God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.

Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection ;

and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of

himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause

: now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as

intellectual love.

 

PROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is

that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as

he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the

essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity ;

in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is

part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.

Proof.-This love of the mind must be referred to the

activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.) ; it is

itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself

accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.) ;

that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity

whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human

mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself ;

therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of

the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves

himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God

towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God

are identical.

Note.-From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein

our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists : namely, in

the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God’s love

towards men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called

Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred

to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of

spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really

distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it

is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,

accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is

referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).

Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in

knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.

xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner

and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from

the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thought

it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show

by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I

have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),

is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which

I have styled knowledge of the second kind. For, although in

Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and

consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence

and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate

and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind

so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual

essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.

 

PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to

this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

Proof.-This intellectual love follows necessarily from the

nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through

the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.).

If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary

to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true

; consequently, that, which should be able to take away this

love, would cause that which is true to be false ; an obvious

absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c.

Q.E.D.

Note.-The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular

things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given

time and place : of this, I think, no one can doubt.

 

PROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things

by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to

those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.

Proof.-The mind’s essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.) ;

therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by

the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the

part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently

(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not

touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in

other words, evil (IV. xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind

understands more things by the second and third kinds of

knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains

unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c.

Q.E.D.

Note.-Hence we understand that point which I touched on in

IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part ;

namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the

mind’s clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,

consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again,

since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest

possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind

can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which

we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of

little importance when compared with the part which endures. But

I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.

 

PROP. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest

number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part

is eternal.

Proof.-He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest

number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which

are evil (IV. xxxviii.)-that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions

which are contrary to our nature ; therefore (V. x.), he

possesses the power of arranging and associating the

modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,

and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the

modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God ;

whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected

with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute

the chief part of the mind ; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man

will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.-Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number

of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a

nature, that they may be