History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

these at home on

our own behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles

whose interest it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing

but talk themselves and leave the danger to others, and who if they

succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down

their friends with them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed at

being chosen to command, who urges you to make the expedition,

merely for ends of his own—specially if he be still too young to

command—who seeks to be admired for his stud of horses, but on

account of its heavy expenses hopes for some profit from his

appointment, do not allow such a one to maintain his private splendour

at his country’s risk, but remember that such persons injure the

public fortune while they squander their own, and that this is a

matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide or hastily to

take in hand.

 

“When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same

individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn,

summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next

him not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a

coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely

success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to

them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country,

now threatened by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his

hand on the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the

limits now existing between us, limits of which no one can complain

(the Ionian sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the

open main), to enjoy their own possessions and to settle their own

quarrels; that the Egestaeans, for their part, be told to end by

themselves with the Selinuntines the war which they began without

consulting the Athenians; and that for the future we do not enter into

alliance, as we have been used to do, with people whom we must help in

their need, and who can never help us in ours.

 

“And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the

commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put the

question to the vote, and take a second time the opinions of the

Athenians. If you are afraid to move the question again, consider that

a violation of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many

abettors, that you will be the physician of your misguided city, and

that the virtue of men in office is briefly this, to do their

country as much good as they can, or in any case no harm that they can

avoid.”

 

Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that came

forward spoke in favour of the expedition, and of not annulling what

had been voted, although some spoke on the other side. By far the

warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of

Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent

and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and

who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped

to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and

reputation by means of his successes. For the position he held among

the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real

means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his

expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin of

the Athenian state. Alarmed at the greatness of his licence in his own

life and habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things

soever that he undertook, the mass of the people set him down as a

pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although

publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired,

individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to

commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the

city. Meanwhile he now came forward and gave the following advice to

the Athenians:

 

“Athenians, I have a better right to command than others—I must

begin with this as Nicias has attacked me—and at the same time I

believe myself to be worthy of it. The things for which I am abused,

bring fame to my ancestors and to myself, and to the country profit

besides. The Hellenes, after expecting to see our city ruined by the

war, concluded it to be even greater than it really is, by reason of

the magnificence with which I represented it at the Olympic games,

when I sent into the lists seven chariots, a number never before

entered by any private person, and won the first prize, and was second

and fourth, and took care to have everything else in a style worthy of

my victory. Custom regards such displays as honourable, and they

cannot be made without leaving behind them an impression of power.

Again, any splendour that I may have exhibited at home in providing

choruses or otherwise, is naturally envied by my fellow citizens,

but in the eyes of foreigners has an air of strength as in the other

instance. And this is no useless folly, when a man at his own

private cost benefits not himself only, but his city: nor is it unfair

that he who prides himself on his position should refuse to be upon an

equality with the rest. He who is badly off has his misfortunes all to

himself, and as we do not see men courted in adversity, on the like

principle a man ought to accept the insolence of prosperity; or

else, let him first mete out equal measure to all, and then demand

to have it meted out to him. What I know is that persons of this

kind and all others that have attained to any distinction, although

they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their relations with

their fellow-men and especially with their equals, leave to

posterity the desire of claiming connection with them even without any

ground, and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged, not

as strangers or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such

are my aspirations, and however I am abused for them in private, the

question is whether any one manages public affairs better than I do.

Having united the most powerful states of Peloponnese, without great

danger or expense to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake

their all upon the issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although

victorious in the battle, they have never since fully recovered

confidence.

 

“Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting

arguments to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its

ardour win their confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid of my

youth now, but while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears

fortunate, avail yourselves to the utmost of the services of us

both. Neither rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground

that you would be going to attack a great power. The cities in

Sicily are peopled by motley rabbles, and easily change their

institutions and adopt new ones in their stead; and consequently the

inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism, are not provided

with arms for their persons, and have not regularly established

themselves on the land; every man thinks that either by fair words

or by party strife he can obtain something at the public expense,

and then in the event of a catastrophe settle in some other country,

and makes his preparations accordingly. From a mob like this you

need not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in action;

but they will probably one by one come in as they get a fair offer,

especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are told.

Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they boast;

just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous as each state

reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers,

and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this

war. The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will

be found as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages,

for we shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred

of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the

powers at home prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our

fathers with these very adversaries, which it is said we shall now

leave behind us when we sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well,

were able to win the empire, depending solely on their superiority

at sea. The Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us as at

present; and let them be ever so sanguine, although strong enough to

invade our country even if we stay at home, they can never hurt us

with their navy, as we leave one of our own behind us that is a

match for them.

 

“In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for

holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily

for not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to

assist them, without objecting that they have not assisted us. We

did not take them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas, but

that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from

coming over here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has been

won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant

readiness to support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that

invite assistance; since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and

choose whom they ought to assist, we should make but few new

conquests, and should imperil those we have already won. Men do not

rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often strike

the first blow to prevent the attack being made. And we cannot fix the

exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position

in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to

extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of

being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same

point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits

and make them like theirs.

 

“Be convinced, then, that we shall augment our power at home by this

adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the

pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them

see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and

at the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily

may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian

Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small

advantage of ourselves and our allies. The faculty of staying if

successful, or of returning, will be secured to us by our navy, as

we shall be superior at sea to all the Siceliots put together. And

do not let the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his

setting of the young against the old, turn you from your purpose,

but in the good old fashion by which our fathers, old and young

together, by their