A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Surendranath Dasgupta [ebook reader with android os .txt] 📗

positive effects are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the avyakta part of prak@rti with puru@sa as forming one category. The vikâra or evolutionary products of prak@rti are called k@setra, whereas the avyakta part of prak@rti is regarded as the k@setrajña (avyaktamasya k@setrasya k@setrajñam@r@sayo viduh). This avyakta and cetanâ are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested prak@rti or cetanâ is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is derived the ego (aha@mkâra) and from the aha@mkâra the five elements and the senses are produced, and when this production is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return back to prak@rti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the time of a new creation from the puru@sa the unmanifest (avyakta), all the manifested forms—the evolutes of buddhi, aha@mkâra,

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[Footnote 1: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter, is referred to as forming part of prak@rti which is regarded as having eight elements in it prak@rtis'ca@s@tadhâtuki), viz. avyakta, mahat, aha@mkâra, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming part of the prak@rti we hear of indriyârthâ, the five sense objects which have evolved out of the prak@rti.]

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etc.—appear [Footnote ref 1]. This cycle of births or rebirths or of dissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and tamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer this revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in association with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself takes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish, undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive, yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains are felt by the conglomeration (râs'i), and not by the âtman presiding over it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and pain comes desire (t@r@s@nâ) consisting of wish and antipathy, and from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Mok@sa means complete cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns that "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves, but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do not belong to me the self," the self transcends all. This is the last renunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived [Footnote ref 2]. It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Sâ@mkhyas as their goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,

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[Footnote 1: This passage has been differently explained in a commentary previous to Cakrapâ@ni as meaning that at the time of death these resolve back into the prak@rti—the puru@sa—and at the time of rebirth they become manifest again. See Cakrapâ@ni on s'ârîra, I. 46.]

[Footnote 2: Though this state is called brahmabhûta, it is not in any sense like the Brahman of Vedânta which is of the nature of pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (alak@sa@nam), resembling Nâgârjuna's Nirvâ@na. Thus Caraka writes:—tasmi@ms'caramasannyâse samûlâh@hsarvavedanâ@h asa@mjñâjñânavijñânâ niv@rtti@m yântyas'e@sata@h. ata@hpara@m brahmabhûto bhûtâtmâ nopalabhyate ni@hs@rta@h sarvabhâvebhya@h cihna@m yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavidâ@m brahma taccâk@saramalak@sa@nam. Caraka, S'ârîra 1. 98-100.]

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the state of mok@sa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours in the shape of association with good people, abandoning of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva) thus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] and this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self. As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation (mok@se niv@rttirni@hs'e@sâ).

The main features of the Sâ@mkhya doctrine as given by Caraka are thus: 1. Puru@sa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmâtras are not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the conglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, aha@mkâra etc. 6. The senses are formed of matter (bhautika).

This account of Sâ@mkhya agrees with the system of Sâ@mkhya propounded by Pañcas'ikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of Âsuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the Mahâbhârata XII. 219. Pañcas'ikha of course does not describe the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what little he says it may be supposed that the system of Sâ@mkhya he sketches is the same as that of Caraka [Footnote ref 2]. Pañcas'ikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all Sâ@mkhya literature to prak@rti) in the state of puru@sa (purusâvasthamavyaktam). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility. The same discussion occurs in Pañcas'ikha also, and the proofs

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[Footnote 1: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory: (1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect, (2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to remember.]

[Footnote 2: Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty in accepting Pañcas'ikha's doctrine as a genuine Sâ@mkhya doctrine. This may probably be due to the fact that the Sâ@mkhya doctrines sketched in Caraka did not attract their notice.]

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for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again Pañcas'ikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,—and the element of "cetas." They are mutually independent, and by such independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Mok@sa is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these phenomena. The gu@nas described by Pañcas'ikha are the different kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it. The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the k@setra, as Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose themselves in the ocean and it is called ali@nga (without any characteristic)—a term reserved for prak@rti in later Sâ@mkhya. This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction (samyagbadha).

Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya, mentions two schools of Sâ@mkhya, the Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) [Footnote ref 1]. Of these the doctrine of the Maulikya Sâ@mkhya is said to be that which believed that there was a separate pradhâna for each âtman (maulikyasâ@mkhyâ hyâtmânamâtmânam prati p@rthak pradhânam vadanti). This seems to be a reference to the Sâ@mkhya doctrine I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sâ@mkhya.

In Mahâbhârata XII. 318 three schools of Sâ@mkhya are mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five (the well-known orthodox Sâ@mkhya system) and those who admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a supreme being in addition to puru@sa and this was the twenty-sixth principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the form of Sâ@mkhya advocated in the Mahâbhârata. The schools of Sâ@mkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of Sâ@mkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the

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[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's Tarkarahasyadîpikâ, p. 99.]

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other chapters of the Mahâbhârata (XII. 203, 204). The self apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon day; it is said that as Râhu (the shadow on the sun during an eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be seen apart from the body. The selfs (s'arîri@na@h) are spoken of as manifesting from prak@rti.

We do not know anything about Âsuri the direct disciple of Kapila [Footnote ref 1]. But it seems probable that the system of Sâ@mkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same form in the Mahâbhârata and has been attributed there to Pañcas'ikha is probably the earliest form of Sâ@mkhya available to us in a systematic form. Not only does Gu@naratna's reference to the school of Maulikya Sâ@mkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka (78 A.U.) does not refer to the Sâ@mkhya as described by Îs'varak@r@s@na and referred to in other parts of Mahâbhârata is a definite proof that Îs'varak@r@s@na's Sâ@mkhya is a later modification, which was either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded as an authoritative old Sâ@mkhya view.

Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavâsin altered the Sâ@mkhya according to his own views [Footnote ref 2]. Takakusu thinks that Vindhyavâsin was a title of Îs'varak@r@s@na [Footnote ref 3] and Garbe holds that the date of Îs'varak@r@s@na was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a very plausible view that Îs'varak@r@s@na was indebted for his kârikâs to another work, which was probably written in a style different from what he employs. The seventh verse of his Kârikâ seems to be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the

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[Footnote 1: A verse attributed to Âsuri is quoted by Gu@naratna (Tarkarahasyadîpikâ, p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (puru@sa) has experience. It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.]

[Footnote 2: Vassilief's Buddhismus, p. 240.]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu's "A study of Paramârtha's life of Vasubandhu," J. R.A.S., 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be extremely doubtful, for Gu@naratna mentions Îs'varak@r@s@na and Vindhyavâsin as two different authorities (Tarkarahasyadîpikâ, pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavâsin (p. 104) in anu@s@tubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Îs'varak@r@s@nâ. It appears that Îs'varak@r@s@na wrote two books; one is the Sâ@mkhya kârikâ and another an independent work on Sâ@mkhya, a line from which, quoted by Gu@naratna, stands as follows:

"Pratiniyatâdhyavasâya@h s'rotrâdisamuttha adhyak@sam" (p. 108).

If Vâcaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumâna in his Tattvakaumudî be considered to be a correct explanation of Sâ@mkhya kârikâ then Îs'varak@r@s@na must be a different person from Vindhyavâsin whose views on anumâna as referred to in S'lokavârttika, p. 393, are altogether different. But Vâcaspati's own statement in the Tâtparyya@tîkâ (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not faithful.]

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Mahâbhâsya of Patañjali the grammarian (147 B.C.) [Footnote ref 1]. The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which frustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned with the strictly technical part of Sâ@mkhya, and it is just possible that the book from which Patañjali quoted the passage, and which was probably paraphrased in the Âryâ metre by Îs'varak@r@s@na was not a Sâ@mkhya book at all. But though the subject of the verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Sâ@mkhya, yet since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard against certain objections against the Sâ@mkhya doctrine of prak@rti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the verse of a Sâ@mkhya book which was paraphrased by Îs'varak@r@s@na.

The earliest descriptions of a Sâ@mkhya which agrees with Îs'varak@r@s@na's Sâ@mkhya (but with an addition of Îs'vara) are to be found in Patañjali's Yoga sûtras and in the