Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, Henrik Lunde [new ebook reader TXT] 📗

stated that the notes brought his country to the edge of war. The British ambassador expected Sweden to mobilize the following day and had great difficulties persuading the foreign minister not to release the notes to the press. However, in a conversation with Koht, Günther opined that the notes were not as ominous as they sounded, and that they were probably designed to silence domestic critics in Great Britain and France.32

Chamberlain and Halifax decided to send a message to calm Swedish fears and anger. Despite the fact that British naval forces were already at sea, and troops were in the process of embarking for landings in Norway, the British message assured the Swedes that they had no intention of landing in Scandinavia unless they were forced to do so by a similar German action. This was also the day on which the British government approved military orders to execute the mining operations and the landing of troops in Narvik.

Allied Operations Begin

Four destroyers of the 20th Destroyer Flotilla, commanded by Captain Bickford, left Scapa Flow on April 5 with a course for Vestfjord, to lay a minefield. They were accompanied by four more destroyers of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, under the command of Captain Warburton-Lee. His mission was to cover Bickford’s destroyers during the mine-laying operation and later to guard the minefield. Another force left Scapa Flow on the same day. It consisted of the minelayer Teviot Bank, escorted by four destroyers under the command of Captain Tod. The mission of this force was to lay mines off Stadt (north of Bergen). British destroyers would also simulate laying a minefield near the town of Molde.

Chamberlain and Halifax were nervous about the possibility of armed conflict with the Norwegian Navy during the mining operations. An agitated Koht had recently protested to the British Embassy about continued British violations of Norwegian waters, and stated that such violations would no longer be tolerated. Henceforth, the Norwegians would use force. Admiral Pound explained that the British warships would not let themselves be chased away by Norwegian warships. The mines would be laid, but only minimum force would be used. He agreed there could be some exchange of fire since, according to recent intelligence, the Norwegian Navy had orders to use force against neutrality violations. However, the Norwegians had concentrated their naval forces near the larger cities, and since the minefields were located far from these cities, he did not anticipate a quick reaction.33

The British Navy would not interfere with Norwegian operations to sweep the minefields; it would just lay a new field in a slightly different location. If the Norwegians challenged the British destroyers guarding the minefields, they were to be told that they were there on humanitarian grounds, to keep innocent ships from being sunk. Thereafter, they were to withdraw from Norwegian waters and leave the guard mission to the Norwegians.

It was planned initially that the cruiser Birmingham and two destroyers hunting for a German fishing fleet near the Lofoten Islands would cover the mining operation in Vestfjord. The final decision was to send the battle cruiser Renown, flagship of Vice Admiral W.J. Whitworth, as a show of force to discourage the Norwegians from trying to hinder the operation with their coastal defense ships Norge and Eidsvold. Renown, escorted by the destroyers Greyhound, Glowworm, Heron, and Hyperion, left Scapa Flow late in the afternoon of April 5. On their way to Vestfjord, they were joined by the eight destroyers that had departed Scapa Flow earlier the same day.

Nineteen submarines, including two French and one Polish, were directed to the Kattegat and Skagerrak on April 4. Their mission was to frustrate any German attempt to interfere with the British mining operations or the bringing of troops to Norway.

In readiness to protect the operation against German counter-measures were the 2nd Cruiser Squadron in Rosyth, consisting of two cruisers and 15 destroyers, and the 18th Cruiser Squadron in Scapa Flow, consisting of two heavy cruisers and five destroyers. Vice Admiral G. F. B. Edward-Collins commanded the 2nd, and Vice Admiral G. Layton commanded the 18th. The Home Fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, was also in Scapa Flow, ready for operations. It consisted of the battleships Rodney and Valiant, the battle cruiser Repulse, the cruiser Sheffield, and 10 destroyers.34

Admiral Sir Edward Evans was designated naval commander of the expedition against Narvik. He hoisted his flag on the cruiser Aurora in the Clyde on April 4. This ship, together with the cruiser Penelope, was ordered to escort a large troop transport that embarked troops on April 7. The ship took aboard one battalion of the 24th Guards Brigade, the First Scots Guards. The other two battalions of the brigade were on their way to the embarkation point on April 7. This force was scheduled to depart the Clyde early in the morning of April 8.

The orders for the operation were similar to those issued for Plymouth earlier. The main difference was that the force would advance to the Swedish border and await further instructions. However, if the opportunity presented itself, the force would continue on to the iron ore field at Gällivare.

Some confusing statements in the military order perplexed even Halifax. He noted that one paragraph stated that the Allied forces were to land only after agreement with the Norwegian government, while the next paragraph stated that they should tolerate some losses if the Norwegians opened fire. Ironside explained that this provision was included since it was possible that even if the Norwegians decided to cooperate, local military commanders might be confused or out of communications with their superiors. The parenthetical reference to the precondition of Norwegian cooperation was removed from the document.

Major General Pierce C. Mackesy, the designated ground-force commander for Narvik, explained to Halifax what was meant by the phrase that called for landings provided it could be done without serious fighting. The troops were to accomplish their missions by methods like those used against civilians: persuasion, pressure, rifle butts, and fists. The troops