readenglishbook.com » History » History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

Book online «History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗». Author Thucydides



1 ... 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105
Go to page:
of their disobedience; besides a host of other injurious

inventions.

 

On hearing this the first thought of the army was to fall upon the

chief authors of the oligarchy and upon all the rest concerned.

Eventually, however, they desisted from this idea upon the men of

moderate views opposing it and warning them against ruining their

cause, with the enemy close at hand and ready for battle. After

this, Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders

in the revolution, now wishing in the most public manner to change the

government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most

tremendous oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any,

to accept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute actively

the war with the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four

Hundred, and to hold no communication with them. The same oath was

also taken by all the Samians of full age; and the soldiers associated

the Samians in all their affairs and in the fruits of their dangers,

having the conviction that there was no way of escape for themselves

or for them, but that the success of the Four Hundred or of the

enemy at Miletus must be their ruin.

 

The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy

upon the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp.

Meanwhile the soldiers forthwith held an assembly, in which they

deposed the former generals and any of the captains whom they

suspected, and chose new captains and generals to replace them,

besides Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They also

stood up and encouraged one another, and among other things urged that

they ought not to lose heart because the city had revolted from

them, as the party seceding was smaller and in every way poorer in

resources than themselves. They had the whole fleet with which to

compel the other cities in their empire to give them money just as

if they had their base in the capital, having a city in Samos which,

so far from wanting strength, had when at war been within an ace of

depriving the Athenians of the command of the sea, while as far as the

enemy was concerned they had the same base of operations as before.

Indeed, with the fleet in their hands, they were better able to

provide themselves with supplies than the government at home. It was

their advanced position at Samos which had throughout enabled the home

authorities to command the entrance into Piraeus; and if they

refused to give them back the constitution, they would now find that

the army was more in a position to exclude them from the sea than they

were to exclude the army. Besides, the city was of little or no use

towards enabling them to overcome the enemy; and they had lost nothing

in losing those who had no longer either money to send them (the

soldiers having to find this for themselves), or good counsel, which

entitles cities to direct armies. On the contrary, even in this the

home government had done wrong in abolishing the institutions of their

ancestors, while the army maintained the said institutions, and

would try to force the home government to do so likewise. So that even

in point of good counsel the camp had as good counsellors as the city.

Moreover, they had but to grant him security for his person and his

recall, and Alcibiades would be only too glad to procure them the

alliance of the King. And above all if they failed altogether, with

the navy which they possessed, they had numbers of places to retire to

in which they would find cities and lands.

 

Debating together and comforting themselves after this manner,

they pushed on their war measures as actively as ever; and the ten

envoys sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood

while they were still at Delos, stayed quiet there.

About this time a cry arose among the soldiers in the

Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that Astyochus and Tissaphernes were

ruining their cause. Astyochus had not been willing to fight at

sea—either before, while they were still in full vigour and the

fleet of the Athenians small, or now, when the enemy was, as they were

informed, in a state of sedition and his ships not yet united—but

kept them waiting for the Phoenician fleet from Tissaphernes, which

had only a nominal existence, at the risk of wasting away in

inactivity. While Tissaphernes not only did not bring up the fleet in

question, but was ruining their navy by payments made irregularly, and

even then not made in full. They must therefore, they insisted, delay

no longer, but fight a decisive naval engagement. The Syracusans were

the most urgent of any.

 

The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these murmurs, had

already decided in council to fight a decisive battle; and when the

news reached them of the disturbance at Samos, they put to sea with

all their ships, one hundred and ten in number, and, ordering the

Milesians to move by land upon Mycale, set sail thither. The Athenians

with the eighty-two ships from Samos were at the moment lying at

Glauce in Mycale, a point where Samos approaches near to the

continent; and, seeing the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them,

retired into Samos, not thinking themselves numerically strong

enough to stake their all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice from

Miletus of the wish of the enemy to engage, and were expecting to be

joined from the Hellespont by Strombichides, to whom a messenger had

been already dispatched, with the ships that had gone from Chios to

Abydos. The Athenians accordingly withdrew to Samos, and the

Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and encamped with the land forces

of the Milesians and the people of the neighbourhood. The next day

they were about to sail against Samos, when tidings reached them of

the arrival of Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont,

upon which they immediately sailed back to Miletus. The Athenians,

thus reinforced, now in their turn sailed against Miletus with a

hundred and eight ships, wishing to fight a decisive battle, but, as

no one put out to meet them, sailed back to Samos.

