An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume [online e book reader TXT] 📗

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can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause;

or if they have any turpitude, they must involve our Creator in the same

guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author.

For as a man, who fired a mine, is answerable for all the consequences

whether the train he employed be long or short; so wherever a continued

chain of necessary causes is fixed, that Being, either finite or

infinite, who produces the first, is likewise the author of all the

rest, and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong

to them. Our clear and unalterable ideas of morality establish this

rule, upon unquestionable reasons, when we examine the consequences of

any human action; and these reasons must still have greater force when

applied to the volitions and intentions of a Being infinitely wise and

powerful. Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for so limited a

creature as man; but those imperfections have no place in our Creator.

He foresaw, he ordained, he intended all those actions of men, which we

so rashly pronounce criminal. And we must therefore conclude, either

that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accountable

for them. But as either of these positions is absurd and impious, it

follows, that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly

be true, as being liable to all the same objections. An absurd

consequence, if necessary, proves the original doctrine to be absurd; in

the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause,

if the connexion between them be necessary and evitable.

 

This objection consists of two parts, which we shall examine separately;

First, that, if human actions can be traced up, by a necessary chain,

to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite

perfection of that Being from whom they are derived, and who can intend

nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or, Secondly, if

they be criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection, which we

ascribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author

of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures.

 

79. The answer to the first objection seems obvious and convincing.

There are many philosophers who, after an exact scrutiny of all the

phenomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, considered as one system,

is, in every period of its existence, ordered with perfect benevolence;

and that the utmost possible happiness will, in the end, result to all

created beings, without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or

misery. Every physical ill, say they, makes an essential part of this

benevolent system, and could not possibly be removed, even by the Deity

himself, considered as a wise agent, without giving entrance to greater

ill, or excluding greater good, which will result from it. From this

theory, some philosophers, and the ancient Stoics among the rest,

derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions, while they taught

their pupils that those ills under which they laboured were, in reality,

goods to the universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could

comprehend the whole system of nature, every event became an object of

joy and exultation. But though this topic be specious and sublime, it

was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual. You would surely more

irritate than appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by

preaching up to him the rectitude of those general laws, which produced

the malignant humours in his body, and led them through the proper

canals, to the sinews and nerves, where they now excite such acute

torments. These enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination

of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and security; but neither

can they dwell with constancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by

the emotions of pain or passion; much less can they maintain their

ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists. The affections take a

narrower and more natural survey of their object; and by an economy,

more suitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings

around us, and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the

private system.

 

80. The case is the same with moral as with physical ill. It cannot

reasonably be supposed, that those remote considerations, which are

found of so little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more

powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is so

formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters,

dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of

approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more essential to its

frame and constitution. The characters which engage our approbation are

chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society;

as the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public

detriment and disturbance: Whence it may reasonably be presumed, that

the moral sentiments arise, either mediately or immediately, from a

reflection of these opposite interests. What though philosophical

meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture; that everything

is right with regard to the WHOLE, and that the qualities, which disturb

society, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as suitable to the

primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its

happiness and welfare? Are such remote and uncertain speculations able

to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and

immediate view of the objects? A man who is robbed of a considerable

sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these

sublime reflections? Why then should his moral resentment against the

crime be supposed incompatible with them? Or why should not the

acknowledgment of a real distinction between vice and virtue be

reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy, as well as that

of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity? Both these

distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human mind:

And these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any

philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever.

 

81. The second objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an

answer; nor is it possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be

the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of

sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and

unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she

embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties,

and even contradictions, at every step which she takes with regard to

such subjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human

actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the

Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed

all the power of philosophy. Happy, if she be thence sensible of her

temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a

scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable

modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common

life; where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries,

without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and

contradiction!

 

SECTION IX.

 

OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS.

 

82. All our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a

species of Analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause the same

events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the

causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference,

drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive: nor does any man

ever entertain a doubt, where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have

weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances, which have ever

fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a

similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less

conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree

of similarity and resemblance. The anatomical observations, formed upon

one animal, are, by this species of reasoning, extended to all animals;

and it is certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for instance,

is clearly proved to have place in one creature, as a frog, or fish, it

forms a strong presumption, that the same principle has place in all.

These analogical observations may be carried farther, even to this

science, of which we are now treating; and any theory, by which we

explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin and connexion

of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find,

that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all

other animals. We shall make trial of this, with regard to the

hypothesis, by which we have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured

to account for all experimental reasonings; and it is hoped, that this

new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations.

 

83. First, It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many

things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always

follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted

with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually,

from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water,

earth, stones, heights, depths, &c., and of the effects which result

from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are

here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old,

who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what hurt them, and to

pursue what gave ease or pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to

the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap,

and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old

greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the

younger, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles;

nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occasion, founded in any

thing but his observation and experience.

 

This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education

on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments,

may be taught any course of action, and most contrary to their natural

instincts and propensities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog

apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat

him? Is it not even experience, which makes him answer to his name, and

infer, from such an arbitrary sound, that you mean him rather than any

of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a

certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?

 

In all these cases, we may observe, that the animal infers some fact

beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is

altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from

the present object the same consequences, which it has always found in

its observation to result from similar objects.

 

84. Secondly, It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can

be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he

concludes, that like events must follow like objects, and that the

course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if there

be in reality any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too abstruse

for the observation of such imperfect understandings; since it may well

employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover

and observe them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences

by reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of

mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are

philosophers