The Ethics, Benedictus de Spinoza [best reads txt] 📗
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have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to
think of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the
nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the
definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.
PART IV :
Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions
PREFACEHuman infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I
name bondage : for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is
not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune : so much
so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better
for him, to follow that which is worse. Why this is so, and what
is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part
of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well to make a
few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good
and evil.
When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has
brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect,
not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks
that he knows, the intention and aim of its author. For
instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not
yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work
is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect ; he will,
on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is
carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it.
But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen
before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he
plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect.
Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.
But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out
types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain
types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that
which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the
thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree
less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently
been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.
This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,
which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or
imperfect : for men are wont to form general ideas of things
natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they
hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing
without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types
before herself. Therefore, when they behold something in Nature,
which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they
have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has
fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete.
Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect
or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true
knowledge of what they pronounce upon.
Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does
not work with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite
Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as
that whereby it exists. For we have shown, that by the same
necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I.
xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the
reason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore, as he does
not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the
sake of an end ; of his existence and of his action there is
neither origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final
is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered
as the origin or cause of anything. For example, when we say
that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we
mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of
household life, had a desire to build a house. Wherefore, the
being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is
nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the
efficient cause ; it is regarded as the primary cause, because
men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires. They
are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions
and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are
determined to any particular desire. Therefore, the common
saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and
produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses
treated of in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection and
imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or
notions which we form from a comparison among one another of
individuals of the same species ; hence I said above (II. Def.
vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For
we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one
genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category
of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.
Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this
category, and comparing them one with another, find that some
possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,
say that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far as
we attribute to them anything implying negation-as term, end,
infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because
they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call
perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or
because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope
of a thing’s nature, save that which follows from the necessity
of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from
the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily
comes to pass.
As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive
quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of
thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things
one with another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the same
time good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for
him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns ; for him that is
deaf, it is neither good nor bad.
Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be
retained. For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a
type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful
for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have
indicated.
In what follows, then, I shall mean by, “good” that, which we
certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the
type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves ; by
“bad,” that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in
approaching the said type. Again, we shall that men are more
perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more
or less nearly to the said type. For it must be specially
remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a
greater perfection, or vice vers�, I do not mean that he is
changed from one essence or reality to another ; for instance, a
horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a
man, as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we
conceive the thing’s power of action, in so far as this is
understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished. Lastly,
by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality-in
other words, each thing’s essence, in so far as it exists, and
operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to
its duration. For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,
because it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration
of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence
of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence ;
but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will
always be able to persist in existence with the same force
wherewith it began to exist ; wherefore, in this respect, all
things are equal.
DEFINITIONS.
I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to
us.
II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a
hindrance
to us in the attainment of any good.
(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the
end.)
III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while
regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which
necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.
IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while
regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not,
whether such causes be determined for producing them.
(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between
possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need
to distinguish them accurately.)
V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in
different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as
luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are
contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future,
present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii.,
which see.
(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly
conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit
; that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred
feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that
which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance
from us, and all in the same plane ; so also objects, whose time
of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer
interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally
distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the
same moment of time.)
VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a
desire.
VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing ; that
is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a
man’s nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of
effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.
AXIOM.
There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is
not another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given,
there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.
PROPOSITIONS.
PROP. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is
removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being
true.
Proof.-Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge
which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any
positive quality on account of which they are called false (II.
xxxiii.) ; contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God,
they are true (II. xxxii.). Wherefore, if the positive quality
possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is
true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be
removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no
positive
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