History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗
- Author: Thucydides
- Performer: -
Book online «History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗». Author Thucydides
inventions.
On hearing this the first thought of the army was to fall upon the
chief authors of the oligarchy and upon all the rest concerned.
Eventually, however, they desisted from this idea upon the men of
moderate views opposing it and warning them against ruining their
cause, with the enemy close at hand and ready for battle. After
this, Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders
in the revolution, now wishing in the most public manner to change the
government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most
tremendous oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any,
to accept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute actively
the war with the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four
Hundred, and to hold no communication with them. The same oath was
also taken by all the Samians of full age; and the soldiers associated
the Samians in all their affairs and in the fruits of their dangers,
having the conviction that there was no way of escape for themselves
or for them, but that the success of the Four Hundred or of the
enemy at Miletus must be their ruin.
The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy
upon the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp.
Meanwhile the soldiers forthwith held an assembly, in which they
deposed the former generals and any of the captains whom they
suspected, and chose new captains and generals to replace them,
besides Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They also
stood up and encouraged one another, and among other things urged that
they ought not to lose heart because the city had revolted from
them, as the party seceding was smaller and in every way poorer in
resources than themselves. They had the whole fleet with which to
compel the other cities in their empire to give them money just as
if they had their base in the capital, having a city in Samos which,
so far from wanting strength, had when at war been within an ace of
depriving the Athenians of the command of the sea, while as far as the
enemy was concerned they had the same base of operations as before.
Indeed, with the fleet in their hands, they were better able to
provide themselves with supplies than the government at home. It was
their advanced position at Samos which had throughout enabled the home
authorities to command the entrance into Piraeus; and if they
refused to give them back the constitution, they would now find that
the army was more in a position to exclude them from the sea than they
were to exclude the army. Besides, the city was of little or no use
towards enabling them to overcome the enemy; and they had lost nothing
in losing those who had no longer either money to send them (the
soldiers having to find this for themselves), or good counsel, which
entitles cities to direct armies. On the contrary, even in this the
home government had done wrong in abolishing the institutions of their
ancestors, while the army maintained the said institutions, and
would try to force the home government to do so likewise. So that even
in point of good counsel the camp had as good counsellors as the city.
Moreover, they had but to grant him security for his person and his
recall, and Alcibiades would be only too glad to procure them the
alliance of the King. And above all if they failed altogether, with
the navy which they possessed, they had numbers of places to retire to
in which they would find cities and lands.
Debating together and comforting themselves after this manner,
they pushed on their war measures as actively as ever; and the ten
envoys sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood
while they were still at Delos, stayed quiet there.
About this time a cry arose among the soldiers in the
Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that Astyochus and Tissaphernes were
ruining their cause. Astyochus had not been willing to fight at
sea—either before, while they were still in full vigour and the
fleet of the Athenians small, or now, when the enemy was, as they were
informed, in a state of sedition and his ships not yet united—but
kept them waiting for the Phoenician fleet from Tissaphernes, which
had only a nominal existence, at the risk of wasting away in
inactivity. While Tissaphernes not only did not bring up the fleet in
question, but was ruining their navy by payments made irregularly, and
even then not made in full. They must therefore, they insisted, delay
no longer, but fight a decisive naval engagement. The Syracusans were
the most urgent of any.
The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these murmurs, had
already decided in council to fight a decisive battle; and when the
news reached them of the disturbance at Samos, they put to sea with
all their ships, one hundred and ten in number, and, ordering the
Milesians to move by land upon Mycale, set sail thither. The Athenians
with the eighty-two ships from Samos were at the moment lying at
Glauce in Mycale, a point where Samos approaches near to the
continent; and, seeing the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them,
retired into Samos, not thinking themselves numerically strong
enough to stake their all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice from
Miletus of the wish of the enemy to engage, and were expecting to be
joined from the Hellespont by Strombichides, to whom a messenger had
been already dispatched, with the ships that had gone from Chios to
Abydos. The Athenians accordingly withdrew to Samos, and the
Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and encamped with the land forces
of the Milesians and the people of the neighbourhood. The next day
they were about to sail against Samos, when tidings reached them of
the arrival of Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont,
upon which they immediately sailed back to Miletus. The Athenians,
thus reinforced, now in their turn sailed against Miletus with a
hundred and eight ships, wishing to fight a decisive battle, but, as
no one put out to meet them, sailed back to Samos.
