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the corn transports and the

smaller craft and the rest of the expedition, had already received

orders to muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian Sea from thence in

a body to the Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves, and

such of their allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus

upon a day appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for

putting out to sea. With them also went down the whole population, one

may say, of the city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of

the country each escorting those that belonged to them, their friends,

their relatives, or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their

way, as they thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or

of the friends whom they might never see again, considering the long

voyage which they were going to make from their country. Indeed, at

this moment, when they were now upon the point of parting from one

another, the danger came more home to them than when they voted for

the expedition; although the strength of the armament, and the profuse

provision which they remarked in every department, was a sight that

could not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of

the crowd, they simply went to see a sight worth looking at and

passing all belief.

 

Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most

costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a

single city up to that time. In mere number of ships and heavy

infantry that against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when

going against Potidaea under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing as

it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and

one hundred galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and

many allies besides. But these were sent upon a short voyage and

with a scanty equipment. The present expedition was formed in

contemplation of a long term of service by land and sea alike, and was

furnished with ships and troops so as to be ready for either as

required. The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great cost to the

captains and the state; the treasury giving a drachma a day to each

seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty men-of-war and forty

transports, and manning these with the best crews obtainable; while

the captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to

the thranitae and crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon

figure-heads and equipments, and one and all making the utmost

exertions to enable their own ships to excel in beauty and fast

sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been picked from the best

muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great attention to

their arms and personal accoutrements. From this resulted not only a

rivalry among themselves in their different departments, but an idea

among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a display of power and

resources than an armament against an enemy. For if any one had

counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private outlay

of individuals—that is to say, the sums which the state had already

spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands of the

generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their personal

outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still to lay

out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey

money which each was likely to have provided himself with,

independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such

length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the

purpose of exchange—it would have been found that many talents in

all were being taken out of the city. Indeed the expedition became not

less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its

appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the

peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was

the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most

ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those who

undertook it.

 

The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which

they meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers

customary before putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship

by itself, but by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls

of wine were mixed through all the armament, and libations made by the

soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets. In their

prayers joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens and all others

that wished them well. The hymn sung and the libations finished,

they put out to sea, and first out in column then raced each other

as far as Aegina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra, where the rest

of the allied forces were also assembling.

CHAPTER XIX

_Seventeenth Year of the War - Parties at Syracuse - Story of

Harmodius and Aristogiton - Disgrace of Alcibiades_

 

Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the

expedition, but for a long while met with no credence whatever.

Indeed, an assembly was held in which speeches, as will be seen,

were delivered by different orators, believing or contradicting the

report of the Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of

Hermon, came forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the

matter, and gave the following counsel:

 

“Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have

been when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I

know that those who either make or repeat statements thought not

worthy of belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for

their pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my

tongue when the state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can

speak with more authority on the matter than other persons. Much as

you wonder at it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us

with a large force, naval and military, professedly to help the

Egestaeans and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily,

and above all our city, which once gained, the rest, they think,

will easily follow. Make up your minds, therefore, to see them

speedily here, and see how you can best repel them with the means

under your hand, and do be taken off your guard through despising

the news, or neglect the common weal through disbelieving it.

Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at the force or

daring of the enemy. They will not be able to do us more hurt than

we shall do them; nor is the greatness of their armament altogether

without advantage to us. Indeed, the greater it is the better, with

regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay will make more

ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, disappointed of

the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a moment that

they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious exploit

for us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one. Few indeed

have been the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian, that have

gone far from home and been successful. They cannot be more numerous

than the people of the country and their neighbours, all of whom

fear leagues together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies in

a foreign land, to those against whom their plans were laid none the

less they leave renown, although they may themselves have been the

main cause of their own discomfort. Thus these very Athenians rose

by the defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental

causes, from the mere fact that Athens had been the object of his

attack; and this may very well be the case with us also.

 

“Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send

and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance

of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that

the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our

allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also

think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by

no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear

that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps

think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be

sacrificed, and be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one

way if not in another. They are the best able to do so, if they

will, of any of the present day, as they possess most gold and silver,

by which war, like everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to

Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to come here and help us as

soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in Hellas. But the true

thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present moment, is

what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see,

and what I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together,

or at least as many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch

the whole of our actual navy with two months’ provisions, and meet the

Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them

that before fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their

passage across the Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into their

army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for our

defensive—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—while they have a wide

sea to cross with all their armament, which could with difficulty keep

its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to attack

as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the other hand, if

they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast

sailers and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them

when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do

so, we could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few

provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate

places, and would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to

sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and being

further discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the cities

would receive them. In my opinion this consideration alone would be

sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what

with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts,

they would let the season go on until winter was upon them, or,

confounded by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up the

expedition, especially as their most experienced general has, as I

hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first

excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours. We should also be

reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, and men’s

minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to attack,

or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack,

inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the

emergency. This would just be the case with the Athenians at

present. They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not

resist, having a right to judge us severely because we did not help

the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see us

showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they would

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