The Sense of Beauty, George Santayana [e ink epub reader .txt] 📗

reasons when we are surprised. If we had no expectations we should have no surprises. And what gives us expectation is the spontaneous direction of our thought, determined by the structure of our brain and the effects of our experience. If our spontaneous thoughts came to run in harmony with the course of nature, if our expectations were then continually fulfilled, the sense of mystery would vanish. We should be incapable of asking why the world existed or had such a nature, just as we are now little inclined to ask why anything is right, but mightily disinclined to give up asking why anything is wrong.

This satisfaction of our reason, due to the harmony between our nature and our experience, is partially realized already. The sense of beauty is its realization. When our senses and imagination find what they crave, when the world so shapes itself or so moulds the mind that the correspondence between them is perfect, then perception is pleasure, and existence needs no apology. The duality which is the condition of conflict disappears. There is no inward standard different from the outward fact with which that outward fact may be compared. A unification of this kind is the goal of our intelligence and of our affection, quite as much as of our aesthetic sense; but we have in those departments fewer examples of success. In the heat of speculation or of love there may come moments of equal perfection, but they are unstable. The reason and the heart remain deeply unsatisfied. But the eye finds in nature, and in some supreme achievements of art, constant and fuller satisfaction. For the eye is quick, and seems to have been more docile to the education of life than the heart or the reason of man, and able sooner to adapt itself to the reality. Beauty therefore seems to be the clearest manifestation of perfection, and the best evidence of its possibility. If perfection is, as it should be, the ultimate justification of being, we may understand the ground of the moral dignity of beauty. Beauty is a pledge of the possible conformity between the soul and nature, and consequently a ground of faith in  the supremacy of the good.

FOOTNOTES

1  Schopenhauer, indeed, who makes much of it, was a good critic, but his psychology suffered much from the pessimistic generalities of his system. It concerned him to show that the will was bad, and, as he felt beauty to be a good if not a holy thing, he hastened to convince himself that it came from the suppression of the will. But even in his system this suppression is only relative. The desire of individual objects, indeed, is absent in the perception of beauty, but there is still present that initial love of the general type and principles of things which is the first illusion of the absolute, and drives it on to the fatal experiment of creation. So that, apart from Schopenhauer's mythology, we have even in him the recognition that beauty gives satisfaction to some dim and underlying demand of our nature, just as particular objects give more special and momentary pleasures to our individualized wills. His psychology was, however, far too vague and general to undertake an analysis of those mysterious feelings.

2  Cf. Stendhal, De L'Amour, passim.

3  This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the metaphysical value of the idea of space. Suffice it to point out that in human experience serviceable knowledge of our environment is to be had only in spatial symbols, and, for whatever reason or accident, this is the language which the mind must speak if it is to advance in clearness and efficiency.

4  The discussion is limited in this chapter to visible form, audible form is probably capable of a parallel treatment, but requires studies too technical for this place.

5  The relation to stability also makes us sensitive to certain kinds of symmetry; but this is an adventitious consideration with which we are not concerned.

6  Cf. Fechner, Vorschule der Aesthetik, Erster Theil, S. 73, a passage by which the following classification of forms was first suggested.

7  See Introduction, p. 12.

8  The contention of Burke that the beautiful is small is due to an arbitrary definition. By beautiful he means pretty and charming; agreeable as opposed to impressive. He only exaggerates the then usual opposition of the beautiful to the sublime.

9  When we speak of things definite in themselves, we of course mean things made definite by some human act of definition. The senses are instruments that define and differentiate sensation; and the result of one operation is that definite object upon which the next operation is performed. The memory, for example, classifies in time what the senses may have classified in space. We are nowhere concerned with objects other than objects of human experience, and the epithets, definite and indefinite, refer necessarily to their relation to our various categories of perception and comprehension.

10  In the Aegina marbles the wounded and dying warriors still wear this Buddha-like expression: their bodies, although conventional, show a great progress in observation, compared with the impossible Athena in the centre with her sacred feet in Egyptian profile and her owl-like visage.

11  Symposium of Xenophon, V.

12  It is a superstition to suppose that a refined taste would necessarily find the actual and useful to be the perfect; to conceal structure is as legitimate as to emphasize it, and for the name reason. We emphasize in the direction of abstract beauty,  in the direction of absolute pleasure; and we conceal or eliminate in the same direction. The most exquisite Greek taste, for instance, preferred to drape the lower part of the female figure, as in the Venus of Milo; also in men to shave the hair of the face and body, in order to maintain the purity and strength of the lines. In the one case we conceal structure, in the other we reveal it, modifying nature into greater sympathy with our faculties of perception. For, after all, it must be remembered that beauty, or pleasure to be given to the eye, is not a guiding principle in the world of nature or in that of the practical arts. The beauty is in nature a result of the functional adaptation of our senses and imagination to the mechanical products of our environment. This adaptation is never complete, and there is, accordingly, room for the fine arts, in which beauty is a result of the intentional adaptation of mechanical forms to the functions which our senses and imagination already have acquired. This watchful subservience to our aesthetic demands is the essence of fine art. Nature is the basis, but man is the goal.

13  Not only are words untranslatable when the exact object has no name in another language, as "home" or "mon ami," but even when the object is the same, the attitude toward it, incorporated in one word, cannot be rendered by another. Thus, to my sense, "bread" is as inadequate a translation of the human intensity of the Spanish "pan" as "Dios" is of the awful mystery of the English "God." This latter word does not designate an object at all, but a sentiment, a psychosis, not to say a whole chapter of religious history. English is remarkable for the intensity and variety of the colour of its words. No language, I believe, has so many words specifically poetic.

