The Poetics, Aristotle [ebook reader for surface pro TXT] 📗

the

Odyssey, as also of the Iliad. The truth is that, just as in the

other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, so in

poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one

action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely

connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will

disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no perceptible

difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole.

9

From what we have said it will be seen that the poet’s function is to

describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that

might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable or necessary.

The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing

prose and the other verse—you might put the work of Herodotus into

verse, and it would still be a species of history; it consists really

in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the

other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more

philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements

are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are

singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to what such or such

a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do—which is the

aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the characters; by a

singular statement, one as to what, say, Alcibiades did or had done to

him. In Comedy this has become clear by this time; it is only when

their plot is already made up of probable incidents that the.g.ve it

a basis of proper names, choosing for the purpose any names that may

occur to them, instead of writing like the old iambic poets about

particular persons. In Tragedy, however, they still adhere to the

historic names; and for this reason: what convinces is the possible;

now whereas we are not yet sure as to the possibility of that which

has not happened, that which has happened is manifestly possible, else

it would not have come to pass. Nevertheless even in Tragedy there are

some plays with but one or two known names in them, the rest being

inventions; and there are some without a single known name, e.g.

Agathon’s Anthens, in which both incidents and names are of the poet’s

invention; and it is no less delightful on that account. So that one

must not aim at a rigid adherence to the traditional stories on which

tragedies are based. It would be absurd, in fact, to do so, as even

the known stories are only known to a few, though they are a delight

none the less to all.

 

It i.e.ident from the above that, the poet must be more the poet of

his stories or Plots than of his verses, inasmuch as he is a poet by

virtue of the imitative element in his work, and it is actions that he

imitates. And if he should come to take a subject from actual history,

he is none the less a poet for that; since some historic occurrences

may very well be in the probable and possible order of things; and it

is in that aspect of them that he is their poet.

 

Of simple Plots and actions the episodic are the worst. I call a Plot

episodic when there is neither probability nor necessity in the

sequence of episodes. Actions of this sort bad poets construct through

their own fault, and good ones on account of the players. His work

being for public performance, a good poet often stretches out a Plot

beyond its capabilities, and is thus obliged to twist the sequence of

incident.

 

Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete action, but

also of incidents arousing pity and fear. Such incidents have the very

greatest effect on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the

same time in consequence of one another; there is more of the

marvellous in them then than if they happened of themselves or by mere

chance. Even matters of chance seem most marvellous if there is an

appearance of design as it were in them; as for instance the statue of

Mitys at Argos killed the author of Mitys’ death by falling down on

him when a looker-on at a public spectacle; for incidents like that we

think to be not without a meaning. A Plot, therefore, of this sort is

necessarily finer than others.

10

Plots are either simple or complex, since the actions they represent

are naturally of this twofold description. The action, proceeding in

the way defined, as one continuous whole, I call simple, when the

change in the hero’s fortunes takes place without Peripety or

Discovery; and complex, when it involves one or the other, or both.

These should each of them arise out of the structure of the Plot

itself, so as to be the consequence, necessary or probable, of the

antecedents. There is a great difference between a thing happening

propter hoc and post hoc.

11

A Peripety is the change from one state of things within the play to

its opposite of the kind described, and that too in the way we are

saying, in the probable or necessary sequence of events; as it is for

instance in Oedipus: here the opposite state of things is produced

by the Messenger, who, coming to gladden Oedipus and to remove his

fears as to his mother, reveals the secret of his birth. And in

Lynceus: just as he is being led off for execution, with Danaus at

his side to put him to death, the incidents preceding this bring it

about that he is saved and Danaus put to death. A Discovery is, as the

very word implies, a change from ignorance to knowledge, and thus to

either love or hate, in the personages marked for good or evil

fortune. The finest form of Discovery is one attended by Peripeties,

like that which goes with the Discovery in Oedipus. There are no

doubt other forms of it; what we have said may happen in a way in

reference to inanimate things, even things of a very casual kind; and

it is also possible to discover whether some one has done or not done

something. But the form most directly connected with the Plot and the

action of the piece is the first-mentioned. This, with a Peripety,

will arouse either pity or fear—actions of that nature being what

Tragedy is assumed to represent; and it will also serve to bring about

the happy or unhappy ending. The Discovery, then, being of persons, it

may be that of one party only to the other, the latter being already

known; or both the parties may have to discover themselves. Iphigenia,

for instance, was discovered to Orestes by sending the letter; and

another Discovery was required to reveal him to Iphigenia.

