History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

you, and not at a time when we

have been wronged and they are in peril; nor yet at a time when you

will be admitting to a share in your protection those who never

admitted you to a share in their power, and will be incurring an equal

amount of blame from us with those in whose offences you had no

hand. No, they should have shared their power with you before they

asked you to share your fortunes with them.

 

“So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and

the violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But

that you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to

learn. It may be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that

it shall be competent for any state, whose name was not down on the

list, to join whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not

meant for those whose object in joining is the injury of other powers,

but for those whose need of support does not arise from the fact of

defection, and whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is

mad enough to receive them war instead of peace; which will be the

case with you, if you refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become

their auxiliary and remain our friend; if you join in their attack,

you must share the punishment which the defenders inflict on them. And

yet you have the best possible right to be neutral, or, failing

this, you should on the contrary join us against them. Corinth is at

least in treaty with you; with Corcyra you were never even in truce.

But do not lay down the principle that defection is to be

patronized. Did we on the defection of the Samians record our vote

against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesian powers were equally

divided on the question whether they should assist them? No, we told

them to their face that every power has a right to punish its own

allies. Why, if you make it your policy to receive and assist all

offenders, you will find that just as many of your dependencies will

come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press

less heavily on us than on yourselves.

 

“This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right.

But we have also advice to offer and claims on your gratitude,

which, since there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not

enemies, and since our friendship does not amount to very frequent

intercourse, we say ought to be liquidated at the present juncture.

When you were in want of ships of war for the war against the

Aeginetans, before the Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with

twenty vessels. That good turn, and the line we took on the Samian

question, when we were the cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to

assist them, enabled you to conquer Aegina and to punish Samos. And we

acted thus at crises when, if ever, men are wont in their efforts

against their enemies to forget everything for the sake of victory,

regarding him who assists them then as a friend, even if thus far he

has been a foe, and him who opposes them then as a foe, even if he has

thus far been a friend; indeed they allow their real interests to

suffer from their absorbing preoccupation in the struggle.

 

“Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they

are from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have

done unto you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we

say, but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the

straightest path generally speaking the wisest; but the coming of

the war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade

you to do wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be

carried away by it into gaining the instant and declared enmity of

Corinth. It were, rather, wise to try and counteract the

unfavourable impression which your conduct to Megara has created.

For kindness opportunely shown has a greater power of removing old

grievances than the facts of the case may warrant. And do not be

seduced by the prospect of a great naval alliance. Abstinence from all

injustice to other first-rate powers is a greater tower of strength

than anything that can be gained by the sacrifice of permanent

tranquillity for an apparent temporary advantage. It is now our turn

to benefit by the principle that we laid down at Lacedaemon, that

every power has a right to punish her own allies. We now claim to

receive the same from you, and protest against your rewarding us for

benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by yours. On the contrary,

return us like for like, remembering that this is that very crisis in

which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he who opposes is most a

foe. And for these Corcyraeans—neither receive them into alliance in

our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So do, and you will act

as we have a right to expect of you, and at the same time best consult

your own interests.”

 

Such were the words of the Corinthians.

 

When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held.

In the first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the

representations of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had

changed and an alliance with Corcyra was decided on, with certain

reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance.

It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens

could not be required to join Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth.

But each of the contracting parties had a right to the other’s

assistance against invasion, whether of his own territory or that of

an ally. For it began now to be felt that the coming of the

Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one was

willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed

to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other by

mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which

Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other naval

powers. At the same time the island seemed to lie conveniently on

the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens

received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of the

Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance.

They were commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus,

the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their

instructions were to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet

except under certain circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and

threatened a landing on her coast, or in any of her possessions,

they were to do their utmost to prevent it. These instructions were

prompted by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the treaty.

 

Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed

for Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. Of these Elis furnished

ten, Megara twelve, Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one,

and Corinth herself ninety. Each of these contingents had its own

admiral, the Corinthian being under the command of Xenoclides, son of

Euthycles, with four colleagues. Sailing from Leucas, they made land

at the part of the continent opposite Corcyra. They anchored in the

harbour of Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotis, above which,

at some distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre, in the Elean

district. By this city the Acherusian lake pours its waters into the

sea. It gets its name from the river Acheron, which flows through

Thesprotis and falls into the lake. There also the river Thyamis

flows, forming the boundary between Thesprotis and Kestrine; and

between these rivers rises the point of Chimerium. In this part of the

continent the Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an

encampment. When the Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a

hundred and ten ships, commanded by Meikiades, Aisimides, and

Eurybatus, and stationed themselves at one of the Sybota isles; the

ten Athenian ships being present. On Point Leukimme they posted

their land forces, and a thousand heavy infantry who had come from

Zacynthus to their assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the

mainland without their allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers

to their assistance, the inhabitants of this part of the continent

being old allies of theirs.

 

When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three

days’ provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for

action. Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out

at sea and coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both

sides formed in order of battle. On the Corcyraean right wing lay

the Athenian ships, the rest of the line being occupied by their own

vessels formed in three squadrons, each of which was commanded by

one of the three admirals. Such was the Corcyraean formation. The

Corinthian was as follows: on the right wing lay the Megarian and

Ambraciot ships, in the centre the rest of the allies in order. But

the left was composed of the best sailers in the Corinthian navy, to

encounter the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon

as the signals were raised on either side, they joined battle. Both

sides had a large number of heavy infantry on their decks, and a large

number of archers and darters, the old imperfect armament still

prevailing. The sea-fight was an obstinate one, though not

remarkable for its science; indeed it was more like a battle by

land. Whenever they charged each other, the multitude and crush of the

vessels made it by no means easy to get loose; besides, their hopes of

victory lay principally in the heavy infantry on the decks, who

stood and fought in order, the ships remaining stationary. The

manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried; in short, strength and

pluck had more share in the fight than science. Everywhere tumult

reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion; meanwhile the

Athenian ships, by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were

pressed, served to alarm the enemy, though their commanders could

not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The right wing

of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and

chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, sailed

up to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and

plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians and their

allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where

the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided

success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further weakened

by the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the

Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them

more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from charging

any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and the

Corinthians were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set

to, and all distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point,

that the Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each

other.

 

After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves

in lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels

which they had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom

they butchered as they sailed through, not caring so much to make

prisoners. Some even of their own friends were slain by them, by

mistake, in their ignorance of the defeat of the right wing For