Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle [most read books of all time .txt] 📗

will which is more permanent in its nature than a merely intellectual habit. And further, when once acquired it must be constantly strengthened by exercise, as occasions for action can never be wanting. ↩

Art, which is one of the five enumerated above, is here omitted, either in sheer carelessness, or perhaps because it is subordinate to prudence: cf. Chapter 5 (“Moreover, art⁠ ⁠…”). ↩

Of course we do not use “wisdom” in this sense. ↩

πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον, i.e. as the last link in the chain of causes leading to the proposed end⁠—last in the order of deliberation, but first in the order of events: cf. III 3 (“… that which is last in the analysis coming first in the order of construction.”). ↩

Varying as the good varies; cf. Chapter 7 above (“Now, as the terms wholesome and good⁠ ⁠…”), and I 3 (“Now the things that are noble and just⁠ ⁠…”). ↩

Here in the looser sense, below (in the following paragraph) in the stricter sense, which is the technical meaning of the term in Aristotle: cf. the opening paragraphs of Chapter 7. ↩

He does not mean that the principles of mathematics are not derived from experience, but only that they are derived from the primitive experience which every boy has, being in fact (as we should say) the framework on which the simplest knowledge of an external world is built. ↩

Chapter 2. ↩

The perception “that the ultimate fact is a triangle” (which is the more obvious translation of these words), whether this means “that three lines is the least number that will enclose a space,” or “that the possibility of a triangle is a fact that cannot be demonstrated,” is in either case not the perception of a particular fact; but it is the perception of a particular fact that is needed if the illustration is to be relevant. ↩

The intuitive reason (νοῦς) is here opposed to prudence (φρόνησις), but presently (Chapter 11) is found to be included in it; reason (νοῦς) was similarly in Chapter 6 opposed to wisdom (σοφία), but in Chapter 7 found to be included in it. ↩

This, however, is not done here, perhaps because it has been already done at length in III 3. ↩

Omitting ἰδεῖν. ↩

E.g. this act should be done simply because it is just; I may decide to do it for reputation, or for pleasure’s sake, or thinking it to be an act of generosity. ↩

All particular facts (τὰ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον) are ultimate (ἔσχατα), i.e. undemonstrable; but not all ultimate facts (ἔσχατα) are particular facts⁠—as presently appears. ↩

Literally in both directions, i.e. not the last only, but the first also. ↩

See the opening paragraphs of Chapter 8. ↩

This αἴσθησις may be called νοῦς, which is the faculty of universals, because the universal (the general conception of human good) is elicited from these particular judgments. ↩

Throughout this chapter we are concerned with the practical intellect alone. He has already stated in Chapter 6 that the intuitive reason is the basis of the speculative intellect; here he says that it is also the basis of the practical intellect. We have to distinguish here three different employments of the practical faculty:

(If we invert the order), undemonstrated assertion, viz. that under the circumstances this is the right thing to do (as in this section): here the judgment is altogether intuitive; i.e. no grounds are given.

Demonstration (improperly so called, more properly calculation) that this is the right thing to do; e.g. this act is to be done because it is just: here the intuitive reason supplies the minor premise of the practical syllogism (this act is just), and also (indirectly) the major (whatever is just is good), i.e. it supplies the data⁠—the several particular intuitions from which the general proposition is elicited: ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς sc. ἀποδείξεσι (practical calculations) earlier in this chapter: cf. τῶν ἀποδείξεων in this section, and οἱ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν, Chapter 12.

Deduction or demonstration (also improperly so called) of general truths in morals and politics: κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις, earlier in this chapter: here also the data from which deduction starts can only be apprehended by intuitive perception or reason: cf. I 4 (“But we must not omit to notice the distinction⁠ ⁠…”), I 7 (“… as in the case of the starting-points or principles of a science”). The difference between (2) and (3) is plainly shown above, in Chapter 8 (“Of this faculty in its application⁠ ⁠…”), where πολιτική in the wider sense (= νομοθετική) which deals with laws, is distinguished from πολιτική in the narrower sense which has to do with decrees: cf. also I 2 (“Since then it makes use of the other practical sciences⁠ ⁠…”), and X 9 (“It would be best, then, that the regulation of these matters⁠ ⁠…”).

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I.e. in the sense in which a healthy state of the body (ὑγίεια as a ἕξις in Aristotle’s language) produces healthy performance of the bodily functions (ὑγίεια as an ἐνέργεια). ↩

The other three are sense, reason, desire (αἴσθησις, νοῦς, ὄρεξις): cf. Chapter 2. The excellences or best states of the desires have already been described as the moral virtues. Wisdom and prudence