Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle [most read books of all time .txt] 📗

the conditions which it implies and which imply it, and continue the chain till we come to some thing (drawing of some lines) which we already know how to do. ↩

Cf. III 2 (“And the case is the same with the virtues⁠ ⁠…”), and 5 (“We have next to inquire what excellence or virtue is.”), and X 7 (“Again, happiness is thought to imply leisure⁠ ⁠…”). There is no real inconsistency between this and the doctrine that the end of life is life, that the good act is to be chosen for its own sake (II 4⁠—“… he must choose it, and choose it for itself⁠ ⁠…”), because it is noble (III 7⁠—“… sticks to its post because it is noble to do so⁠ ⁠…”): for the end is not outside the means; happiness or the perfect life is the complete system of those acts, and the real nature of each act is determined by its relation to this system; to choose it as a means to this end is to choose it for itself. ↩

βουλητόν. This word hovers between two senses, (1) wished for, (2) to be wished for, just as αἱρετόν hovers between (1) desired, (2) desirable. The difficulty, as here put, turns entirely upon the equivocation; but at bottom lies the fundamental question, whether there be a common human nature, such that we can say, “This kind of life is man’s real life.” ↩

Each virtuous act is desired and chosen as a means to realizing a particular virtue, and this again is desired as a part or constituent of, and so as a means to, that perfect self-realization which is happiness: cf. Chapter 3 (“It appears, then, that a man, as we have already said, originates his acts⁠ ⁠…”). ↩

My act is mine, and does not cease to be mine because I would undo it if I could; and so, further, since we made the habits whose bonds we cannot now unloose, we are responsible, not merely for the acts which made them, but also for the acts which they now produce “in spite of us:” what constrains us is ourselves. ↩

τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, the highest expression that Aristotle has for the moral motive, = καλοῦ ἕνεκα (see below starting at “But the end or motive of every manifestation⁠ ⁠…”) and δτι καλόν (see below starting at “Courage then, as we have said⁠ ⁠…”), “as a means to or as a constituent part of the noble life.” ↩

The courageous man desires the courageous act for the same reason for which he desires the virtue itself, viz. simply because it is noble: see the previous note. ↩

ἐν τούτοις, i.e. ἐν οἷς δύναται, so long as he can imitate the courageous man without being courageous. ↩

Homer’s Iliad, xxii 200. ↩

Homer’s Iliad, viii 148, 149. ↩

Homer’s Iliad, xv 348, ii 391. ↩

Outside Coronea, when the town was betrayed, in the Sacred War. ↩

The incident is narrated by Xenophon, Hellenica, iv 10. ↩

Cf. I 8 (“And, further, the life of these men is in itself pleasant⁠ ⁠…”) ↩

Cf. VII 14 “the opposite of this excessive pleasure [i.e. going without a wrong pleasure] is not pain, except to the man who sets his heart on this excessive pleasure.” ↩

I.e. the pleasures of taste and touch. ↩

Of course the English term is not so used. ↩

κόλασις, chastening; ἀκόλαστος, unchastened, incorrigible, profligate. ↩

ἄσωτος, ὰ priv. and σῶς, σώζειν. ↩

The connection is plainer in the original, because to τὰ χρήματα, “wealth,” is at once seen to be identical with to τὰ χρήσιμα, “useful things,” and connected with χρεία, “use.” ↩

Were it not for some extraneous consideration, e.g. desire to stand well with his neighbours. ↩

This is strictly a departure from the virtue; but Aristotle seems often to pass insensibly from the abstract ideal of a virtue to its imperfect embodiment in a complex character. Cf. Chapter 3. ↩

No single English word can convey the associations of the Greek τύραννος, a monarch who has seized absolute power, not necessarily one who abuses it. ↩

See J. A. Stewart Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. ↩

I.e. in men of some age and fixed character; they often coexist in very young men, he says, but cannot possibly coexist for long. ↩

As he has already said in effect, in the section above that begins “For, as we have already said, he is liberal⁠ ⁠…”. ↩

Literally “cummin-splitter.” ↩

Reading ταὐτὰ. ↩

A worthy expenditure of £100,000 would be magnificent from its mere amount; but even £100 may be spent in a magnificent manner (by a man who can afford it), e.g. in buying a rare engraving for a public collection: cf. the sections below that begin “And on each occasion he will spend⁠ ⁠…” and “(for the greatness of the result⁠ ⁠…)”. ↩

ἁπλῶς seems unnecessary. ↩

For that is impossible. ↩

Homer’s Iliad, i 394 f., 503 f. ↩

Reading ἔστι δὴ. ↩