_Twenty-first Year of the War - Recall of Alcibiades to Samos -
Revolt of Euboea and Downfall of the Four Hundred -
Battle of Cynossema_
In the same summer, immediately after this, the Peloponnesians
having refused to fight with their fleet united, through not
thinking themselves a match for the enemy, and being at a loss where
to look for money for such a number of ships, especially as
Tissaphernes proved so bad a paymaster, sent off Clearchus, son of
Ramphias, with forty ships to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the original
instructions from Peloponnese; Pharnabazus inviting them and being
prepared to furnish pay, and Byzantium besides sending offers to
revolt to them. These Peloponnesian ships accordingly put out into the
open sea, in order to escape the observation of the Athenians, and
being overtaken by a storm, the majority with Clearchus got into
Delos, and afterwards returned to Miletus, whence Clearchus
proceeded by land to the Hellespont to take the command: ten, however,
of their number, under the Megarian Helixus, made good their passage
to the Hellespont, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. After this,
the commanders at Samos were informed of it, and sent a squadron
against them to guard the Hellespont; and an encounter took place
before Byzantium between eight vessels on either side.
Meanwhile the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who
from the moment that he had changed the government had remained firmly
resolved to recall Alcibiades, at last in an assembly brought over the
mass of the soldiery, and upon their voting for his recall and
amnesty, sailed over to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades to
Samos, being convinced that their only chance of salvation lay in
his bringing over Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to
themselves. An assembly was then held in which Alcibiades complained
of and deplored his private misfortune in having been banished, and
speaking at great length upon public affairs, highly incited their
hopes for the future, and extravagantly magnified his own influence
with Tissaphernes. His object in this was to make the oligarchical
government at Athens afraid of him, to hasten the dissolution of the
clubs, to increase his credit with the army at Samos and heighten
their own confidence, and lastly to prejudice the enemy as strongly as
possible against Tissaphernes, and blast the hopes which they
entertained. Alcibiades accordingly held out to the army such
extravagant promises as the following: that Tissaphernes had
solemnly assured him that if he could only trust the Athenians they
should never want for supplies while he had anything left, no, not
even if he should have to coin his own silver couch, and that he would
bring the Phoenician fleet now at Aspendus to the Athenians instead of
to the Peloponnesians; but that he could only trust the Athenians if
Alcibiades were recalled to be his security for them.
Upon hearing this and much more besides, the Athenians at once
elected him general together with the former ones, and put all their
affairs into his hands. There was now not a man in the army who
would have exchanged his present hopes of safety and vengeance upon
the Four Hundred for any consideration whatever; and after what they
had been told they were now inclined to disdain the enemy before them,
and to sail at once for Piraeus. To the plan of sailing for Piraeus,
leaving their more immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades opposed
the most positive refusal, in spite of the numbers that insisted
upon it, saying that now that he had been elected general he would
first sail to Tissaphernes and concert with him measures for
carrying on the war. Accordingly, upon leaving this assembly, he
immediately took his departure in order to have it thought that
there was an entire confidence between them, and also wishing to
increase his consideration with Tissaphernes, and to show that he
had now been elected general and was in a position to do him good or
evil as he chose; thus managing to frighten the Athenians with
Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.
Meanwhile the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of
Alcibiades and, already distrustful of Tissaphernes, now became far
more disgusted with him than ever. Indeed after their refusal to go
out and give battle to the Athenians when they appeared before
Miletus, Tissaphernes had grown slacker than ever in his payments; and
even before this, on account of Alcibiades, his unpopularity had
been on the increase. Gathering together, just as before, the soldiers
and some persons of consideration besides the soldiery began to reckon
up how they had never yet received their pay in full; that what they
did receive was small in quantity, and even that paid irregularly, and
that unless they fought a decisive battle or removed to some station
where they could get supplies, the ships’ crews would desert; and that
it was all the fault of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his
own private advantage.
The army was engaged in these reflections, when the following
disturbance took place about the person of Astyochus. Most of the
Syracusan and Thurian sailors were freemen, and these the freest crews
in the armament were likewise the boldest in setting upon Astyochus
and demanding their pay. The latter answered somewhat stiffly and
threatened them, and when Dorieus spoke up for his own sailors even
went so far as to lift his baton against him; upon seeing which the
mass of men, in sailor fashion, rushed in a fury to strike
Astyochus. He, however, saw them in time and fled for refuge
Comments (0)