History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

that the

enemy, emboldened by his victory, might make straight for them and

sail against Piraeus, which they had no longer ships to defend; and

every moment they expected him to arrive. This, with a little more

courage, he might easily have done, in which case he would either have

increased the dissensions of the city by his presence, or, if he had

stayed to besiege it, have compelled the fleet from Ionia, although

the enemy of the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their country and

of their relatives, and in the meantime would have become master of

the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of everything as far as

Euboea, or, to speak roundly, of the whole Athenian empire. But

here, as on so many other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved the

most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war

with. The wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and

want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and

enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service,

especially to a maritime empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown

by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character,

and also most successful in combating them.

 

Nevertheless, upon receipt of the news, the Athenians manned

twenty ships and called immediately a first assembly in the Pnyx,

where they had been used to meet formerly, and deposed the Four

Hundred and voted to hand over the government to the Five Thousand, of

which body all who furnished a suit of armour were to be members,

decreeing also that no one should receive pay for the discharge of any

office, or if he did should be held accursed. Many other assemblies

were held afterwards, in which law-makers were elected and all other

measures taken to form a constitution. It was during the first

period of this constitution that the Athenians appear to have

enjoyed the best government that they ever did, at least in my time.

For the fusion of the high and the low was effected with judgment, and

this was what first enabled the state to raise up her head after her

manifold disasters. They also voted for the recall of Alcibiades and

of other exiles, and sent to him and to the camp at Samos, and urged

them to devote themselves vigorously to the war.

 

Upon this revolution taking place, the party of Pisander and

Alexicles and the chiefs of the oligarchs immediately withdrew to

Decelea, with the single exception of Aristarchus, one of the

generals, who hastily took some of the most barbarian of the archers

and marched to Oenoe. This was a fort of the Athenians upon the

Boeotian border, at that moment besieged by the Corinthians, irritated

by the loss of a party returning from Decelea, who had been cut off by

the garrison. The Corinthians had volunteered for this service, and

had called upon the Boeotians to assist them. After communicating with

them, Aristarchus deceived the garrison in Oenoe by telling them

that their countrymen in the city had compounded with the

Lacedaemonians, and that one of the terms of the capitulation was that

they must surrender the place to the Boeotians. The garrison

believed him as he was general, and besides knew nothing of what had

occurred owing to the siege, and so evacuated the fort under truce. In

this way the Boeotians gained possession of Oenoe, and the oligarchy

and the troubles at Athens ended.

 

To return to the Peloponnesians in Miletus. No pay was forthcoming

from any of the agents deputed by Tissaphernes for that purpose upon

his departure for Aspendus; neither the Phoenician fleet nor

Tissaphernes showed any signs of appearing, and Philip, who had been

sent with him, and another Spartan, Hippocrates, who was at

Phaselis, wrote word to Mindarus, the admiral, that the ships were not

coming at all, and that they were being grossly abused by

Tissaphernes. Meanwhile Pharnabazus was inviting them to come, and

making every effort to get the fleet and, like Tissaphernes, to

cause the revolt of the cities in his government still subject to

Athens, founding great hopes on his success; until at length, at about

the period of the summer which we have now reached, Mindarus yielded

to his importunities, and, with great order and at a moment’s

notice, in order to elude the enemy at Samos, weighed anchor with

seventy-three ships from Miletus and set sail for the Hellespont.

Thither sixteen vessels had already preceded him in the same summer,

and had overrun part of the Chersonese. Being caught in a storm,

Mindarus was compelled to run in to Icarus and, after being detained

five or six days there by stress of weather, arrived at Chios.

 

Meanwhile Thrasyllus had heard of his having put out from Miletus,

and immediately set sail with fifty-five ships from Samos, in haste to

arrive before him in the Hellespont. But learning that he was at

Chios, and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts in

Lesbos and on the continent opposite to prevent the fleet moving

without his knowing it, and himself coasted along to Methymna, and

gave orders to prepare meal and other necessaries, in order to

attack them from Lesbos in the event of their remaining for any length

of time at Chios. Meanwhile he resolved to sail against Eresus, a town

in Lesbos which had revolted, and, if he could, to take it. For some

of the principal Methymnian exiles had carried over about fifty

heavy infantry, their sworn associates, from Cuma, and hiring others

from the continent, so as to make up three hundred in all, chose

Anaxander, a Theban, to command them, on account of the community of

blood existing between the Thebans and the Lesbians, and first

attacked Methymna. Balked in this attempt by the advance of the

Athenian guards from Mitylene, and repulsed a second time in a

battle outside the city, they then crossed the mountain and effected

the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus accordingly determined to go there

with all his ships and to attack the place. Meanwhile Thrasybulus

had preceded him thither with five ships from Samos, as soon as he

heard that the exiles had crossed over, and coming too late to save

Eresus, went on and anchored before the town. Here they were joined

also by two vessels on their way home from the Hellespont, and by

the ships of the Methymnians, making a grand total of sixty-seven

vessels; and the forces on board now made ready with engines and every

other means available to do their utmost to storm Eresus.