 

Two parts of the Plot, then, Peripety and Discovery, are on matters of

this sort. A third part is Suffering; which we may define as an action

of a destructive or painful nature, such as murders on the stage,

tortures, woundings, and the like. The other two have been already

explained.

12

The parts of Tragedy to be treated as formative elements in the whole

were mentioned in a previous Chapter. From the point of view, however,

of its quantity, i.e. the separate sections into which it is divided,

a tragedy has the following parts: Prologue, Episode, Exode, and a

choral portion, distinguished into Parode and Stasimon; these two are

common to all tragedies, whereas songs from the stage and Commoe are

only found in some. The Prologue is all that precedes the Parode of

the chorus; an Episode all that comes in between two whole choral

songs; the Exode all that follows after the last choral song. In the

choral portion the Parode is the whole first statement of the chorus;

a Stasimon, a song of the chorus without anapaests or trochees; a

Commas, a lamentation sung by chorus and actor in concert. The parts

of Tragedy to be used as formative elements in the whole we have

already mentioned; the above are its parts from the point of view of

its quantity, or the separate sections into which it is divided.

13

The next points after what we have said above will be these: (1) What

is the poet to aim at, and what is he to avoid, in constructing his

Plots? and (2) What are the conditions on which the tragi.e.fect

depends?

 

We assume that, for the finest form of Tragedy, the Plot must be not

simple but complex; and further, that it must imitate actions arousing

pity and fear, since that is the distinctive function of this kind of

imitation. It follows, therefore, that there are three forms of Plot

to be avoided. (1) A good man must not be seen passing from happiness

to misery, or (2) a bad man from misery to happiness.

 

The first situation is not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply

odious to us. The second is the most untragic that can be; it has no

one of the requisites of Tragedy; it does not appeal either to the

human feeling in us, or to our pity, or to our fears. Nor, on the

other hand, should (3) an extremely bad man be seen falling from

happiness into misery. Such a story may arouse the human feeling in

us, but it will not move us to either pity or fear; pity is occasioned

by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of one like ourselves; so

that there will be nothing either piteous or fear-inspiring in the

situation. There remains, then, the intermediate kind of personage, a

man not pre-eminently virtuous and just, whose misfortune, however, is

brought upon him not by vice and depravity but by some error of

judgement, of the number of those in the enjoyment of great reputation

and prosperity; e.g. Oedipus, Thyestes, and the men of note of similar

families. The perfect Plot, accordingly, must have a single, and not

(as some tell us) a double issue; the change in the hero’s fortunes

must be not from misery to happiness, but on the contrary from

happiness to misery; and the cause of it must lie not in any

depravity, but in some great error on his part; the man himself being

either such as we have described, or better, not worse, than that.

Fact also confirms our theory. Though the poets began by accepting any

tragic story that came to hand, in these days the finest tragedies are

always on the story of some few houses, on that of Alemeon, Oedipus,

Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, or any others that may have

been involved, as either agents or sufferers, in some deed of horror.

The theoretically best tragedy, then, has a Plot of this description.

The critics, therefore, are wrong who blame Euripides for taking this

line in his tragedies, and giving many of them an unhappy ending. It

is, as we have said, the right line to take. The best proof is this:

on the stage, and in the public performances, such plays, properly

worked out, are seen to be the most truly tragic; and Euripides, even

if hi.e.ecution be faulty i.e.ery other point, is seen to be

nevertheless the most tragic certainly of the dramatists. After this

comes the construction of Plot which some rank first, one with a

double story (like the Odyssey) and an opposite issue for the good

and the bad personages. It is ranked as first only through the

weakness of the audiences; the poets merely follow their public,

writing as its wishes dictate. But the pleasure