The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗
- Author: Benedictus de Spinoza
- Performer: -
Book online «The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗». Author Benedictus de Spinoza
hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict
themselves freely.
However, I pass over this point. My intention her was only
to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing :
individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
does not appertain to their essence. I said that “I considered
as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
thing is necessarily removed also ; or that without which the
thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
conceived.” (II. Def. ii.)
PROP. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being
of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
existing.
Proof.-The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)
is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).
Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
mind. But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.
viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist ; it must
therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of
an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I.xxi., xxii.), must
always necessarily exist ; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
absurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
existing. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
the infinite intellect of God ; thus when we say, that the human
mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so
far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind ; and when we
say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in
part or inadequately.
Note.-Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate ;
I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and
not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
end.
PROP. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,
which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human
mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of
the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea
constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in
that body without being perceived by the mind.
Proof.-Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in
so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said
object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
of anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is
necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
the human mind ; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of
the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words
the mind perceives it.
Note.-This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
to be understood from II. vii., which see.
PROP. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind
is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which
actually exists, and nothing else.
Proof.-If indeed the body were not the object of the human
mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in
God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but
in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else ; that
is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body
would not be in our mind : now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the
idea of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of
the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as
it actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other
object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as
nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.) ; but
(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our
mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.
Note.-We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind
and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately
or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the
nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced hitherto
have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to
other individual things, all of which, though in different
degrees, are animated.3 For of everything there is necessarily
an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as
there is an idea of the human body ; thus whatever we have
asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be
asserted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the other
hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from
the other, one being more excellent than another and containing
more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent
than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.
Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind
differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is
necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of
the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to
explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,
that I should do so. I will only say generally, that in
proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is
the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for
forming many simultaneous perceptions ; and the more the actions
of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it
is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognize
the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the
cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body,
and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following
propositions, deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore I
have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my
present statements. In order to do so, I must premise a few
propositions concerning the nature of bodies.
AXIOM I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
AXIOM II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,
sometimes more quickly.
LEMMA I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in
respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in
respect of substance.
Proof.-The first part of this proposition is, I take it,
self-evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect of
substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought
out still more clearly from I. xv, note.
LEMMA II. All bodies agree in certain respects.
Proof.-All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).
Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly,
and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
LEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
motion or rest by another body, which other body has been
determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third
again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
Proof.-Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which
(Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to
motion and rest ; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be
determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely
(II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in
motion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set in
motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to
motion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on to
infinity. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in
motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other
body ; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a
state of motion by some other body. This is indeed self-evident.
For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,
I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is
at rest. If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,
this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no
other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at
rest. If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so
long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything
concerning it, except that it is in motion. If A is
subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result
of A’s previous motion, for such motion can only have led to
continued motion ; the state of rest therefore must have resulted
from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external
cause determining A to a state of rest.
Axiom I.-All modes, wherein one body is affected by another
body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected
and the body affecting ; so that one and the same body may be
moved in different modes, according to the difference in the
nature of the bodies moving it ; on the other hand, different
bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.
Axiom II.-When a body in motion impinges on another body at
rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to
continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in
the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving
body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line
of motion of incidence and the same plane.
So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,
which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and
rest, quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compound bodies.
Definition.-When any given bodies of the same or different
magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or
if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that
their mutual
Comments (0)