History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗

>peace, and also of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer

of arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty that where

arbitration should be offered there should be no appeal to arms. For

this reason they thought that they deserved their misfortunes, and

took to heart seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had

befallen them. But when, besides the ravages from Pylos, which went on

without any intermission, the thirty Athenian ships came out from

Argos and wasted part of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and other places; when

upon every dispute that arose as to the interpretation of any doubtful

point in the treaty, their own offers of arbitration were always

rejected by the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians at length decided that

Athens had now committed the very same offence as they had before

done, and had become the guilty party; and they began to be full of

ardour for the war. They spent this winter in sending round to their

allies for iron, and in getting ready the other implements for

building their fort; and meanwhile began raising at home, and also

by forced requisitions in the rest of Peloponnese, a force to be

sent out in the merchantmen to their allies in Sicily. Winter thus

ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war of which Thucydides

is the historian.

 

In the first days of the spring following, at an earlier period than

usual, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the

command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. They

began by devastating the parts bordering upon the plain, and next

proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the different

cities. Decelea is about thirteen or fourteen miles from the city of

Athens, and the same distance or not much further from Boeotia; and

the fort was meant to annoy the plain and the richest parts of the

country, being in sight of Athens. While the Peloponnesians and

their allies in Attica were engaged in the work of fortification,

their countrymen at home sent off, at about the same time, the heavy

infantry in the merchant vessels to Sicily; the Lacedaemonians

furnishing a picked force of Helots and Neodamodes (or freedmen),

six hundred heavy infantry in all, under the command of Eccritus, a

Spartan; and the Boeotians three hundred heavy infantry, commanded

by two Thebans, Xenon and Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian.

These were among the first to put out into the open sea, starting from

Taenarus in Laconia. Not long after their departure the Corinthians

sent off a force of five hundred heavy infantry, consisting partly

of men from Corinth itself, and partly of Arcadian mercenaries, placed

under the command of Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also

sent off two hundred heavy infantry at same time as the Corinthians,

under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meantime the

five-and-twenty vessels manned by Corinth during the winter lay

confronting the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until the heavy

infantry in the merchantmen were fairly on their way from Peloponnese;

thus fulfilling the object for which they had been manned

originally, which was to divert the attention of the Athenians from

the merchantmen to the galleys.

 

During this time the Athenians were not idle. Simultaneously with

the fortification of Decelea, at the very beginning of spring, they

sent thirty ships round Peloponnese, under Charicles, son of

Apollodorus, with instructions to call at Argos and demand a force

of their heavy infantry for the fleet, agreeably to the alliance. At

the same time they dispatched Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had

intended, with sixty Athenian and five Chian vessels, twelve hundred

Athenian heavy infantry from the muster-roll, and as many of the

islanders as could be raised in the different quarters, drawing upon

the other subject allies for whatever they could supply that would

be of use for the war. Demosthenes was instructed first to sail

round with Charicles and to operate with him upon the coasts of

Laconia, and accordingly sailed to Aegina and there waited for the

remainder of his armament, and for Charicles to fetch the Argive

troops.

 

In Sicily, about the same time in this spring, Gylippus came to

Syracuse with as many troops as he could bring from the cities which

he had persuaded to join. Calling the Syracusans together, he told

them that they must man as many ships as possible, and try their

hand at a sea-fight, by which he hoped to achieve an advantage in

the war not unworthy of the risk. With him Hermocrates actively joined

in trying to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians at

sea, saying that the latter had not inherited their naval prowess

nor would they retain it for ever; they had been landsmen even to a

greater degree than the Syracusans, and had only become a maritime

power when obliged by the Mede. Besides, to daring spirits like the

Athenians, a daring adversary would seem the most formidable; and

the Athenian plan of paralysing by the boldness of their attack a

neighbour often not their inferior in strength could now be used

against them with as good effect by the Syracusans. He was convinced

also that the unlooked-for spectacle of Syracusans daring to face

the Athenian navy would cause a terror to the enemy, the advantages of

which would far outweigh any loss that Athenian science might

inflict upon their inexperience. He accordingly urged them to throw

aside their fears and to try their fortune at sea; and the Syracusans,

under the influence of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and perhaps some

others, made up their minds for the sea-fight and began to man their

vessels.

