An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume [online e book reader TXT] 📗

themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in

the main, the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims.

Nature must have provided some other principle, of more ready, and more

general use and application; nor can an operation of such immense

consequence in life, as that of inferring effects from causes, be

trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation. Were

this doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with

regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly

established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the rules

of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without any

exception or reserve. It is custom alone, which engages animals, from

every object, that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant,

and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one, to

conceive the other, in that particular manner, which we denominate

belief. No other explication can be given of this operation, in all

the higher, as well as lower classes of sensitive beings, which fall

under our notice and observation [19].

 

[19] Since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived

merely from custom, it may be asked how it happens, that men so

much surpass animals in reasoning, and one man so much

surpasses another? Has not the same custom the same

influence on all?

 

We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference

in human understandings: After which the reason of the

difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended.

 

1. When we have lived any time, and have been accustomed to the

uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we

always transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the

latter to resemble the former. By means of this general

habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the

foundation of reasoning, and expect a similar event with some

degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made

accurately, and free from all foreign circumstances. It is

therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe

the consequences of things; and as one man may very much

surpass another in attention and memory and observation, this

will make a very great difference in their reasoning.

 

2. Where there is a complication of causes to produce any

effect, one mind may be much larger than another, and better

able to comprehend the whole system of objects, and to infer

justly their consequences.

 

3. One man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a

greater length than another.

 

4. Few men can think long without running into a confusion of

ideas, and mistaking one for another; and there are various

degrees of this infirmity.

 

5. The circumstance, on which the effect depends, is frequently

involved in other circumstances, which are foreign and

extrinsic. The separation of it often requires great attention,

accuracy, and subtilty.

 

6. The forming of general maxims from particular observation is

a very nice operation; and nothing is more usual, from haste or

a narrowness of mind, which sees not on all sides, than to

commit mistakes in this particular.

 

7. When we reason from analogies, the man, who has the greater

experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies,

will be the better reasoner.

 

8. Byasses from prejudice, education, passion, party, &c. hang

more upon one mind than another.

 

9. After we have acquired a confidence in human testimony,

books and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one

man’s experience and thought than those of another.

 

It would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make

a difference in the understandings of men.

 

85. But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from

observation, there are also many parts of it, which they derive from the

original hand of nature; which much exceed the share of capacity they

possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve, little or

nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate

Instincts, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary, and

inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. But our

wonder will, perhaps, cease or diminish, when we consider, that the

experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts,

and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species

of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves;

and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or

comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual

faculties. Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an

instinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which

teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the

whole economy and order of its nursery.

 

SECTION X.

 

OF MIRACLES.

 

PART I.

 

86. There is, in Dr. Tillotson’s writings, an argument against the _real

presence_, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument

can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a

serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned

prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is

founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were eyewitnesses

to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission.

Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less

than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the

first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it

must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one

rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of

his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and

therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly

revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just

reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both

the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry

not such evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as

external evidences, and are not brought home to every one’s breast, by

the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.

 

Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which

must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and

free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I

have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with

the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of

superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the

world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and

prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.

 

87. Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters

of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether

infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in

our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in

one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but

it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself

mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have

no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us

beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we

may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like

certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all

countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together:

Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint

our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact,

there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest

certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.

 

A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such

conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the

event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience

as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other

cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite

experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number

of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and

when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we

properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes an

opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found

to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence,

proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on

one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any

event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is

contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In

all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are

opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to

know the exact force of the superior evidence.

 

88. To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe,

that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even

necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony

of men, and the reports of eyewitnesses and spectators. This species of

reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause

and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to

observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from

no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human

testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of

witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any

discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we

can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of

their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not

to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose

connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any

other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree, had not men

commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they

not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I

say, discovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature,

we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man

delirious, or noted for falsehood and villany, has no manner of

authority with us.

 

And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human testimony, is

founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is

regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the

conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object

has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number of

circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgements of this

kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes,

that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and

observation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side,

it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgements, and

with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every

other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of

others. We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or

uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline

to it; but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the

force of its antagonist.

 

89. This contrariety