 

In the meantime Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after

taking provisions for two days and receiving three Chian pieces of

money for each man from the Chians, on the third day put out in

haste from the island; in order to avoid falling in with the ships

at Eresus, they did not make for the open sea, but keeping Lesbos on

their left, sailed for the continent. After touching at the port of

Carteria, in the Phocaeid, and dining, they went on along the

Cumaean coast and supped at Arginusae, on the continent over against

Mitylene. From thence they continued their voyage along the coast,

although it was late in the night, and arriving at Harmatus on the

continent opposite Methymna, dined there; and swiftly passing

Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the neighbouring towns, arrived a

little before midnight at Rhoeteum. Here they were now in the

Hellespont. Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum and at other

places in the neighbourhood.

 

Meanwhile the warnings of the fire signals and the sudden increase

in the number of fires on the enemy’s shore informed the eighteen

Athenian ships at Sestos of the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet.

That very night they set sail in haste just as they were, and, hugging

the shore of the Chersonese, coasted along to Elaeus, in order to sail

out into the open sea away from the fleet of the enemy.

 

After passing unobserved the sixteen ships at Abydos, which had

nevertheless been warned by their approaching friends to be on the

alert to prevent their sailing out, at dawn they sighted the fleet

of Mindarus, which immediately gave chase. All had not time to get

away; the greater number however escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, while

four of the hindmost were overtaken off Elaeus. One of these was

stranded opposite to the temple of Protesilaus and taken with its

crew, two others without their crews; the fourth was abandoned on

the shore of Imbros and burned by the enemy.

 

After this the Peloponnesians were joined by the squadron from

Abydos, which made up their fleet to a grand total of eighty-six

vessels; they spent the day in unsuccessfully besieging Elaeus, and

then sailed back to Abydos. Meanwhile the Athenians, deceived by their

scouts, and never dreaming of the enemy’s fleet getting by undetected,

were tranquilly besieging Eresus. As soon as they heard the news

they instantly abandoned Eresus, and made with all speed for the

Hellespont, and after taking two of the Peloponnesian ships which

had been carried out too far into the open sea in the ardour of the

pursuit and now fell in their way, the next day dropped anchor at

Elaeus, and, bringing back the ships that had taken refuge at

Imbros, during five days prepared for the coming engagement.

 

After this they engaged in the following way. The Athenians formed in

column and sailed close alongshore to Sestos; upon perceiving which

the Peloponnesians put out from Abydos to meet them. Realizing that

a battle was now imminent, both combatants extended their flank; the

Athenians along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani with

seventy-six ships; the Peloponnesians from Abydos to Dardanus with

eighty-six. The Peloponnesian right wing was occupied by the

Syracusans, their left by Mindarus in person with the best sailers

in the navy; the Athenian left by Thrasyllus, their right by

Thrasybulus, the other commanders being in different parts of the

fleet. The Peloponnesians hastened to engage first, and outflanking

with their left the Athenian right sought to cut them off, if

possible, from sailing out of the straits, and to drive their centre

upon the shore, which was not far off. The Athenians perceiving

their intention extended their own wing and outsailed them, while

their left had by this time passed the point of Cynossema. This,

however, obliged them to thin and weaken their centre, especially as

they had fewer ships than the enemy, and as the coast round Point

Cynossema formed a sharp angle which prevented their seeing what was

going on on the other side of it.

 

The Peloponnesians now attacked their centre and drove ashore the

ships of the Athenians, and disembarked to follow up their victory. No

help could be given to the centre either by the squadron of

Thrasybulus on the right, on account of the number of ships

attacking him, or by that of Thrasyllus on the left, from whom the

point of Cynossema hid what was going on, and who was also hindered by

his Syracusan and other opponents, whose numbers were fully equal to

his own. At length, however, the Peloponnesians in the confidence of

victory began to scatter in pursuit of the ships of the enemy, and

allowed a considerable part of their fleet to get into disorder. On

seeing this the squadron of Thrasybulus discontinued their lateral

movement and, facing about, attacked and routed the ships opposed to

them, and next fell roughly upon the scattered vessels of the

victorious Peloponnesian division, and put most of them to flight

without a blow. The Syracusans also had by this time given way

before the squadron of Thrasyllus, and now openly took to flight

upon seeing the flight of their comrades.

 

The rout was now complete. Most of