The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗
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modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body
as actually existing, except through the ideas of the
modifications of its own body.
Proof.-If the human body is in no way affected by a given
external body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the
idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
any manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human
body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far
(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-In so far as the human mind imagines an external
body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.
Proof.-When the human mind regards external bodies through
the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it
imagines (see II. xvii. note) ; now the mind can only imagine
external bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.),
in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body
does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
Proof.-Every idea of a modification of the human body
involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human
body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). But,
inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.
Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body,
in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not
clear and distinct, but confused.
Proof.-The ideas of the modifications of the human body
involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies
(II. xvi.) ; they must involve the nature not only of the human
body but also of its parts ; for the modifications are modes
(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,
consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by
II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so
far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so
far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of
modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind
alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,
confused ideas. Q.E.D.
Note.-The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind
is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in
itself alone, clear and distinct ; as also is the case with the
idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the
modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred
to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.
PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the
human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human
mind.
Proof.-The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,
in other words, does not adequately express its nature ; that is
(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
adequately ; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not
adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not
involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
Corollary.-Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an
adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,
of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not
know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
modifications of body (II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own
body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only
perceives external bodies through the same means ; thus, in so
far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate
knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.
xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a
fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and
note). Q.E.D.
Note.-I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but
only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of
external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common
order of nature ; that is, whenever it is determined from
without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to
regard this or that ; not at such times as it is determined from
within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,
to understand their points of agreement, difference, and
contrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it
regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.
PROP. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of our body.
Proof.-The duration of our body does not depend on its
essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.
xxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate
by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these
last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.
The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
nature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may
be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,
in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
he has the idea of the human body only. (II. ix. Coroll.)
Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God
very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
the nature of the human mind ; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this
knowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of particular things external to ourselves.
Proof.-Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a
fixed and definite relation ; this other particular thing must
likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I.
xxviii.) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from
this common property of particular things, we have only a very
inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body ; we must draw a
similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge
of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence it follows that all particular things are
contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of
their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must
understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I.
xxxiii., Note i.) For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing
is contingent.
PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,
are true.
Proof.-All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with
their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are
all true. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes
them to be called false.
Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality
of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.
xxxii.) ; external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.).
Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to
be called false. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
perfect, is true.
Proof.-When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea
is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the
essence of our mind ; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
an idea is true. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,
which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.
Proof.-There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
to be called false (II. xxxiii.) ; but falsity cannot consist in
simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to
be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
ignorance and error are not identical ; wherefore it consists in
the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or
confused ideas involve. Q.E.D.
Note.-In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists
in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light
on the subject I will give an example. For instance, men are
mistaken in thinking themselves free ; their opinion is made up
of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the
causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom,
therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their
actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the
will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond
thereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none
of them know ; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign
dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke
either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun,
we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet ;
this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact
that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun’s true
distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards
learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
the earth’s diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near
; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are
ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of
our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said
body is affected thereby.
PROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
Proof.-All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they
are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.)
adequate ; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,
except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and
xxviii.) ; therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,
follow by the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II.,
above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not
constitute the essence of any particular thing.
Proof.-If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
constitutes the essence of some particular thing ; for instance,
the essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either
exist or be conceived ; but this is against our hypothesis.
Therefore it does not appertain to B’s essence, nor does it
constitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which
are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived
except adequately.
Proof.-Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and
which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the
whole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately. For the
idea thereof
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