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the Athenians having about sixty remaining

as against less than fifty of their opponents. Nicias was quite of his

mind; but when they wished to man the vessels, the sailors refused

to go on board, being so utterly overcome by their defeat as no longer

to believe in the possibility of success.

 

Accordingly they all now made up their minds to retreat by land.

Meanwhile the Syracusan Hermocrates—suspecting their intention, and

impressed by the danger of allowing a force of that magnitude to

retire by land, establish itself in some other part of Sicily, and

from thence renew the war—went and stated his views to the

authorities, and pointed out to them that they ought not to let the

enemy get away by night, but that all the Syracusans and their

allies should at once march out and block up the roads and seize and

guard the passes. The authorities were entirely of his opinion, and

thought that it ought to be done, but on the other hand felt sure that

the people, who had given themselves over to rejoicing, and were

taking their ease after a great battle at sea, would not be easily

brought to obey; besides, they were celebrating a festival, having

on that day a sacrifice to Heracles, and most of them in their rapture

at the victory had fallen to drinking at the festival, and would

probably consent to anything sooner than to take up their arms and

march out at that moment. For these reasons the thing appeared

impracticable to the magistrates; and Hermocrates, finding himself

unable to do anything further with them, had now recourse to the

following stratagem of his own. What he feared was that the

Athenians might quietly get the start of them by passing the most

difficult places during the night; and he therefore sent, as soon as

it was dusk, some friends of his own to the camp with some horsemen

who rode up within earshot and called out to some of the men, as

though they were well-wishers of the Athenians, and told them to

tell Nicias (who had in fact some correspondents who informed him of

what went on inside the town) not to lead off the army by night as the

Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to make his preparations at

his leisure and to retreat by day. After saying this they departed;

and their hearers informed the Athenian generals, who put off going

for that night on the strength of this message, not doubting its

sincerity.

 

Since after all they had not set out at once, they now determined to

stay also the following day to give time to the soldiers to pack up as

well as they could the most useful articles, and, leaving everything

else behind, to start only with what was strictly necessary for

their personal subsistence. Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus

marched out and blocked up the roads through the country by which

the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept guard at the fords of

the streams and rivers, posting themselves so as to receive them and

stop the army where they thought best; while their fleet sailed up

to the beach and towed off the ships of the Athenians. Some few were

burned by the Athenians themselves as they had intended; the rest

the Syracusans lashed on to their own at their leisure as they had

been thrown up on shore, without any one trying to stop them, and

conveyed to the town.

 

After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking that enough had been

done in the way of preparation, the removal of the army took place

upon the second day after the sea-fight. It was a lamentable scene,

not merely from the single circumstance that they were retreating

after having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone, and

themselves and the state in peril; but also in leaving the camp

there were things most grievous for every eye and heart to

contemplate. The dead lay unburied, and each man as he recognized a

friend among them shuddered with grief and horror; while the living

whom they were leaving behind, wounded or sick, were to the living far

more shocking than the dead, and more to be pitied than those who

had perished. These fell to entreating and bewailing until their

friends knew not what to do, begging them to take them and loudly

calling to each individual comrade or relative whom they could see,

hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of

departure, and following as far as they could, and, when their

bodily strength failed them, calling again and again upon heaven and

shrieking aloud as they were left behind. So that the whole army being

filled with tears and distracted after this fashion found it not

easy to go, even from an enemy’s land, where they had already suffered

evils too great for tears and in the unknown future before them feared

to suffer more. Dejection and self-condemnation were also rife among

them. Indeed they could only be compared to a starved-out town, and

that no small one, escaping; the whole multitude upon the march

being not less than forty thousand men. All carried anything they

could which might be of use, and the heavy infantry and troopers,

contrary to their wont, while under arms carried their own victuals,

in some cases for want of servants, in others through not trusting

them; as they had long been deserting and now did so in greater

numbers than ever. Yet even thus they did not carry enough, as there

was no longer food in the camp. Moreover their disgrace generally, and

the universality of their sufferings, however to a certain extent

alleviated by being borne in company, were still felt at the moment

a heavy burden, especially when they contrasted the splendour and

glory of their setting out with the humiliation in which it had ended.

