History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an

expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own,

six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry,

three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and

about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the

islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not

submit to the Athenians like the other islanders, and at first

remained neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon

the Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, assumed

an attitude of open hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and

Tisias, son of Tisimachus, the generals, encamping in their

territory with the above armament, before doing any harm to their

land, sent envoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring before

the people, but bade them state the object of their mission to the

magistrates and the few; upon which the Athenian envoys spoke as

follows:

 

Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the

people, in order that we may not be able to speak straight on

without interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by

seductive arguments which would pass without refutation (for we know

that this is the meaning of our being brought before the few), what if

you who sit there were to pursue a method more cautious still? Make no

set speech yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not like, and

settle that before going any farther. And first tell us if this

proposition of ours suits you.

 

The Melian commissioners answered:

 

Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you

propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are

too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to

be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect

from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side

and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery.

 

Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the

future, or for anything else than to consult for the safety of your

state upon the facts that you see before you, we will give over;

otherwise we will go on.

 

Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn

more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However, the

question in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country;

and the discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you

propose.

 

Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious

pretences—either of how we have a right to our empire because we

overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you

have done us—and make a long speech which would not be believed; and

in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by

saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their

colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is

feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you

know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in

question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can

and the weak suffer what they must.

 

Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient—we speak as we

are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of

interest—that you should not destroy what is our common protection,

the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and

right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they

can be got to pass current. And you are as much interested in this

as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance

and an example for the world to meditate upon.

 

Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not

frighten us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was

our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as

subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This,

however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to

show you that we are come here in the interest of our empire, and that

we shall say what we are now going to say, for the preservation of

your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over you without

trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both.

 

Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as

for you to rule?

 

Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before

suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.

 

Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends

instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.

 

Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your

friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and

your enmity of our power.

 

Melians. Is that your subjects’ idea of equity, to put those who

have nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are

most of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels?

 

Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it

as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is

because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is

because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we

should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are

islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important

that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea.

 

Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy

which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about

justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain

ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How

can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look

at case from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what

is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and

to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of

it?

 

Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us

but little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their

taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves,

outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be

the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into

obvious danger.

 

Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and

your subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and

cowardice in us who are still free not to try everything that can be

tried, before submitting to your yoke.

 

Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an

equal one, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a

question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far

stronger than you are.

 

Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more

impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose;

to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still

preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect.

 

Athenians. Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by those who

have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without

ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far

as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only

when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them

to guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the

case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale;

nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means

may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to

invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that

delude men with hopes to their destruction.

 

Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the

difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the

terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as

good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that

what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the

Lacedaemonians, who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to

the aid of their kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is

not so utterly irrational.

 

Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as

fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our

conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods,

or practise among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we

know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever

they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or

to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall

leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it,

knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have,

would do the same as we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we

have no fear and no reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage.

But when we come to your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which

leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, here we bless

your simplicity but do not envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when

their own interests or their country’s laws are in question, are the

worthiest men alive; of their conduct towards others much might be

said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than by shortly

saying that of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in

considering what is agreeable honourable, and what is expedient

just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much for the safety

which you now unreasonably count upon.

 

Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their

respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians,

their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in

Hellas and helping their enemies.

 

Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes

with security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without

danger; and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little as

possible.

 

Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face

even danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as

our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our

common blood ensures our fidelity.

 

Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the

goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of

power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than

others. At least, such is their distrust of their home resources

that it is only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now

is it likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over

to an island?

 

Melians.