CHAPTER XXVI

_Twenty-first Year of the War - Recall of Alcibiades to Samos -

Revolt of Euboea and Downfall of the Four Hundred -

Battle of Cynossema_

 

In the same summer, immediately after this, the Peloponnesians

having refused to fight with their fleet united, through not

thinking themselves a match for the enemy, and being at a loss where

to look for money for such a number of ships, especially as

Tissaphernes proved so bad a paymaster, sent off Clearchus, son of

Ramphias, with forty ships to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the original

instructions from Peloponnese; Pharnabazus inviting them and being

prepared to furnish pay, and Byzantium besides sending offers to

revolt to them. These Peloponnesian ships accordingly put out into the

open sea, in order to escape the observation of the Athenians, and

being overtaken by a storm, the majority with Clearchus got into

Delos, and afterwards returned to Miletus, whence Clearchus

proceeded by land to the Hellespont to take the command: ten, however,

of their number, under the Megarian Helixus, made good their passage

to the Hellespont, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. After this,

the commanders at Samos were informed of it, and sent a squadron

against them to guard the Hellespont; and an encounter took place

before Byzantium between eight vessels on either side.

 

Meanwhile the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who

from the moment that he had changed the government had remained firmly

resolved to recall Alcibiades, at last in an assembly brought over the

mass of the soldiery, and upon their voting for his recall and

amnesty, sailed over to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades to

Samos, being convinced that their only chance of salvation lay in

his bringing over Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to

themselves. An assembly was then held in which Alcibiades complained

of and deplored his private misfortune in having been banished, and

speaking at great length upon public affairs, highly incited their

hopes for the future, and extravagantly magnified his own influence

with Tissaphernes. His object in this was to make the oligarchical

government at Athens afraid of him, to hasten the dissolution of the

clubs, to increase his credit with the army at Samos and heighten

their own confidence, and lastly to prejudice the enemy as strongly as

possible against Tissaphernes, and blast the hopes which they

entertained. Alcibiades accordingly held out to the army such

extravagant promises as the following: that Tissaphernes had

solemnly assured him that if he could only trust the Athenians they

should never want for supplies while he had anything left, no, not

even if he should have to coin his own silver couch, and that he would

bring the Phoenician fleet now at Aspendus to the Athenians instead of

to the Peloponnesians; but that he could only trust the Athenians if

Alcibiades were recalled to be his security for them.

 

Upon hearing this and much more besides, the Athenians at once

elected him general together with the former ones, and put all their

affairs into his hands. There was now not a man in the army who

would have exchanged his present hopes of safety and vengeance upon

the Four Hundred for any consideration whatever; and after what they

had been told they were now inclined to disdain the enemy before them,

and to sail at once for Piraeus. To the plan of sailing for Piraeus,

leaving their more immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades opposed

the most positive refusal, in spite of the numbers that insisted

upon it, saying that now that he had been elected general he would

first sail to Tissaphernes and concert with him measures for

carrying on the war. Accordingly, upon leaving this assembly, he

immediately took his departure in order to have it thought that

there was an entire confidence between them, and also wishing to

increase his consideration with Tissaphernes, and to show that he

had now been elected general and was in a position to do him good or

evil as he chose; thus managing to frighten the Athenians with

Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.

 

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of

Alcibiades and, already distrustful of Tissaphernes, now became far

more disgusted with him than ever. Indeed after their refusal to go

out and give battle to the Athenians when they appeared before

Miletus, Tissaphernes had grown slacker than ever in his payments; and

even before this, on account of Alcibiades, his unpopularity had

been on the increase. Gathering together, just as before, the soldiers

and some persons of consideration besides the soldiery began to reckon

up how they had never yet received their pay in full; that what they

did receive was small in quantity, and even that paid irregularly, and

that unless they fought a decisive battle or removed to some station

where they could get supplies, the ships’ crews would desert; and that

it was all the fault of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his

own private advantage.

 

The army was engaged in these reflections, when the following

disturbance took place about the person of Astyochus. Most of the

Syracusan and Thurian sailors were freemen, and these the freest crews

in the armament were likewise the boldest in setting upon Astyochus

and demanding their pay. The latter answered somewhat stiffly and

threatened them, and when Dorieus spoke up for his own sailors even

went so far as to lift his baton against him; upon seeing which the

mass of men, in sailor fashion, rushed in a fury to strike

Astyochus. He, however, saw them in time and fled for refuge

1 ... 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105
Go to page:

Free e-book «History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗» - read online now

Comments (0)

There are no comments yet. You can be the first!
Add a comment