For this was by far the greatest reverse that ever befell an

Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and were departing

in fear of being enslaved themselves: they had sailed out with

prayer and paeans, and now started to go back with omens directly

contrary; travelling by land instead of by sea, and trusting not in

their fleet but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless the greatness of

the danger still impending made all this appear tolerable.

 

Nicias seeing the army dejected and greatly altered, passed along

the ranks and encouraged and comforted them as far as was possible

under the circumstances, raising his voice still higher and higher

as he went from one company to another in his earnestness, and in

his anxiety that the benefit of his words might reach as many as

possible:

 

“Athenians and allies, even in our present position we must still

hope on, since men have ere now been saved from worse straits than

this; and you must not condemn yourselves too severely either

because of your disasters or because of your present unmerited

sufferings. I myself who am not superior to any of you in

strength—indeed you see how I am in my sickness—and who in the gifts

of fortune am, I think, whether in private life or otherwise, the

equal of any, am now exposed to the same danger as the meanest among

you; and yet my life has been one of much devotion toward the gods,

and of much justice and without offence toward men. I have, therefore,

still a strong hope for the future, and our misfortunes do not terrify

me as much as they might. Indeed we may hope that they will be

lightened: our enemies have had good fortune enough; and if any of the

gods was offended at our expedition, we have been already amply

punished. Others before us have attacked their neighbours and have

done what men will do without suffering more than they could bear; and

we may now justly expect to find the gods more kind, for we have

become fitter objects for their pity than their jealousy. And then

look at yourselves, mark the numbers and efficiency of the heavy

infantry marching in your ranks, and do not give way too much to

despondency, but reflect that you are yourselves at once a city

wherever you sit down, and that there is no other in Sicily that could

easily resist your attack, or expel you when once established. The

safety and order of the march is for yourselves to look to; the one

thought of each man being that the spot on which he may be forced to

fight must be conquered and held as his country and stronghold.

Meanwhile we shall hasten on our way night and day alike, as our

provisions are scanty; and if we can reach some friendly place of

the Sicels, whom fear of the Syracusans still keeps true to us, you

may forthwith consider yourselves safe. A message has been sent on

to them with directions to meet us with supplies of food. To sum up,

be convinced, soldiers, that you must be brave, as there is no place

near for your cowardice to take refuge in, and that if you now

escape from the enemy, you may all see again what your hearts

desire, while those of you who are Athenians will raise up again the

great power of the state, fallen though it be. Men make the city and

not walls or ships without men in them.”

 

As he made this address, Nicias went along the ranks, and brought

back to their place any of the troops that he saw straggling out of

the line; while Demosthenes did as much for his part of the army,

addressing them in words very similar. The army marched in a hollow

square, the division under Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes

following, the heavy infantry being outside and the baggage-carriers

and the bulk of the army in the middle. When they arrived at the

ford of the river Anapus there they found drawn up a body of the

Syracusans and allies, and routing these, made good their passage

and pushed on, harassed by the charges of the Syracusan horse and by

the missiles of their light troops. On that day they advanced about

four miles and a half, halting for the night upon a certain hill. On

the next they started early and got on about two miles further, and

descended into a place in the plain and there encamped, in order to

procure some eatables from the houses, as the place was inhabited, and

to carry on with them water from thence, as for many furlongs in

front, in the direction in which they were going, it was not

plentiful. The Syracusans meanwhile went on and fortified the pass

in front, where there was a steep hill with a rocky ravine on each

side of it, called the Acraean cliff. The next day the Athenians

advancing found themselves impeded by the missiles and charges of

the horse and darters, both very numerous, of the Syracusans and

allies; and after fighting for a long while, at length retired to

the same camp, where they had no longer provisions as before, it being

impossible to leave their position by reason of the cavalry.

 

Early next morning they started afresh and forced their way to the

hill, which had been fortified, where they found before them the

enemy’s infantry drawn up many shields deep to defend the

fortification, the pass being narrow. The Athenians assaulted the

work, but were greeted by a storm of missiles from the hill, which

told with the greater effect through its being a steep one, and unable

to force the passage, retreated again and rested. Meanwhile occurred

some claps of thunder and rain, as often happens towards autumn, which

still further disheartened the Athenians, who thought all these things

to be omens of

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