History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

to involve ourselves in alliances with other

powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in risks of their

choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness. It is true that

in the late naval engagement we drove back the Corinthians from our

shores single-handed. But they have now got together a still larger

armament from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas; and we, seeing our

utter inability to cope with them without foreign aid, and the

magnitude of the danger which subjection to them implies, find it

necessary to ask help from you and from every other power. And we hope

to be excused if we forswear our old principle of complete political

isolation, a principle which was not adopted with any sinister

intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in judgment.

 

“Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance

you will congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to

you. First, because your assistance will be rendered to a power which,

herself inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly,

because all that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and

your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of

goodwill which will ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in

our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves excepted, we are the greatest naval

power in Hellas. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune

more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than

that the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much

material and moral strength should present herself self-invited,

should deliver herself into your hands without danger and without

expense, and should lastly put you in the way of gaining a high

character in the eyes of the world, the gratitude of those whom you

shall assist, and a great accession of strength for yourselves? You

may search all history without finding many instances of a people

gaining all these advantages at once, or many instances of a power

that comes in quest of assistance being in a position to give to the

people whose alliance she solicits as much safety and honour as she

will receive. But it will be urged that it is only in the case of a

war that we shall be found useful. To this we answer that if any of

you imagine that that war is far off, he is grievously mistaken, and

is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon regards you with jealousy and

desires war, and that Corinth is powerful there—the same, remember,

that is your enemy, and is even now trying to subdue us as a

preliminary to attacking you. And this she does to prevent our

becoming united by a common enmity, and her having us both on her

hands, and also to ensure getting the start of you in one of two ways,

either by crippling our power or by making its strength her own. Now

it is our policy to be beforehand with her—that is, for Corcyra to

make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it; in fact, we

ought to form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans

she forms against us.

 

“If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into

alliance is not right, let her know that every colony that is well

treated honours its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by

injustice. For colonists are not sent forth on the understanding

that they are to be the slaves of those that remain behind, but that

they are to be their equals. And that Corinth was injuring us is

clear. Invited to refer the dispute about Epidamnus to arbitration,

they chose to prosecute their complaints war rather than by a fair

trial. And let their conduct towards us who are their kindred be a

warning to you not to be misled by their deceit, nor to yield to their

direct requests; concessions to adversaries only end in self-reproach,

and the more strictly they are avoided the greater will be the

chance of security.

 

“If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the

treaty existing between you and Lacedaemon, the answer is that we

are a neutral state, and that one of the express provisions of that

treaty is that it shall be competent for any Hellenic state that is

neutral to join whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable for

Corinth to be allowed to obtain men for her navy not only from her

allies, but also from the rest of Hellas, no small number being

furnished by your own subjects; while we are to be excluded both

from the alliance left open to us by treaty, and from any assistance

that we might get from other quarters, and you are to be accused of

political immorality if you comply with our request. On the other

hand, we shall have much greater cause to complain of you, if you do

not comply with it; if we, who are in peril and are no enemies of

yours, meet with a repulse at your hands, while Corinth, who is the

aggressor and your enemy, not only meets with no hindrance from you,

but is even allowed to draw material for war from your dependencies.

This ought not to be, but you should either forbid her enlisting men

in your dominions, or you should lend us too what help you may think

advisable.

 

“But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and

support. The advantages of this course, as we premised in the

beginning of our speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps

the chief. Could there be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than

is offered by the fact that the power which is at enmity with you is

also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able to punish

defection? And there is a wide difference between declining the

alliance of an inland and of a maritime power. For your first

endeavour should be to prevent, if possible, the existence of any

naval power except your own; failing this, to secure the friendship of

the strongest that does exist. And if any of you believe that what

we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon this belief, lest it should

lead to a breach of the treaty, you must remember that on the one

hand, whatever your fears, your strength will be formidable to your

antagonists; on the other, whatever the confidence you derive from

refusing to receive us, your weakness will have no terrors for a

strong enemy. You must also remember that your decision is for Athens

no less than Corcyra, and that you are not making the best provision

for her interests, if at a time when you are anxiously scanning the

horizon that you may be in readiness for the breaking out of the war

which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your side a

place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with the most

vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for the coast-navigation

in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able to bar the passage

of naval reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese, and from

Peloponnese thither; and it is in other respects a most desirable

station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both general

and particular considerations, let this show you the folly of

sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable

naval powers in Hellas—Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth—and that if you

allow two of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for

herself, you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of

Corcyra and Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our

ships to reinforce you in the struggle.”

 

Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the

Corinthians spoke as follows:

 

“These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine

themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They

also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the

victims of an unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to

touch upon both these points before we proceed to the rest of what

we have to say, that you may have a more correct idea of the grounds

of our claim, and have good cause to reject their petition.

According to them, their old policy of refusing all offers of alliance

was a policy of moderation. It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not

for good; indeed their conduct is such as to make them by no means

desirous of having allies present to witness it, or of having the

shame of asking their concurrence. Besides, their geographical

situation makes them independent of others, and consequently the

decision in cases where they injure any lies not with judges appointed

by mutual agreement, but with themselves, because, while they seldom

make voyages to their neighbours, they are constantly being visited by

foreign vessels which are compelled to put in to Corcyra. In short,

the object that they propose to themselves, in their specious policy

of complete isolation, is not to avoid sharing in the crimes of

others, but to secure monopoly of crime to themselves—the licence of

outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever they can elude,

and the enjoyment of their gains without shame. And yet if they were

the honest men they pretend to be, the less hold that others had

upon them, the stronger would be the light in which they might have

put their honesty by giving and taking what was just.

 

“But such has not been their conduct either towards others or

towards us. The attitude of our colony towards us has always been

one of estrangement and is now one of hostility; for, say they: ‘We

were not sent out to be ill-treated.’ We rejoin that we did not

found the colony to be insulted by them, but to be their head and to

be regarded with a proper respect. At any rate our other colonies

honour us, and we are much beloved by our colonists; and clearly, if

the majority are satisfied with us, these can have no good reason

for a dissatisfaction in which they stand alone, and we are not acting

improperly in making war against them, nor are we making war against

them without having received signal provocation. Besides, if we were

in the wrong, it would be honourable in them to give way to our

wishes, and disgraceful for us to trample on their moderation; but

in the pride and licence of wealth they have sinned again and again

against us, and never more deeply than when Epidamnus, our dependency,

which they took no steps to claim in its distress upon our coming to

relieve it, was by them seized, and is now held by force of arms.

 

“As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first

submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from

the party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the

credit due only to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well

as words, places himself on a level with his adversary. In their case,

it was not before they laid siege to the place, but after they at

length understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that they

thought of the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their

own misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join

with them not in alliance but in crime, and to receive them in spite

of their being at enmity with us. But it was when they stood firmest

that they should have made overtures to