History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

united counsels brought our affairs to their

present height, do you endeavour still to advance them;

understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one

without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate

judgment are strongest when united, and that, by sinking into

inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and

its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give

it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in

word but in deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not

inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself

than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of

life is to take one’s character and institutions for better and for

worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can.”

 

Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the

Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them

of their oaths and imploring their assistance, the Athenians became

more eager for the expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving that

it would be now useless to try to deter them by the old line of

argument, but thinking that he might perhaps alter their resolution by

the extravagance of his estimates, came forward a second time and

spoke as follows:

 

“I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition,

and therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to

give you my opinion at the present juncture. From all that I hear we

are going against cities that are great and not subject to one

another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from

enforced servitude to an easier condition, or in the least likely to

accept our rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the

Hellenic towns, they are very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos

and Catana, which I expect to join us from their connection with

Leontini, there are seven others armed at all points just like our own

power, particularly Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our

expedition. These are full of heavy infantry, archers, and darters,

have galleys in abundance and crowds to man them; they have also

money, partly in the hands of private persons, partly in the temples

at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from some of the barbarians

as well. But their chief advantage over us lies in the number of their

horses, and in the fact that they grow their corn at home instead of

importing it.

 

“Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak

naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail

with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are

not to be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry;

especially if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we

should be left without friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us

with horse to defend ourselves with. It would be disgraceful to have

to retire under compulsion, or to send back for reinforcements,

owing to want of reflection at first: we must therefore start from

home with a competent force, seeing that we are going to sail far from

our country, and upon an expedition not like any which you may

undertaken undertaken the quality of allies, among your subject states

here in Hellas, where any additional supplies needed were easily drawn

from the friendly territory; but we are cutting ourselves off, and

going to a land entirely strange, from which during four months in

winter it is not even easy for a messenger get to Athens.

 

“I think, therefore, that we ought to take great numbers of heavy

infantry, both from Athens and from our allies, and not merely from

our subjects, but also any we may be able to get for love or for money

in Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers and slingers, to

make head against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must have an

overwhelming superiority at sea, to enable us the more easily to carry

in what we want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels,

that is to say, wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills

compelled to serve for pay in the proper proportion; in order that

in case of our being weather-bound the armament may not want

provisions, as it is not every city that will be able to entertain

numbers like ours. We must also provide ourselves with everything else

as far as we can, so as not to be dependent upon others; and above all

we must take with us from home as much money as possible, as the

sums talked of as ready at Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in

talk than in any other way.

 

“Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that

of the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field,

but even at all points superior to him, we shall still find it

difficult to conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We must not disguise

from ourselves that we go to found a city among strangers and enemies,

and that he who undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to

become master of the country the first day he lands, or failing in

this to find everything hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that

we shall have need of much good counsel and more good fortune—a hard

matter for mortal man to aspire to—I wish as far as may be to make

myself independent of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail, to

be as safe as a strong force can make me. This I believe to be

surest for the country at large, and safest for us who are to go on

the expedition. If any one thinks differently I resign to him my

command.”

 

With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust

the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to

sail on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible.

The Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage

taken away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more

eager for it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what

Nicias had thought, as it was held that he had given good advice,

and that the expedition would be the safest in the world. All alike

fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they

would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or

at all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those

in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles,

and had no doubt that they should come safe home again; while the idea

of the common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment,

and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for

the future. With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked

it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against

it, and so kept quiet.

 

At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and

told him that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say at

once before them all what forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon

this he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise upon that

matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far however as he could

see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred galleys—the

Athenians providing as many transports as they might determine, and

sending for others from the allies—not less than five thousand heavy

infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible more; and the

rest of the armament in proportion; archers from home and from

Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable, being got

ready by the generals and taken with them.

 

Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals

should have full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and

of the expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the

interests of Athens. After this the preparations began; messages being

sent to the allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city had

just recovered from the plague and the long war, and a number of young

men had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of the truce,

everything was the more easily provided.

 

In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermae in the

city of Athens, that is to say the customary square figures, so common

in the doorways of private houses and temples, had in one night most

of them their fares mutilated. No one knew who had done it, but

large public rewards were offered to find the authors; and it was

further voted that any one who knew of any other act of impiety having

been committed should come and give information without fear of

consequences, whether he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was

taken up the more seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the

expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and

to upset the democracy.

 

Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body

servants, not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations

of other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and of

mock celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in private

houses. Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken

hold of by those who could least endure him, because he stood in the

way of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and

who thought that if he were once removed the first place would be

theirs. These accordingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed

that the affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were

part and parcel of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that

nothing of all this had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs

alleged being the general and undemocratic licence of his life and

habits.

 

Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also

before going on the expedition, the preparations for which were now

complete, offered to stand his trial, that it might be seen whether he

was guilty of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be punished if

found guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the command. Meanwhile he

protested against their receiving slanders against him in his absence,

and begged them rather to put him to death at once if he were

guilty, and pointed out the imprudence of sending him out at the

head of so large an army, with so serious a charge still undecided.

But his enemies feared that he would have the army for him if he

were tried immediately, and that the people might relent in favour

of the man whom they already caressed as the cause of the Argives

and some of the Mantineans joining in the expedition, and did their

utmost to get this proposition rejected, putting forward other orators

who said that he ought at present to sail and not delay the

departure of the army, and be tried on his return within a fixed

number of days; their plan being to have him sent for and brought home

for trial upon some graver charge, which they would the more easily

get up in his absence. Accordingly it was decreed that he should sail.

 

After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about

midsummer. Most of the allies, with