The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗

much the more, in proportion as this emotion

may have been greater in the object of love. This was our first

point. Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it

is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to

the amount of pain (III. xi. note) ; therefore (III. xix.) he who

conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,

will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said

emotion is greater or less in the object of love. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects

some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards

that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an

object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred

towards it.

Proof.-He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of

our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully-that is, if we

conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or

pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come

to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause ; therefore

(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object

of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with

love or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.

Note.-Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we

may define as pain arising from another’s hurt. What term we can

use for pleasure arising from another’s gain, I know not.

We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on

another, Approval ; and the hatred towards him who injures

another, we will call Indignation. We must further remark, that

we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown

in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto

regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles

ourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval

on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,

contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.

 

PROP. XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is

painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he

thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel

pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according

as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.

Proof.-In so far as an object of hatred is painfully

affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the

strength of the pain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.)

who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully

affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the

amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred. This

was our first point. Again, pleasure postulates the existence of

the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as

the pleasure is greater or less. If anyone imagines that an

object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception

(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist ; in other

words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected.

Q.E.D.

Note.-This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and

without any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop.

xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to

himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like

manner ; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary

circumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only.

 

PROP. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an

object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we

conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall

feel love towards him.

Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as III.

xxii., which see.

Note.-These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable

to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so

far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another’s

hurt, and to grieve at another’s advantage.

 

PROP. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and

concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to

affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise,

we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect

painfully ourselves or the loved object.

Proof.-That, which we conceive to affect an object of our

love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or

painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as

far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us

pleasurably ; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it

endeavours to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III.

xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as

affect us painfully ; therefore, we endeavour to affirm

concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever

we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.

Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we

hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully ; and,

contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything

which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.

Proof.-This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the

foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.

Note.-Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may

easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,

contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is

called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of

himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with

his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that

fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting

them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to

conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines

his own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing

from a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure

which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called

over-esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too

little of a man is called disdain.

 

PROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is

like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,

to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a

like emotion (affectus).

Proof.-The images of things are modifications of the human

body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to

us (II. xvii.) ; in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas

involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature

of the external bodies as present. If, therefore, the nature of

the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the

idea which we form of the external body will involve a

modification of our own body similar to the modification of the

external body. Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to

ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will

express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.

Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be

affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like

emotion. If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we

shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not

similar, emotion. Q.E.D.

Note I.-This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to

pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note) ; when it is

referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else

but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we

conceive that others have the like desire.

Corollary I.-If we conceive that anyone, whom we have

hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something

similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.

If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the

same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.

Proof.-This is proved from the last proposition in the same

manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.

Corollary II.-We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because

its misery affects us painfully.

Proof.-If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice

in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Corollary III.-We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,

a thing which we pity.

Proof.-That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,

affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition)

; therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which

removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.) ; in

other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we

shall be determined for its destruction ; thus, we shall

endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q.E.D.

Note II.-This will or appetite for doing good, which arises

from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is

called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from

compassion. Concerning love or hate towards him who has done

good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like

ourselves, see III. xxii. note.

 

PROP. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive

to conduce to pleasure ; but we endeavour to remove or destroy

whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to

conduce to pain.

Proof.-We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that

which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.) ; in other

words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as

possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour of

the mind, or the mind’s power of thought, is equal to, and

simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body’s power

of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.

Coroll.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its

existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the

same thing) we desire and strive for it ; this was our first

point. Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed

to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we

hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall,

therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy

the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may

not regard it as present ; this was our second point. Wherefore

whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive

men6 to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink

from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.

Proof.-From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate

anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).

That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel

pleasure or pain at the thing’s presence. And so we shall

endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with

pleasure, etc. Q.E.D.

Note.-This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely

in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so

eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit

certain things to our own or another’s hurt : in other cases it

is generally called kindliness. Furthermore I give the name of

praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of

another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us ; but of blame

to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.

 

PROP. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as

affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,

accompanied by the idea of himself as cause ; in other words, he

will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has

done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,

he will regard