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gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation, of which the first is the abhyâsa (habit) of Patañjali, and the object of this abhyâsa is unity with God [Footnote ref 2]. The second stands for vairâgya; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. Yoga sûtra, I. 23 and I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasâyana or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the same as in the Yoga sûtra, II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being one with him. The Brahman is conceived as an urddhvamûla avâks'âkha as'vattha (a tree with roots upwards and branches below), after the Upani@sad fashion, the upper root is pure Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of interpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the

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[Footnote 1: Cf. Yoga sûtra I. 23-29 and II. 1, 45. The Yoga sûtras speak of Is'vâra (God) as an eternally emancipated puru@sa, omniscient, and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of concentration. The commentator Vyâsa notes that he is the best object, for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration. He so wills that he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No argument is given in the Yoga sûtras of the existence of God.]

[Footnote 2: Cf. Yoga II. 1.]

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object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the roots.

The difference of this system from that of the Yoga sûtra is: (1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption in him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama [Footnote ref 1] and the niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of the Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any connection with God as we find in the Yoga sûtra has been lost sight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in God; (5) the introduction of Brahman; (6) the very significance of Yoga as control of mental states (citta@rttinirodha) is lost sight of, and (7) rasâyana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the means of salvation.

From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modification of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patañjali's Yoga sûtra in the direction of Vedânta and Tantra, and as such it probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga doctrine of the sûtras entered into a new channel in such a way that it could be easily assimilated from there by later developments of Vedânta, Tantra and S'aiva doctrines [Footnote ref 2]. As the author mentions rasâyana as a means of salvation, it is very probable that he flourished after Nâgarjuna and was probably the same person who wrote Pâtañjala tantra, who has been quoted by S'ivadâsa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of by Nâges'a as "Carake Patañjali@h." We can also assume with some degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that Cakrapa@ni and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with the writer of the _Mahâbhâ@sya. It is also very probable that Cakrapâ@ni by his line "pâtañjalamahâbhâ@syacarakapratisa@msk@rtai@h" refers to this work which was called "Pâtañjala." The commentator of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvîpas and the sâgaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the Vyâsabhâ@sya, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probably written at a time when the Vyâsabhâ@sya was not written or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni

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[Footnote 1: Alberuni, in his account of the book of Sâ@mkhya, gives a list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama, but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.]

[Footnote 2: Cf. the account of Pâs'upatadars'ana in Sarvadas'anasa@mgraha.]

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also described the book as being very famous at the time, and Bhoja and Cakrapâ@ni also probably confused him with Patañjali the grammarian; from this we can fairly assume that this book of Patañjali was probably written by some other Patañjali within the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not be improbable that when Vyâsabhâ@sya quotes in III. 44 as "iti Patañjali@h," he refers to this Patañjali.

The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrâya@na Upani@sad consisted of six a@ngas or accessories, namely prâ@nâyâma, pratyâhâra, dhyâna, dhara@nâ, tarka and samâdhi [Footnote ref 1]. Comparing this list with that of the list in the Yoga sûtras we find that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been replaced by âsana. Now from the account of the sixty-two heresies given in the Brahmajâla sutta we know that there were people who either from meditation of three degrees or through logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samâdhi or Dhyâna school as belonging to one class of thinkers called s'âs'vatavâda, and from the inclusion of tarka as an a@nga in samâdhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the a@ngas given in Maitrâya@nî Upani@sad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine, when the Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being grafted on each other, and when the Sa@mkhya method of discussion did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The substitution of âsana for tarka in the list of Patañjali shows that the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Sa@mkhya. The introduction of ahi@msâ (non-injury), satya (truthfulness), asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha (want of greed) as yama and s'auca (purity), santo@sa (contentment) as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is deemed impossible (for the first time in the sûtras), probably marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitrî, karu@nâ, muditâ, upek@sâ is also equally significant, as we do not find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation. Beginning from the Âcârâ@ngasûtra, Uttarâdhyayanasûtra,

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[Footnote 1: prâ@nâyâmah pratyâhârah dhyânam dhara@nâ tarkah samâdhih sa@da@nga ityucyate yoga (Maitr. 6 8).]

