The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗

reason, which compels me to

maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse ;

nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion.

It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I

should hardly call him the same. As I have heard tell of a

certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and

though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his

past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he

had written to be his own : indeed, he might have been taken for

a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If

this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A

man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can

only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy

of other men. However, I prefer to leave such questions

undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for

raising new issues.

 

PROP. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man’s social life, or causes

men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever

brings discord into a State is bad.

Proof.-For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony

also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is

therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)

whatsoever brings about discord is bad. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good :

contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.

Proof.-Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the

body’s power of activity is increased or helped ; pain is

emotion, whereby the body’s power of activity is diminished or

checked ; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good,

&c. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good ;

contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.

Proof.-Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure,

which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all

parts of the body being affected equally : that is (III. xi.),

the body’s power of activity is increased or aided in such a

manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion

of motion and rest ; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.),

and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. in the

same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is

referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or

hindrance of the body’s power of activity ; therefore (IV.

xxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad ; on the other

hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is

bad.

Proof.-Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is

pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body,

consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the

rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note) ; the power of this

emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body

(IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus

rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other

ways : therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad. Again, grief,

which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.). But, as its

force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause

compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees

and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.) ; we can,

therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and

preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body’s

capabilities ; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.

Proof.-Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an

external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.) ; therefore stimulation,

accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi.

note) ; hence love maybe excessive. Again, the strength of

desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises

(III. xxxvii.). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men’s

actions (IV. vi.) ; so, therefore, can desire, which arises from

the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become

excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning

stimulation.

Note.-Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived

more easily than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby

we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the

body which is affected more than the rest ; hence the emotions

are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation

of one object, that it is unable to think of others ; and

although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions-and very few

are found who are always assailed by one and the same-yet there

are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately

fixed. We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that,

although it be not present, they think they have it before them ;

when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is

delirious or mad ; nor are those persons who are inflamed with

love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their

mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are

made objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but

gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but

glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are

generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated. But,

in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness,

though they may not be reckoned among diseases.

 

PROP. XLV. Hatred can never be good.

Proof.-When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.

xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that

is bad. Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.

N.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred

towards men.

Corollary I.-Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and

other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are

bad ; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.

Corollary II.-Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is

base, and in a State unjust. This also is evident from III.

xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV.

xxxvii. note.

Note.-Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to

be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference. For

laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure ; therefore, so

long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.).

Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and

gloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate one’s

hunger and thirst than to drive away one’s melancholy? I reason,

and have convinced myself as follows : No deity, nor anyone else,

save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,

nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,

which axe signs of infirmity of spirit ; on the contrary, the

greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the

perfection whereto we pass ; in other words, the more must we

necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use

of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible

(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is

the part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise man to

refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and

drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing

plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,

and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to

his neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous

parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of

fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be

equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from

the necessity of its own nature ; and, consequently, so that the

mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things

simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees best with our

principles, and also with general practice ; therefore, if there

be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is

the best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for

me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.

 

PROP. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason,

endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,

for other men’s hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.

Proof.-All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.) ;

therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will

endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such

emotions (IV. xix.) ; consequently, he will also endeavour to

prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.). But hatred is

increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love

(III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.) ;

therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will

endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness.

Q.E.D.

Note.-He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is

assuredly wretched. But he, who strives to conquer hatred with

love, fights his battle in joy and confidence ; he withstands

many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune’s aid.

Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but

through increase in their powers ; all these consequences follow

so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,

that I have no need to prove them in detail.

 

PROP. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves

good.

Proof.-Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain.

For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of

the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without

fear ; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in

themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive

pleasure (IV. xliii.). Q.E.D.

Note.-We may add, that these emotions show defective

knowledge and an absence of power in the mind ; for the same

reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of

a want of mental power. For although confidence and joy are

pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain,

namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to be

guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope ; we endeavour to

free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate

fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.

 

PROP. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are

always bad.

Proof.-These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.)

are repugnant to reason ; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.)

bad. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud.

Proof.-If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love’s

sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be

pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.) ; the good

which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.) ; and

therefore, for love’s sake, rate ourselves too highly ; in other

words, we are apt to become proud. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,

is in itself bad and useless.

Proof.-Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and

therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect which

follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity

from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the

dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.) ; only at