An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume [online e book reader TXT] 📗

may observe,

that, though, in reflecting on human actions, we seldom feel

such a looseness, or indifference, but are commonly able to

infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and

from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens,

that, in performing the actions themselves, we are sensible

of something like it: And as all resembling objects are readily

taken for each other, this has been employed as a demonstrative

and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel, that our

actions are subject to our will, on most occasions; and imagine

we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because,

when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel, that it

moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or a

Velle�ty, as it is called in the schools) even on that side,

on which it did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we

persuade ourselves, could, at that time, have been compleated

into the thing itself; because, should that be denied, we find,

upon a second trial, that, at present, it can. We consider not,

that the fantastical desire of shewing liberty, is here the

motive of our actions. And it seems certain, that, however we

may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can

commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and

even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might,

were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our

situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our

complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of

necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.

 

73. But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the

question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of

metaphysics, the most contentious science; it will not require many

words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of

liberty as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute, in

this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by

liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean that

actions have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and

circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of

uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we

can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and

acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean _a

power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the

will;_ that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to

move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed

to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then,

is no subject of dispute.

 

74. Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we should be careful to

observe two requisite circumstances; first, that it be consistent with

plain matter of fact; secondly, that it be consistent with itself. If

we observe these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible,

I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with

regard to it.

 

It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its

existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative

word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature.

But it is pretended that some causes are necessary, some not necessary.

Here then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one define a cause,

without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a _necessary

connexion_ with its effect; and let him show distinctly the origin of

the idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall readily give up the

whole controversy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be

received, this must be absolutely impracticable. Had not objects a

regular conjunction with each other, we should never have entertained

any notion of cause and effect; and this regular conjunction produces

that inference of the understanding, which is the only connexion, that

we can have any comprehension of. Whoever attempts a definition of

cause, exclusive of these circumstances, will be obliged either to

employ unintelligible terms or such as are synonymous to the term which

he endeavours to define.[18] And if the definition above mentioned be

admitted; liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the

same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no

existence.

 

[18] Thus, if a cause be defined, _that which produces any

thing;_ it is easy to observe, that producing is synonymous

to causing. In like manner, if a cause be defined, _that by

which any thing exists;_ this is liable to the same objection.

For what is meant by these words, by which? Had it been said,

that a cause is that after which _any thing constantly

exists;_ we should have understood the terms. For this is,

indeed, all we know of the matter. And this constancy forms the

very essence of necessity, nor have we any other idea of it.

 

PART II.

 

75. There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more

blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation

of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to

religion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is

certainly false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because

it is of dangerous consequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely

to be forborne; as serving nothing to the discovery of truth, but only

to make the person of an antagonist odious. This I observe in general,

without pretending to draw any advantage from it. I frankly submit to

an examination of this kind, and shall venture to affirm that the

doctrines, both of necessity and of liberty, as above explained, are not

only consistent with morality, but are absolutely essential to

its support.

 

Necessity may be defined two ways, conformably to the two definitions of

cause, of which it makes an essential part. It consists either in the

constant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the

understanding from one object to another. Now necessity, in both these

senses, (which, indeed, are at bottom the same) has universally, though

tacitly, in the schools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allowed

to belong to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to deny that

we can draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those

inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions, with

like motives, inclinations, and circumstances. The only particular in

which any one can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will refuse to

give the name of necessity to this property of human actions: But as

long as the meaning is understood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or

that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther in the

operations of matter. But this, it must be acknowledged, can be of no

consequence to morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural

philosophy or metaphysics. We may here be mistaken in asserting that

there is no idea of any other necessity or connexion in the actions of

body: But surely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind, but what

everyone does, and must readily allow of. We change no circumstance in

the received orthodox system with regard to the will, but only in that

with regard to material objects and causes. Nothing, therefore, can be

more innocent, at least, than this doctrine.

 

76. All laws being founded on rewards and punishments, it is supposed as

a fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and uniform

influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil

actions. We may give to this influence what name we please; but, as it

is usually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a cause, and

be looked upon as an instance of that necessity, which we would here

establish.

 

The only proper object of hatred or vengeance is a person or creature,

endowed with thought and consciousness; and when any criminal or

injurious actions excite that passion, it is only by their relation to

the person, or connexion with him. Actions are, by their very nature,

temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in

the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can

neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. The actions

themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of

morality and religion: But the person is not answerable for them; and as

they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant, and

leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon

their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. According

to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and consequently

causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most

horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character

anywise concerned in his actions, since they are not derived from it,

and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the

depravity of the other.

 

Men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and

casually, whatever may be the consequences. Why? but because the

principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them

alone. Men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and

unpremeditately than for such as proceed from deliberation. For what

reason? but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause or

principle in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the

whole character. Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended

with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for?

but by asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they

are proofs of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by an

alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, they

likewise cease to be criminal. But, except upon the doctrine of

necessity, they never were just proofs, and consequently never

were criminal.

 

77. It will be equally easy to prove, and from the same arguments, that

liberty, according to that definition above mentioned, in which all

men agree, is also essential to morality, and that no human actions,

where it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be

the objects either of approbation or dislike. For as actions are objects

of our moral sentiment, so far only as they are indications of the

internal character, passions, and affections; it is impossible that they

can give rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from

these principles, but are derived altogether from external violence.

 

78. I pretend not to have obviated or removed all objections to this

theory, with regard to necessity and liberty. I can foresee other

objections, derived from topics which have not here been treated of. It

may be said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected to

the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a

continued chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined,

reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of

every human creature. No contingency anywhere in the universe; no

indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at the same time, acted

upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the

world, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine, and placed all

beings in that particular position, whence every subsequent event, by

an inevitable necessity, must result. Human actions, therefore,