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the Sûtrak@rtâ@ngasûtra, etc., and passing through Umâsvati's Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra to Hemacandra's Yogas'âstra we find that the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the basis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the opinion expressed in Alberuni's Pâtanjal that these cannot give salvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its thoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the same as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the path to the removal of suffering [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the metaphysics of the sa@msâra (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination, decease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of similarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism. Avidyâ is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidyâ should not be confused with the Vedânta avidyâ of S'a@nkara, as it is an avidyâ of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusion nor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the range of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidyâ is the ignorance of the four sacred truths, as we have in the sûtra "anityâs'ucidu@hkhânâtmasu nityas'ucidu@hkhâtmakhyâtiravidyâ" (II. 5).

The ground of our existing is our will to live (abhinives'a). "This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds of existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts off being for us at least [Footnote ref 2]." This is true as much of Buddhism as of the Yoga abhinives'a, which is a term coined and used in the Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has never been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu literature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things in this section is to show that the Yoga sûtras proper (first three chapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of Buddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between the Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such

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[Footnote 1: Yoga sûtra, II. 15, 16. 17. Yathâcikitsâs'âstra@m caturvyûha@m rogo rogahetuh ârogya@m bhais'ajyamiti evamidamapi s'âstram caturvyûhameva; tadyathâ sa@msâra@h, sa@msârahetu@h mok@sa@h mok@sopâya@h; duhkhabahula@h sa@msâro heya@h, pradhânapuru@sayo@h sa@myogo heyahetu@h, sa@myogasyâtyantikî niv@rttirhâna@m hanopâya@h samyagdar`sanam, Vyâsabhâ@sya, II. 15]

[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's Buddhism [Footnote ref 1].]

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a stage that they would not like to borrow from one another. As this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposed to think that the date of the first three chapters of the Yoga sûtras must be placed about the second century B.C. Since there is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the grammarian Patañjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may take them as being identical [Footnote ref 1].

The Sâ@mkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Puru@sa.

The Sâ@mkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles, souls and prak@rti, the root principle of matter. Souls are many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities. They do not contract or expand according as they occupy a smaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and are not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are many, and had it not been so (the Sâ@mkhya argues) with the birth of one all would have been born and with the death of one all would have died [Footnote ref 2].

The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension, and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly grasp in order to understand the Sâ@mkhya philosophy. Unlike the Jaina soul possessing anantajñâna, anantadars'ana, anantasukha, and anantavîryya, the Sâ@mkhya soul is described as being devoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is absolute pure consciousness (cit). The Sâ@mkhya view differs from the Vedânta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (ânanda) [Footnote ref 3]. Bliss with Sâ@mkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it belongs to prak@rti and does not constitute the nature of soul; secondly, according to Vedânta the individual souls (Jîva) are

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[Footnote 1: See S.N. Das Gupta, Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of thought, ch. II. The most important point in favour of this identification seems to be that both the Patañjalis as against the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of spho@ta which was denied even by Sâ@mkhya. On the doctrine of Spho@ta see my Study of Patanjali, Appendix I.]

[Footnote 2: Kârikâ, 18.]

[Footnote 3: See Citsukha's Tattvapradîpikâ, IV.]

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but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the Brahman, but according to Sâ@mkhya they are all real and many.

The most interesting feature of Sâ@mkhya as of Vedânta is the analysis of knowledge. Sâ@mkhya holds that our knowledge of things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things are indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind, the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in some sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature like the external things. The sense-data and images come and go, they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things, and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material, but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest. These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious, if there were no separate principles of consciousness in connection with which the whole conscious plane could be interpreted as the experience of a person [Footnote ref 1]. We know that the Upani@sads consider the soul or atman as pure and infinite consciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas, and the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis

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