readenglishbook.com » Other » Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, Henrik Lunde [new ebook reader TXT] 📗

Book online «Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, Henrik Lunde [new ebook reader TXT] 📗». Author Henrik Lunde



1 ... 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ... 238
Go to page:
to try to convince the French to carry out both operations. In the meantime, however, those operations were put on hold. Churchill met Daladier on April 5. He was not particularly interested in Royal Marine and did not press Daladier to change his mind as Chamberlain had hoped. Churchill told Chamberlain and Halifax that the French arguments against Royal Marine were well grounded, but that the mining of Norwegian waters should proceed. Both the prime minister and his foreign secretary appear to have reached that decision even before Churchill’s return. The British War Cabinet decided to carry out Operation Wilfred in the early morning hours of April 8. Halifax favored proceeding with Wilfred since he feared that not doing so could cause the Reynaud government to fall. He realized that Reynaud’s resolute offensive spirit was largely motivated by a desire to avoid the fate of Daladier. The delay in launching the Allied operation from April 5 to April 8 had a huge effect on events in Norway.

The decision to proceed with the operations in Norway caused a feeling of relief and optimism among the people of London and Paris. The optimistic mood is reflected in Chamberlain’s speech to a gathering of conservative politicians and supporters on April 5. He pointed out to the audience that Hitler, in not going on the offensive over the past seven months, had failed to exploit his initial military superiority. He continued:

Whatever may be the reason—whether it was that Hitler thought he might get away with what he had got without fighting for it, or whether it was that after all the preparations were not sufficiently complete—however, one thing is certain: he missed the bus.29

Chamberlain’s statement that Hitler had missed the bus was as ill advised as his claim of “peace in our time” after his earlier meeting with Hitler in Munich. As he addressed the House of Commons on May 7 in an emotionally charged atmosphere, when things were unraveling for the Allies in Norway, his speech was continually interrupted by shouts of “Hitler missed the bus!” and “Who missed the bus?”

To meet the contingency of a German reaction, Operation Wilfred had a complementary plan named R4. This was scheduled to go into operation when “the Germans set foot on Norwegian soil, or there was clear evidence that they intended to do so.”30 This plan included provisions for a British brigade (the 24th Guards) and a French contingent to be dispatched to Narvik to clear that port and advance to the Swedish border. Another five battalions were destined for Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim to deny those cities to the enemy. Plan R4 was allocated no air support. It was apparently expected that the infantry units, once ashore, would be able to hold these cities against all threats. It was hoped that the Norwegians would welcome the British and French troops as allies. There were no contingencies covering the real possibility that the Norwegians would resist.

The primary objective of the expedition in Norway was Narvik and the railroad leading to the Swedish border. Later, as opportunity presented itself, the Allied troops were to advance into Sweden and occupy the iron ore districts of Kiruna and Gällivare. The brigade destined for Narvik was to be brought there in a transport escorted by two cruisers. These ships were to leave their debarkation port a few hours after the minefields were laid. It is evident from this timeline that a landing in Narvik was to take place even if there was no immediate German counter-move. A gradual buildup of forces in Narvik was anticipated until the strength of the units there reached approximately 18,000. This force would be composed for the most part of French alpine troops. If an advance into Sweden became an actuality, one squadron of fighters would support these troops. The plan—especially the assumptions and force allocation parts—strikes one as tentative, nonchalant, and unrealistic when compared to what the Germans were planning.

Allied Diplomatic Notes on April 5, 1940

The British and French notes were delivered to Norway and Sweden on the evening of April 5. The gist was contained in paragraph five of the documents:

The Allies, seeing that they are waging war for aims which are as much in the interests of smaller States as in their own, cannot allow the course of the war to be influenced against them by the advantage derived by Germany from Norway or from Sweden. They therefore give notice that they reserve the right to take such measures as they may think necessary to hinder or prevent Germany from obtaining from these countries resources or facilities which for the prosecution of the war would be to her advantage or to the disadvantage of the Allies.31

Koht received the note as he was preparing to attend a dinner at the residence of the U.S. Ambassador, Mrs. Harrimann. He addressed the Norwegian Parliament with carefully chosen words to conceal his mixed feelings of fear and anger and to avoid creating a sense of alarm in the country. His speech was directed more at the diplomatic corps and the foreign press representatives than at the Norwegian people. He stressed that the Allies had nothing to gain by closing Norwegian waters since the country traded more with Great Britain than with Germany, and more iron ore from Narvik went to the Allies than to Germany. He reminded the listeners that the Allies had approved the trade agreements and signed treaties to that effect. To force Norway to abandon these agreements would be a breach of neutrality and Norway would find itself at war.

The British government had little information about Koht’s reaction to the note when some of the War Cabinet members met on Saturday, April 6. However, there was no doubt about the Swedish reaction. The Swedish ambassador to Great Britain had stated immediately that it could become necessary to reexamine the trade agreements between Sweden and England. The British ambassador in Stockholm reported that the Swedish Foreign Minister, Christian Günther, had

1 ... 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ... 238
Go to page:

Free e-book «Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, Henrik Lunde [new ebook reader TXT] 📗» - read online now

Comments (0)

There are no comments yet. You can be the first!
Add a comment