History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

never have sent for if he

had attacked immediately; for they fancied that they were a match

for him by themselves, and would not have discovered their inferiority

until they were already invested, and even if they then sent for

succours, they would no longer have been equally able to profit by

their arrival. Recollecting this, and well aware that it was now on

the first day after his arrival that he like Nicias was most

formidable to the enemy, Demosthenes determined to lose no time in

drawing the utmost profit from the consternation at the moment

inspired by his army; and seeing that the counterwall of the

Syracusans, which hindered the Athenians from investing them, was a

single one, and that he who should become master of the way up to

Epipolae, and afterwards of the camp there, would find no difficulty

in taking it, as no one would even wait for his attack, made all haste

to attempt the enterprise. This he took to be the shortest way of

ending the war, as he would either succeed and take Syracuse, or would

lead back the armament instead of frittering away the lives of the

Athenians engaged in the expedition and the resources of the country

at large.

 

First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste the lands of

the Syracusans about the Anapus and carried all before them as at

first by land and by sea, the Syracusans not offering to oppose them

upon either element, unless it were with their cavalry and darters

from the Olympieum. Next Demosthenes resolved to attempt the

counterwall first by means of engines. As however the engines that

he brought up were burnt by the enemy fighting from the wall, and

the rest of the forces repulsed after attacking at many different

points, he determined to delay no longer, and having obtained the

consent of Nicias and his fellow commanders, proceeded to put in

execution his plan of attacking Epipolae. As by day it seemed

impossible to approach and get up without being observed, he ordered

provisions for five days, took all the masons and carpenters, and

other things, such as arrows, and everything else that they could want

for the work of fortification if successful, and, after the first

watch, set out with Eurymedon and Menander and the whole army for

Epipolae, Nicias being left behind in the lines. Having come up by the

hill of Euryelus (where the former army had ascended at first)

unobserved by the enemy’s guards, they went up to the fort which the

Syracusans had there, and took it, and put to the sword part of the

garrison. The greater number, however, escaped at once and gave the

alarm to the camps, of which there were three upon Epipolae,

defended by outworks, one of the Syracusans, one of the other

Siceliots, and one of the allies; and also to the six hundred

Syracusans forming the original garrison for this part of Epipolae.

These at once advanced against the assailants and, falling in with

Demosthenes and the Athenians, were routed by them after a sharp

resistance, the victors immediately pushing on, eager to achieve the

objects of the attack without giving time for their ardour to cool;

meanwhile others from the very beginning were taking the counterwall

of the Syracusans, which was abandoned by its garrison, and pulling

down the battlements. The Syracusans and the allies, and Gylippus with

the troops under his command, advanced to the rescue from the

outworks, but engaged in some consternation (a night attack being a

piece of audacity which they had never expected), and were at first

compelled to retreat. But while the Athenians, flushed with their

victory, now advanced with less order, wishing to make their way as

quickly as possible through the whole force of the enemy not yet

engaged, without relaxing their attack or giving them time to rally,

the Boeotians made the first stand against them, attacked them, routed

them, and put them to flight.

 

