History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗
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smaller craft and the rest of the expedition, had already received
orders to muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian Sea from thence in
a body to the Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves, and
such of their allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus
upon a day appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for
putting out to sea. With them also went down the whole population, one
may say, of the city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of
the country each escorting those that belonged to them, their friends,
their relatives, or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their
way, as they thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or
of the friends whom they might never see again, considering the long
voyage which they were going to make from their country. Indeed, at
this moment, when they were now upon the point of parting from one
another, the danger came more home to them than when they voted for
the expedition; although the strength of the armament, and the profuse
provision which they remarked in every department, was a sight that
could not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of
the crowd, they simply went to see a sight worth looking at and
passing all belief.
Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most
costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a
single city up to that time. In mere number of ships and heavy
infantry that against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when
going against Potidaea under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing as
it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and
one hundred galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and
many allies besides. But these were sent upon a short voyage and
with a scanty equipment. The present expedition was formed in
contemplation of a long term of service by land and sea alike, and was
furnished with ships and troops so as to be ready for either as
required. The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great cost to the
captains and the state; the treasury giving a drachma a day to each
seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty men-of-war and forty
transports, and manning these with the best crews obtainable; while
the captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to
the thranitae and crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon
figure-heads and equipments, and one and all making the utmost
exertions to enable their own ships to excel in beauty and fast
sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been picked from the best
muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great attention to
their arms and personal accoutrements. From this resulted not only a
rivalry among themselves in their different departments, but an idea
among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a display of power and
resources than an armament against an enemy. For if any one had
counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private outlay
of individuals—that is to say, the sums which the state had already
spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands of the
generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their personal
outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still to lay
out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey
money which each was likely to have provided himself with,
independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such
length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the
purpose of exchange—it would have been found that many talents in
all were being taken out of the city. Indeed the expedition became not
less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its
appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the
peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was
the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most
ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those who
undertook it.
The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which
they meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers
customary before putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship
by itself, but by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls
of wine were mixed through all the armament, and libations made by the
soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets. In their
prayers joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens and all others
that wished them well. The hymn sung and the libations finished,
they put out to sea, and first out in column then raced each other
as far as Aegina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra, where the rest
of the allied forces were also assembling.
_Seventeenth Year of the War - Parties at Syracuse - Story of
Harmodius and Aristogiton - Disgrace of Alcibiades_
Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the
expedition, but for a long while met with no credence whatever.
Indeed, an assembly was held in which speeches, as will be seen,
were delivered by different orators, believing or contradicting the
report of the Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of
Hermon, came forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the
matter, and gave the following counsel:
“Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have
been when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I
know that those who either make or repeat statements thought not
worthy of belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for
their pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my
tongue when the state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can
speak with more authority on the matter than other persons. Much as
you wonder at it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us
with a large force, naval and military, professedly to help the
Egestaeans and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily,
and above all our city, which once gained, the rest, they think,
will easily follow. Make up your minds, therefore, to see them
speedily here, and see how you can best repel them with the means
under your hand, and do be taken off your guard through despising
the news, or neglect the common weal through disbelieving it.
Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at the force or
daring of the enemy. They will not be able to do us more hurt than
we shall do them; nor is the greatness of their armament altogether
without advantage to us. Indeed, the greater it is the better, with
regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay will make more
ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, disappointed of
the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a moment that
they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious exploit
for us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one. Few indeed
have been the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian, that have
gone far from home and been successful. They cannot be more numerous
than the people of the country and their neighbours, all of whom
fear leagues together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies in
a foreign land, to those against whom their plans were laid none the
less they leave renown, although they may themselves have been the
main cause of their own discomfort. Thus these very Athenians rose
by the defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental
causes, from the mere fact that Athens had been the object of his
attack; and this may very well be the case with us also.
“Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send
and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance
of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that
the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our
allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also
think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by
no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear
that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps
think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be
sacrificed, and be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one
way if not in another. They are the best able to do so, if they
will, of any of the present day, as they possess most gold and silver,
by which war, like everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to
Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to come here and help us as
soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in Hellas. But the true
thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present moment, is
what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see,
and what I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together,
or at least as many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch
the whole of our actual navy with two months’ provisions, and meet the
Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them
that before fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their
passage across the Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into their
army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for our
defensive—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—while they have a wide
sea to cross with all their armament, which could with difficulty keep
its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to attack
as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the other hand, if
they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast
sailers and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them
when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do
so, we could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few
provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate
places, and would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to
sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and being
further discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the cities
would receive them. In my opinion this consideration alone would be
sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what
with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts,
they would let the season go on until winter was upon them, or,
confounded by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up the
expedition, especially as their most experienced general has, as I
hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first
excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours. We should also be
reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, and men’s
minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to attack,
or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack,
inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the
emergency. This would just be the case with the Athenians at
present. They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not
resist, having a right to judge us severely because we did not help
the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see us
showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they would
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