14  Curiously enough, common speech here reverses our use of terms, because it looks at the matter from the practical instead of from the aesthetic point of view, regarding (very unpsychologically) the thought as the source of the image, not the image as the source of the thought. People call the words the expression of the thought: whereas for the observer, the hearer (and generally for the speaker, too), the words are the datum and the thought is their expressiveness — that which they suggest.

INDEX

Achilles, 179, 187.
Aesthetic feeling, its importance, 1.
     speculation, causes of its neglect, 2.
     theory, its uses, 6, 7.
Aesthetics, Use of the word, 15.
Angels, 55, 182.
Apperception, 96 et seq.
Arabic inscriptions as ornament, 195.
Architecture, Effects of Gothic, 165, 166.
     governed by use, 161, 162.
Aristotelian forms, 156.
Aristotle, 174, 175, 288.
Associative process, 198 et seq.
Augustine, Saint, quoted, 252.

Beauty a value, 14 et seq.
     as felt is indescribable, 267, 268.
     a justification of things, 268, 269.
     defined, 49 et seq.
     verbal definitions quoted, 14.
Beethoven, 43.
Breathing related to the sense of beauty, 56.
Burke, 124, note.
Byron, quoted, 136.
Byzantine architecture, 108, 109.

Calderon, 174.
Centaurs, 183, 256.
Character as an aesthetic form, 176 et seq.
Characters, Ideal, 180 et seq.
Charles V.'s palace at the Alhambra, 44.
Christ, the various ideas of his nature, 189.
Circle, its aesthetic quality, 89.
Classicism, French and English, 109.
Colonnades, 108.
Colour, 72 et seq.
     its analogy to other sensations, 74, 75.
     possibility of an abstract art of colour, 75.
Comic, The, 245 et seq.
Conscience, its representative character, 33, 34.
Cost as an element of effect, 211 et seq.
Couplet, The, 108.
Criticism, Use of the word, 15.

Definite and indefinite, meaning of the terms, 138, note.
Degradation not what pleases in the comic, 247 et seq.
Democracy, aesthetics of it, 109
Descartes, 16, 183.
Disinterestedness not the differentia of aesthetic pleasure, 37 et seq.
Don Quixote, 179, 255.

Economy and fitness, 214 et seq.
Emerson, 144.
Epicurean esthetics, 10, 11.
     sublime, The, 241, 243.
Escurial, The, 95, 210.
Ethos, 174, 175.
Evil, life without it aesthetic, 29, 30.
     in the second term of expression, 221 et seq.
     conventional use of the word, 223.
     an occasion of the sublime, 235 et seq.
     excluded from the beautiful, 260, 261.
Evolution, its possible tendency to eliminate imagination, 26
Exclusiveness a sign of aesthetic vigour, 44.
Experience superior to theory in aesthetics, 11, 12.
Expression defined, 192 et seq.
     of feeling in another, 202, 203.
     of practical values, 208 et seq.
Expressiveness, Use of the word, 197.

Fechner, 97.
Form, There is a beauty of, 82 et seq.
     the unity of a manifold, 95 et seq.
Functions of the mind may all contribute to the sense of beauty, 53 et seq.

Geometrical figures, 88 et seq.
God, the idea of him in tradition and in metaphysics, 188, 189.
Gods, development of their ideal characters, 185 et seq.
Goethe, 9, 170, 179.
Grammar, its analogy to metaphysics, 169.
Gretchen, 179.
Grotesque, The, 256 et seq.

Hamlet, 179.
Happiness and aesthetic interest, 63, 65.
Health a condition of aesthetic life, 54.
Hedonism opposed by the moral sense, 23, 24.
History an imaginative thing, 141, 142.
Home as a social and as an aesthetic idea, 64.
Homer, 171.
     his aesthetic quality, 205, 206.
     his epithets, 179.
Horace, quoted, 172.
Humour, 253 et seq.

Ideals are modified averages, 121 et seq.
     immanent in human nature, 262.
     stable, 263 et seq.
Imagination has a universal creative function, 190, 191.
     and sense alternately active, 55, 56.
Impression distinguished from expression, 84, 85.
Impressionism in painting, 134, 136.
incongruity not what pleases in the comic, 247 et seq.
Indeterminate organizational et seq.
Infinite beauty, the idea impossible, 148 et seq.
Inspiration, 252, 253.

καλοκάγαθία, 31.
Kant, 105.
Keats, quoted, 67, 105, 181, 264.
King Lear, 229.
Kipling, R., quoted, 68.

Landscape, 133 et seq.
     with figures, 135, 136.
Liberation of self, 233 et seq.
Love, influence of the passion, 56 et seq.
Lowell, J. R., quoted, 148.
Lower senses, 65 et seq.
Lucretius, quoted, 172.
     on the sublime, 236.

Maps, 209, 210.
Material beauty most easily appreciated, 78 et seq.
     its effect the fundamental one, 78.
Materials of beauty surveyed, 76 et seq.
Methods in aesthetics, 5.
Michael Angelo, 182.
Miser's fallacy, its parallel in morals and aesthetics, 31, 32.
Modern languages inferior to the ancient, 173, 174.
Molière, 174; quoted, 20.
Monarchy, its imaginative value, 34, 35.
Moral and aesthetic values, 23 et seq.
     the authority of morals over aesthetics, 218 et seq.
Morality and utility jealous of art, 216, 217.
Multiplicity in uniformity, 97 et seq.
     its defects, 106 et seq.
Musset, Alfred de, quoted, 170, 226.
Mysticism in aesthetics, 126 et seq.

Naturalism, the ground of its value, 21.
Nature, its organization the source of apperceptive forms, 152 et seq.
     the love of it among the ancients, 137, 138.
New York, the plan of the streets, 95.
Nouns, idea