Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, Henrik Lunde [new ebook reader TXT] 📗

were expected to tolerate seeing some of their own shot before resorting to deadly force. Thereafter, it was permitted to use as much force as necessary to protect themselves.35

One battalion of the 146th Infantry Brigade, destined for Trondheim, was embarked on another transport on April 7. Two battalions of the 148th Infantry Brigade, to be landed in Bergen and Stavanger, were at the same time embarked on the cruisers Devonshire, Berwick, York, and Glasgow in Rosyth. Admiral J.H.D. Cunningham commanded this squadron. The force was scheduled to leave Rosyth early on April 8.

The commanders of the forces for Trondheim and Bergen had some special instructions. The landings were to take place only after German “hostile actions,” unless the Norwegians extended an invitation. If the force destined for Bergen was unable to land, it should try to do so in Trondheim. If that also proved impossible, the forces were to return to Great Britain. Cooperation with Norwegian military forces was important, but this should not divert the Allies from their primary goals.

A British brigade of three battalions was held back as a reserve, to be transported to Narvik as soon as the 24th Brigade had occupied that city. A French force of about 14,000 men was also destined for Narvik. However, its first part, a combined alpine brigade of six battalions, was not scheduled to sail from France until eight days after the first British troops had sailed.

The Allied operations in Norway were underway. Their origins can be traced to the political leadership in both Great Britain and France. While the ideas were Churchill’s, he had the wholehearted support at the highest levels in the French government (Reynaud and Daladier). Chamberlain and Halifax gave their reluctant support only after the storm of criticism that broke out following their failure to take timely action to help the Finns. It is important to keep the strategic credentials of these policy makers in mind. Kersaudy has commented, “With the exception of Winston Churchill, the War Cabinet ministers had not the slightest notion of strategy, and they knew it; as for Churchill’s notions, they were highly imperfect—and he did not know it.”36 The British naval leadership supported the operation because it held out promise for action that could cripple the German Navy, prevent the latter from improving its strategic position, and strengthen the naval blockade. The other services in Britain were much less enthusiastic, particularly the air force. They were concerned about the diversion of scarce resources away from the main theater of operations in France.

There is no doubt that what the Allies contemplated constituted aggression; but any clear-cut interpretation becomes muddled because of almost simultaneous German action. Similarity of intent should not be inferred because of the coincidental timing of the operations. Moulton draws the distinction by writing that the German intent was to occupy the capital and country, while the Allies were involved in a small naval operation to mine the territorial waters with a small military force in British ports in case of a German reaction. While this sounds reasonable, we have seen that the naval forces were not small; the military force designed to occupy the main population centers on the coast was small because it was all that was immediately available, and that this force was to sail before or simultaneously with the mining operation. The fact that they did not sail as scheduled was due to a British Admiralty decision that all ships were needed for naval action when it became aware that the Germans were at sea.

G

ERMAN

P

LANS

: B

OLD

, I

MAGINATIVE, AND

R

ECKLESS

“The operation in itself is contrary to all principles in the theory of naval warfare.”

STATEMENT TO HITLER BY GENERAL ADMIRAL ERIC RAEDER ON MARCH 9, 1940.

Norway in German Strategic Planning

When World War II began, Germany had no plans to invade Norway. In a conversation with Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, on August 12, 1939, Hitler stated that he was convinced none of the belligerents would attack the Scandinavian countries, and that these countries would not join in an attack on Germany. There are no reasons to doubt the sincerity of this statement, and it is confirmed in a directive on October 9, 1939.

At the outset of war in 1939, Hitler considered it advantageous to have a neutral Scandinavia. The same views also prevailed initially among the staff of the German Armed Forces Headquarters (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW). The members of the OKW considered it foolish to initiate an attack on Norway unless the British and French tried to spread the war to that area. They viewed a campaign in Norway as a risky drain on troops and resources from the main front in the west.

When the idea of invading Norway began to take shape, it did not originate with Hitler, but from members of the German Navy. In fact, he needed considerable persuasion before accepting what some considered a necessity. Eventually, he became convinced of the need for a preemptive strike to forestall a British move against Norway. Liddell-Hart wrote that “Hitler, despite all his unscrupulousness, would have preferred to keep Norway neutral, and did not plan to invade her until he was provoked to do so by palpable signs that the Allies were planning a hostile move in that quarter.”1

German war planners considered Norway of great importance to Germany in a prolonged war. However, since initially they did not anticipate a long war, Norway’s role was reduced to keeping sea traffic flowing without interference from the enemy for a relatively short period. The OKW strategic plan for the war was simple. The main attack would be directed against France and, after an expected victory, Britain would be presented with a generous peace offer that the political leadership felt confident would be accepted.

The navy’s reason for pushing to secure Norway may be traced back to that service’s experience in World War I, when the large German fleet failed