The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗

>horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything

which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will

necessarily regard the horse as present : he will not be able to

doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We

have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams ; and I

do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,

while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his

judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it

about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that

he sees ; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we

suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.

Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as

actual perception extends-that is, I grant that the mind’s

imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.

xvii. note) ; but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of

perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of

a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the

mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would

regard the same as present to itself : it would have no reasons

for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless

the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which

precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind

perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is

inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the

existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the

subject.

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third

objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is

predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is

common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate

essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the

abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the

same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting

the idea’s essence : for, in this respect, particular

affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For

instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,

differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much

as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.

Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal

power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and

to affirm that that which is false is true. These two

affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to

one another as being and not-being ; for there is nothing

positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of

falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).

We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when

we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason

and abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, I

am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium

described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,

a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from

him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such

an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man ; I

answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be

considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider

children, fools, madmen, &c.

It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this

doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered

from what has been said. The doctrine is good,

1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the

decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so

much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and

more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely

tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest

happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of

God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid

us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true

estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God

with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as

for having endured the direst slavery ; as if virtue and the

service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.

2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct

ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which

are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it

shows us, that we should await and endure fortune’s smiles or

frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the

eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from

the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two

right angles.

3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches

us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to

be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be

content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any

womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the

guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as

I will show in Part III.

4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the

commonwealth ; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and

led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do

whatsoever things are best.

I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of

this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a

close. I think I have therein explained the nature and

properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,

considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient

clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many

excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary

to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.

 

PART III.

ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

 

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be

treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural

phenomena following nature’s general laws. They appear to

conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a

kingdom : for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows

nature’s order, that he has absolute control over his actions,

and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute

human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in

general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which

accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens,

abuse : he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human

mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked

upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent

men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted),

who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way

of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one,

so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the

emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their

restraint.

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he

believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,

strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at

the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain

to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he

accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own

great intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the

present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or

deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will,

doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of

human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth

with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as

repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However,

such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be

set down to a flaw therein ; for nature is always the same, and

everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action ;

that is, nature’s laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to

pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and

always the same ; so that there should be one and the same method

of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely,

through nature’s universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of

hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow

from this same necessity and efficacy of nature ; they answer to

certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and

possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the

properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself

affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and

strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I

employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the

mind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the

same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and

solids.

DEFINITIONS

I. By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect

can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an inadequate or

partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its

effect cannot be understood.

 

II. I say that we act when anything takes place, either within

us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause ; that

is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature

something takes place within us or externally to us, which can

through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood.

On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something

when that something takes place within us, or follows from our

nature externally, we being only the partial cause.

 

III. By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby

the active power of the said body is increased or diminished,

aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.

 

N.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these

modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I

call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.

POSTULATES

I. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its

power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other

ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or

less.

N.B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and

Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.

 

II. The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless,

retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.),

and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II.

xvii.).

 

PROP. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain

cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is

necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it

is necessarily passive.

Proof.-In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and

some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note).

Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in

God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl.

Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise

(by