 

When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out the whole army by

night; his plan being to assault in person the forts on Plemmyrium

by land, while thirty-five Syracusan galleys sailed according to

appointment against the enemy from the great harbour, and the

forty-five remaining came round from the lesser harbour, where they

had their arsenal, in order to effect a junction with those inside and

simultaneously to attack Plemmyrium, and thus to distract the

Athenians by assaulting them on two sides at once. The Athenians

quickly manned sixty ships, and with twenty-five of these engaged

the thirty-five of the Syracusans in the great harbour, sending the

rest to meet those sailing round from the arsenal; and an action now

ensued directly in front of the mouth of the great harbour, maintained

with equal tenacity on both sides; the one wishing to force the

passage, the other to prevent them.

 

In the meantime, while the Athenians in Plemmyrium were down at

the sea, attending to the engagement, Gylippus made a sudden attack on

the forts in the early morning and took the largest first, and

afterwards the two smaller, whose garrisons did not wait for him,

seeing the largest so easily taken. At the fall of the first fort, the

men from it who succeeded in taking refuge in their boats and

merchantmen, found great difficulty in reaching the camp, as the

Syracusans were having the best of it in the engagement in the great

harbour, and sent a fast-sailing galley to pursue them. But when the

two others fell, the Syracusans were now being defeated; and the

fugitives from these sailed alongshore with more ease. The Syracusan

ships fighting off the mouth of the harbour forced their way through

the Athenian vessels and sailing in without any order fell foul of one

another, and transferred the victory to the Athenians; who not only

routed the squadron in question, but also that by which they were at

first being defeated in the harbour, sinking eleven of the Syracusan

vessels and killing most of the men, except the crews of three ships

whom they made prisoners. Their own loss was confined to three

vessels; and after hauling ashore the Syracusan wrecks and setting

up a trophy upon the islet in front of Plemmyrium, they retired to

their own camp.

 

Unsuccessful at sea, the Syracusans had nevertheless the forts in

Plemmyrium, for which they set up three trophies. One of the two

last taken they razed, but put in order and garrisoned the two others.

In the capture of the forts a great many men were killed and made

prisoners, and a great quantity of property was taken in all. As the

Athenians had used them as a magazine, there was a large stock of

goods and corn of the merchants inside, and also a large stock

belonging to the captains; the masts and other furniture of forty

galleys being taken, besides three galleys which had been drawn up

on shore. Indeed the first and chiefest cause of the ruin of the

Athenian army was the capture of Plemmyrium; even the entrance of

the harbour being now no longer safe for carrying in provisions, as

the Syracusan vessels were stationed there to prevent it, and

nothing could be brought in without fighting; besides the general

impression of dismay and discouragement produced upon the army.

 

After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under the command of

Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these went to Peloponnese with

ambassadors to describe the hopeful state of their affairs, and to

incite the Peloponnesians to prosecute the war there even more

actively than they were now doing, while the eleven others sailed to

Italy, hearing that vessels laden with stores were on their way to the

Athenians. After falling in with and destroying most of the vessels in

question, and burning in the Caulonian territory a quantity of

timber for shipbuilding, which had been got ready for the Athenians,

the Syracusan squadron went to Locri, and one of the merchantmen

from Peloponnese coming in, while they were at anchor there,

carrying Thespian heavy infantry, took these on board and sailed

alongshore towards home. The Athenians were on the lookout for them

with twenty ships at Megara, but were only able to take one vessel

with its crew; the rest getting clear off to Syracuse. There was

also some skirmishing in the harbour about the piles which the

Syracusans had driven in the sea in front of the old docks, to allow

their ships to lie at anchor inside, without being hurt by the

Athenians sailing up and running them down. The Athenians brought up

to them a ship of ten thousand talents burden furnished with wooden

turrets and screens, and fastened ropes round the piles from their

boats, wrenched them up and broke them, or dived down and sawed them

in two. Meanwhile the Syracusans plied them with missiles from the

docks, to which they replied from their large vessel; until at last

most of the piles were removed by the Athenians. But the most

awkward part of the stockade was the part out of sight: some of the

piles which had been driven in did not appear above water, so that

it was dangerous to sail up, for fear of running the ships upon

them, just as upon a reef, through not seeing them. However divers

went down and sawed off even these for reward; although the Syracusans

drove in others. Indeed there was no end to the contrivances to

which they resorted against each other, as might be expected between

two hostile armies confronting each other at such a short distance:

and skirmishes and all kinds of other attempts were of constant

occurrence. Meanwhile the Syracusans sent embassies to the cities,

composed of Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedaemonians, to tell

them of the capture of Plemmyrium, and that their defeat in the

sea-fight was due less to the strength of the enemy than to their

own disorder; and generally, to let them know that they were full of

hope, and to desire them to come to their help with ships and

troops, as the Athenians were expected with a fresh army, and if the

one already there could