The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗

>man’s nature ; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man

differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so

far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the

essence of the other ; consequently, any emotion of one

individual only differs, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.-Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals

which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of

mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man’s

emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human

nature. Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of

procreation ; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire

of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of

insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the

several natures. Thus, although each individual lives content

and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his

being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is

nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and

hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of

another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the

essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing

proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy

which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a

philosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I have

treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is

passive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable to

him in so far as he is active.

 

PROP. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities

or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and

desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.

Proof.-When the mind conceives itself and its power of

activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.) : now the mind

necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or

adequate idea (II. xliii.). But the mind does conceive certain

adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.). Therefore it feels pleasure in

so far as it conceives adequate ideas ; that is, in so far as it

is active (III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has

clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,

endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.) ; but by such

an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.) ;

therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we

understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.

 

PROP. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as

active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or

desire.

Proof.-All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or

pain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain we

mean that the mind’s power of thinking is diminished or checked

(III. xi. and note) ; therefore, in so far as the mind feels

pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is

diminished or checked (III. i.) ; therefore, no painful emotions

can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but

only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)

are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D.

Note.-All actions following from emotion, which are

attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set

down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into

courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). By

courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve

his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.

By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,

solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to

unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore,

which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to

courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to

highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind

in danger, &c., are varieties of courage ; courtesy, mercy, &c.,

are varieties of highmindedness.

I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their

primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,

which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,

to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I

have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external

causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds

we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I

have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting

emotions, not all that might be given. For, by proceeding in the

same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to

repentance, scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from

what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with

another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise

therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However,

for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most

important ; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be

more curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning

love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a

thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,

acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another

way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind

begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, when

we conceive something which generally delights us with its

flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we

are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is

otherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus

otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be

stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be

stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel

repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the

presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become

odious. This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or

weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward

modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for

instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these

are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the

mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be

supplemented in a few points ; I will therefore repeat them,

interpolating such observations as I think should here and there

be added.

DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS

I. Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is

conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given

modification of itself.

Explanation.-We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of

this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof ;

further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is

determined to act in a way tending to promote its own

persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that,

strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite

and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or

not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order to

avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from

explaining desire by appetite ; but I have take care to define it

in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those

endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms

appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said,

that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived

as determined to a particular activity ; but from such a

definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can

be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to

imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,

in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c.

For, by a modification of man’s essence, we understand every

disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be

innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of

thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,

lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.

By the term desire, then, I here mean all man’s endeavours,

impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each

man’s disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to

another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and

knows not where to turn.

 

II. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater

perfection.

 

III. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less

perfection.

Explanation-I say transition : for pleasure is not perfection

itself. For, if man were born with the perfection to which he

passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of

pleasure. This appears more clearly from the consideration of

the contrary emotion, pain. No one can deny, that pain consists

in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less

perfection itself : for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he

partakes of perfection of any degree. Neither can we say, that

pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For

absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity ;

wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition

from a greater to a less perfection-in other words, it is an

activity whereby a man’s power of action is lessened or

constrained (cf. III. xi. note). I pass over the definitions of

merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these

terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely

kinds of pleasure or pain.

 

IV. Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein

the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in

question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and

note).

Explanation-In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,

why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway

falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the

images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one

follows the other. This state of association is impossible, if

the image of the thing be new ; the mind will then be at a stand

in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other

causes to think of something else.

Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is

of the same nature as other conceptions ; hence, I do not include

wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include

it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no

positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but

merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the

mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the

contemplation of another.

I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary

emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,

pain, and desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is

customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three

primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the

objects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a

definition of contempt.

 

V. Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind

so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those

qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.

III. lii. note).

The definitions of veneration