The Athenians now fell into great disorder and perplexity, so that

it was not easy to get from one side or the other any detailed account

of the affair. By day certainly the combatants have a clearer

notion, though even then by no means of all that takes place, no one

knowing much of anything that does not go on in his own immediate

neighbourhood; but in a night engagement (and this was the only one

that occurred between great armies during the war) how could any one

know anything for certain? Although there was a bright moon they saw

each other only as men do by moonlight, that is to say, they could

distinguish the form of the body, but could not tell for certain

whether it was a friend or an enemy. Both had great numbers of heavy

infantry moving about in a small space. Some of the Athenians were

already defeated, while others were coming up yet unconquered for

their first attack. A large part also of the rest of their forces

either had only just got up, or were still ascending, so that they did

not know which way to march. Owing to the rout that had taken place

all in front was now in confusion, and the noise made it difficult

to distinguish anything. The victorious Syracusans and allies were

cheering each other on with loud cries, by night the only possible

means of communication, and meanwhile receiving all who came against

them; while the Athenians were seeking for one another, taking all

in front of them for enemies, even although they might be some of

their now flying friends; and by constantly asking for the

watchword, which was their only means of recognition, not only

caused great confusion among themselves by asking all at once, but

also made it known to the enemy, whose own they did not so readily

discover, as the Syracusans were victorious and not scattered, and

thus less easily mistaken. The result was that if the Athenians fell

in with a party of the enemy that was weaker than they, it escaped

them through knowing their watchword; while if they themselves

failed to answer they were put to the sword. But what hurt them as

much, or indeed more than anything else, was the singing of the paean,

from the perplexity which it caused by being nearly the same on either

side; the Argives and Corcyraeans and any other Dorian peoples in

the army, struck terror into the Athenians whenever they raised

their paean, no less than did the enemy. Thus, after being once thrown

into disorder, they ended by coming into collision with each other

in many parts of the field, friends with friends, and citizens with

citizens, and not only terrified one another, but even came to blows

and could only be parted with difficulty. In the pursuit many perished

by throwing themselves down the cliffs, the way down from Epipolae

being narrow; and of those who got down safely into the plain,

although many, especially those who belonged to the first armament,

escaped through their better acquaintance with the locality, some of

the newcomers lost their way and wandered over the country, and were

cut off in the morning by the Syracusan cavalry and killed.

 

The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one upon Epipolae

where the ascent had been made, and the other on the spot where the

first check was given by the Boeotians; and the Athenians took back

their dead under truce. A great many of the Athenians and allies

were killed, although still more arms were taken than could be

accounted for by the number of the dead, as some of those who were

obliged to leap down from the cliffs without their shields escaped

with their lives and did not perish like the rest.

 

After this the Syracusans, recovering their old confidence at such

an unexpected stroke of good fortune, dispatched Sicanus with

fifteen ships to Agrigentum where there was a revolution, to induce if

possible the city to join them; while Gylippus again went by land into

the rest of Sicily to bring up reinforcements, being now in hope of

taking the Athenian lines by storm, after the result of the affair

on Epipolae.

 

In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon the disaster

which had happened, and upon the general weakness of the army. They

saw themselves unsuccessful in their enterprises, and the soldiers

disgusted with their stay; disease being rife among them owing to

its being the sickly season of the year, and to the marshy and

unhealthy nature of the spot in which they were encamped; and the

state of their affairs generally being thought desperate. Accordingly,

Demosthenes was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but

agreeably to his original idea in risking the attempt upon Epipolae,

now that this had failed, he gave his vote for going away without

further loss of time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and their

late reinforcement might give them the superiority at all events on

that element. He also said that it would be more profitable for the

state to carry on the war against those who were building

fortifications in Attica, than against the Syracusans whom it was no

longer easy to subdue; besides which it was not right to squander

large sums of money to no purpose by going on with the siege.

 

This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, without denying the bad

state of their affairs, was unwilling to avow their weakness, or to

have it reported to the enemy that the Athenians in full council

were openly voting for retreat; for in that case they would be much

less likely to effect it when they wanted without discovery. Moreover,

his own particular information still gave him reason to hope that

the affairs of the enemy would soon be in a worse state than their

own, if the Athenians persevered in the siege; as they would wear

out the Syracusans by want of money, especially with the more

extensive command of the sea now given them by their present navy.

Besides this, there was a party in Syracuse who wished to betray the

city to the Athenians, and kept sending him messages and telling him

not to raise the siege. Accordingly, knowing this and really waiting

because he hesitated between the two courses and wished to see his way

more clearly, in his public speech on this occasion he refused to lead

off the army, saying he was sure the Athenians would never approve

of their returning without a vote of theirs. Those who would vote upon

their conduct, instead of judging the facts as eye-witnesses like

themselves and not from what they might hear from hostile critics,

would simply be guided by the calumnies of the first clever speaker;

while many, indeed most, of the soldiers on the spot, who now so

loudly proclaimed the danger of their position, when they reached

Athens would proclaim just as loudly the opposite, and would say

that their generals had been bribed to betray them and return. For

himself, therefore, who knew the Athenian temper, sooner than perish

under a dishonourable charge and by an unjust sentence at the hands of

the Athenians, he would rather take his chance and die, if die he

must, a soldier’s death at the hand of the enemy. Besides, after

all, the Syracusans were in a worse case than themselves. What with

paying mercenaries, spending upon fortified posts, and now for a

full year maintaining a large navy, they were already at a loss and

would soon be at a standstill: they had already spent two thousand

talents and incurred heavy debts besides, and could not lose even ever

so small a fraction of their present force through not paying it,

without ruin to their cause; depending as they did