The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗

himself with pain.

Proof.-He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure

or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with

pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and

xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby

he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,

that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with

pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause ; in other

words, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so mutatis

mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.

Note.-As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the

idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the

idea of an external cause ; the pleasure and pain in question

will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms love and

hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ

other names for the emotions now under discussion : pleasure

accompanied by the idea of an external cause7 we will style

Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame : I

mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man’s

belief, that he is being praised or blamed : otherwise pleasure

accompanied by the idea of an external cause8 is called

self-complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance.

Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure,

wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist

solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone

endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives

will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a

vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,

when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.

 

PROP. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates

anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall

thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,

&c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from

something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.

Proof.-From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves

anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.) : but

we are assumed to love it already ; there is, therefore, a new

cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered ; hence we

shall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again, from the mere

fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall

ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.). If we assume

that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously

love it and shrink from it ; in other words, we shall be subject

to vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D.

Corollary.-From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it

follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause

others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself

hates : as the poet says : “As lovers let us share every hope

and every fear : ironhearted were he who should love what the

other leaves.“9

Note.-This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes

and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really

ambition (see III. xxix. note) ; wherefore we see that everyone

by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should

live according to his own individual disposition : when such a

desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone

else’s way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all

become mutually hateful.

 

PROP. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in

something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour

to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain

possession thereof.

Proof.-From the mere fact of our conceiving that another

person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we

shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight

therein. But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be

prevented by another’s delight in its object ; we shall,

therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III.

xxviii.). Q.E.D.

Note.-We thus see that man’s nature is generally so

constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies

those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his

own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see that

from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that

men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and

ambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall

find that she entirely confirms what we have said ; more

especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our

life. We find that children, whose body is continually, as it

were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others

laughing or crying ; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate

whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of

whatever they conceive as delighting others : inasmuch as the

images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human

body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by

external causes to act in this or that manner.

 

PROP. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we

endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love

us in return.

Proof.-That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to

conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.). If the

thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it

pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.). In

other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it

about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure

accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note),

that it should love us in return. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a

loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our

complacency.

Proof.-We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to

bring about, that what we love should love us in return : in

other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure

accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, in

proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected

because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.-that is (III. xi.

and note) the greater will be our pleasure. But when we take

pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something

similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30)

; therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a

loved object to be affected, &c. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love

joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he

himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards

the loved object and with envy towards his rival.

Proof.-In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is

well affected towards him, will be the strength of his

self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of

his pleasure ; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as

far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound

to him : this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks

that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.). But this

endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the

loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved

object has joined to itself ; therefore (III. xi. note) he will

for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of

the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his

rival ; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred

towards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv.

Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved

object. Q.E.D.

Note.-This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy

is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a

wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and

hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied.

Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater,

in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont

to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object ; and

also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained

towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate

the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably

affected by one whom he himself hates : and also because he is

compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image

of him whom he hates. This condition generally comes into play

in the case of love for a woman : for he who thinks, that a woman

whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not

only because his own desire is restrained, but also because,

being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the

parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks

from her.

We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved

with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives

him pain as a lover, as I will now show.

 

PROP. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once

taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances

as when he first took delight therein.

Proof.-Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with

the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of

pleasure (III. xv.) ; he will, therefore, desire to possess it,

in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight ; in other

words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the

same circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the

aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.

Proof.-For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be

missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence. As

he is assumed to be desirous for love’s sake of that thing or

circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he

conceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.

Note.-This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence

of the object of love, is called Regret.

 

PROP. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or

love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.

Proof.-Pain diminishes or constrains a man’s power of

activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes

or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in

his own being ; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said

endeavour : thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are

directed to removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain),

in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily

opposed to a greater part of man’s power of activity ; therefore

the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed

to remove it ; that is, the greater will be the desire or

appetite in endeavouring to remove it. Again, since pleasure

(III. xi. note) increases or aids a man’s power of activity, it

may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by

pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his

desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.

Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain

and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour,

appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be

greater in proportion