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first is the nature of the connection of the buddhi states with the puru@sa. Vâcaspati holds that there is no contact (sa@myoga) of any buddhi state with the puru@sa but that a reflection of the puru@sa is caught in the state of buddhi by virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection that it does not explain how the puru@sa can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience (bhoga) on the basis of that image alone without any actual connection of the puru@sa with the buddhi. The answer of Vâcaspati Mis'ra is that there is no contact of the two in space and time, but that their proximity (sannidhi) means only a specific kind of fitness (yogyatâ) by virtue of which the puru@sa, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed to a person. Vijñâna Bhik@su differs from Vâcaspati and says that if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no

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reason why puru@sa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all, for the fitness being in the puru@sa, he could not be divested of it, and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in the buddhi for ever. Vijñana Bhik@su thus holds that there is a real contact of the puru@sa with the buddhi state in any cognitive state. Such a contact of the puru@sa and the buddhi does not necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers changes, and when these changes are reflected in the puru@sa, there is the notion of a person or experiencer in the puru@sa, and when the puru@sa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between Vâcaspati and Bhik@su as regards the nature of the perceptual process. Bhik@su thinks that the senses can directly perceive the determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas, whereas Vâcaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified by the activity of manas called sa@mkalpa which coordinates the indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics. Bhik@su who supposes that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate position to manas as being only the faculty of desire, doubt, and imagination.

It may not be out of place to mention here that there are one or two passages in Vâcaspati's commentary on the Sâ@mkhya kârikâ which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (aha@mkâra) as producing the subjective series of the senses and the objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will, but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view with regard to the evolution of the tanmâtras from the mahat; for contrary to the view of Vyâsabhâ@sya and Vijñâna Bhik@su etc. Vâcaspati holds that from the mahat there was aha@mkâra and

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from aha@mkâra the tanmâtras [Footnote ref 1]. Vijñâna Bhik@su however holds that both the separation of aha@mkâra and the evolution of the tanmâtras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between Vâcaspati and Bhik@su which are not of much philosophical importance.

Yoga and Patañjali.

The word yoga occurs in the @Rg-Veda in various senses such as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was used in this sense in @Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as the S'atapatha Brâhmana and the B@rhadâra@nyaka Upani@sad [Footnote ref 2]. The word has another derivative "yugya" in later Sanskrit literature [Footnote ref 3].

With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the @Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues and considered as being productive of the highest power [Footnote ref 4].

As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control of the senses [Footnote ref 5].

In Pâ@nini's time the word yoga had attained its technical meaning, and he distinguished this root "yuj samâdhau" (yuj in the sense of concentration) from "yujir yoge" (root yujir in the sense of connecting). Yuj in the first sense is seldom used as a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological derivation of the word yoga [Footnote ref 6].

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[Footnote 1: See my Study of Patanjali, p. 60 ff.]

[Footnote 2: Compare R.V.I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114. 9/IV. 24. 4/I. 5. 3/I. 30. 7; S'atapatha Brahma@na 14. 7. I. II.]

[Footnote 3: It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German
Joch, A.S. geoc. l atm jugum.]

[Footnote 4: See Chandogya III. 17. 4; B@rh. I. 2. 6; B@rh. III. 8. 10;
Taitt. I. 9. I/III. 2. I/III. 3. I; Taitt, Brâh, II. 2. 3. 3; R.V.x. 129;
S'atap. Brâh. XI. 5. 8. 1.]

[Footnote 5: Katha III. 4, indriyâ@ni hayânâhu@h vi@sayâte@sugocarân.
The senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects.
Maitr. 2. 6. Karmendriyâ@nyasya hayâ@h the conative senses are its
horses.]

[Footnote 6: Yugya@h is used from the root of yujir yoge and not from yuja samâdhau. A consideration of Pa@nini's rule "Tadasya brahmacaryam," V.i. 94 shows that not only different kinds of asceticism and rigour which passed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time (Pâ@nini as Goldstûcker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated with these had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by the name of Yoga.]

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In the Bhagavadgîtâ, we find that the word yoga has been used not only in conformity with the root "yuj-samâdhau" but also with "yujir yoge" This has been the source of some confusion to the readers of the Bhagavadgîtâ. "Yogin" in the sense of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of this word lies in this that the Bhagavadgîtâ tried to mark out a middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently from yujir yoge) on the other, who should combine in himself the best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.

Kau@tilya in his Arthas'âstra when enumerating the philosophic sciences of study names Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, and Lokâyata. The oldest Buddhist sûtras (e.g. the Satipa@t@thâna sutta) are fully familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.

As regards the connection of Yoga with Sâ@mkhya, as we find it in the Yoga sûtras of Patañjali, it is indeed difficult to come to any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted notice in many of the earlier Upani@sads, though there had not probably developed any systematic form of prâ@nâyâma (a system of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we come to Maitrâya@nî that we find that the Yoga method had attained a systematic development. The other two Upani@sads in which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S'vetâs'vatara and the Ka@tha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three Upani@sads of K@r@s@na Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to the Sâ@mkhya tenets, though the Sâ@mkhya and Yoga ideas do not appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the Maitrâya@nî in the conversation between S'âkyâyana and B@rhad ratha where we find that the Sâ@mkhya metaphysics was offered

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in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes, and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the Sâ@mkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently systematized by Patañjali. Thus S'âkyâyana says: "Here some say it is the gu@na which through the differences of nature goes into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief, certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave, but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man stand free from will, imagination and belief—this is the sign of liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state [Footnote ref 1].'"

An examination of such Yoga Upani@sads as S'â@n@dilya, Yogatattva, Dhyânabindu, Ha@msa, Am@rtanâda, Varâha, Ma@n@dala Brâhma@na, Nâdabindu, and Yogaku@n@dalû, shows that the Yoga practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but none of these show any predilection for the Sâ@mkhya. Thus the Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the

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[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâyana, however, in his bhâ@sya on Nyâya sûtra, I. i 29, distinguishes Sâ@mkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sâ@mkhya holds that nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any change in the pure intelligence (niratis'ayâ@h cetanâ@h). All changes are due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects. Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the puru@sa. Do@sas (passions) and the prav@rtti (action) are the cause of karma. The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non being can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last view is indeed quite different from the Yoga of Vyâsabhâ@sya, It is closer to Nyâya in its doctrines. If Vâtsyâyana's statement is correct, it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in creation was borrowed by Sâ@mkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the same sûtra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sâ@mkhya and Yoga on the doctrine of the indriyas being "abhautika." Curiously enough Vâtsyâyana quotes a passage from Vyâsabhâ@sya, III. 13, in his bhâ@sya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (viruddha).]

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S'aivas and S'@aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga; they grew in another direction as the Ha@thayoga which was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The Yogatattva Upani@sad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Ha@thayoga and Râjayoga [Footnote ref 1]. In some cases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedântism with these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also very great, but we have to leave out these from our present consideration as they have little philosophic importance

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