History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗
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guard, and helped the Syracusans in completing the remainder of the
cross wall. Meanwhile Gylippus went into the rest of Sicily to raise
land and naval forces, and also to bring over any of the cities that
either were lukewarm in the cause or had hitherto kept out of the
war altogether. Syracusan and Corinthian envoys were also dispatched
to Lacedaemon and Corinth to get a fresh force sent over, in any way
that might offer, either in merchant vessels or transports, or in
any other manner likely to prove successful, as the Athenians too were
sending for reinforcements; while the Syracusans proceeded to man a
fleet and to exercise, meaning to try their fortune in this way
also, and generally became exceedingly confident.
Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his
own difficulties daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens. He had
before sent frequent reports of events as they occurred, and felt it
especially incumbent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they
were in a critical position, and that, unless speedily recalled or
strongly reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety. He
feared, however, that the messengers, either through inability to
speak, or through failure of memory, or from a wish to please the
multitude, might not report the truth, and so thought it best to write
a letter, to ensure that the Athenians should know his own opinion
without its being lost in transmission, and be able to decide upon the
real facts of the case.
His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the
requisite verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the
army, making it his aim now to keep on the defensive and to avoid
any unnecessary danger.
At the close of the same summer the Athenian general Euetion marched
in concert with Perdiccas with a large body of Thracians against
Amphipolis, and failing to take it brought some galleys round into the
Strymon, and blockaded the town from the river, having his base at
Himeraeum.
Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the persons sent by Nicias,
reaching Athens, gave the verbal messages which had been entrusted
to them, and answered any questions that were asked them, and
delivered the letter. The clerk of the city now came forward and
read out to the Athenians the letter, which was as follows:
“Our past operations, Athenians, have been made known to you by many
other letters; it is now time for you to become equally familiar
with our present condition, and to take your measures accordingly.
We had defeated in most of our engagements with them the Syracusans,
against whom we were sent, and we had built the works which we now
occupy, when Gylippus arrived from Lacedaemon with an army obtained
from Peloponnese and from some of the cities in Sicily. In our first
battle with him we were victorious; in the battle on the following day
we were overpowered by a multitude of cavalry and darters, and
compelled to retire within our lines. We have now, therefore, been
forced by the numbers of those opposed to us to discontinue the work
of circumvallation, and to remain inactive; being unable to make use
even of all the force we have, since a large portion of our heavy
infantry is absorbed in the defence of our lines. Meanwhile the
enemy have carried a single wall past our lines, thus making it
impossible for us to invest them in future, until this cross wall be
attacked by a strong force and captured. So that the besieger in
name has become, at least from the land side, the besieged in reality;
as we are prevented by their cavalry from even going for any
distance into the country.
“Besides this, an embassy has been dispatched to Peloponnese to
procure reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily,
partly in the hope of inducing those that are at present neutral to
join him in the war, partly of bringing from his allies additional
contingents for the land forces and material for the navy. For I
understand that they contemplate a combined attack, upon our lines
with their land forces and with their fleet by sea. You must none of
you be surprised that I say by sea also. They have discovered that the
length of the time we have now been in commission has rotted our ships
and wasted our crews, and that with the entireness of our crews and
the soundness of our ships the pristine efficiency of our navy has
departed. For it is impossible for us to haul our ships ashore and
careen them, because, the enemy’s vessels being as many or more than
our own, we are constantly anticipating an attack. Indeed, they may be
seen exercising, and it lies with them to take the initiative; and not
having to maintain a blockade, they have greater facilities for drying
their ships.
“This we should scarcely be able to do, even if we had plenty of
ships to spare, and were freed from our present necessity of
exhausting all our strength upon the blockade. For it is already
difficult to carry in supplies past Syracuse; and were we to relax our
vigilance in the slightest degree it would become impossible. The
losses which our crews have suffered and still continue to suffer
arise from the following causes. Expeditions for fuel and for
forage, and the distance from which water has to be fetched, cause our
sailors to be cut off by the Syracusan cavalry; the loss of our
previous superiority emboldens our slaves to desert; our foreign
seamen are impressed by the unexpected appearance of a navy against
us, and the strength of the enemy’s resistance; such of them as were
pressed into the service take the first opportunity of departing to
their respective cities; such as were originally seduced by the
temptation of high pay, and expected little fighting and large
gains, leave us either by desertion to the enemy or by availing
themselves of one or other of the various facilities of escape which
the magnitude of Sicily affords them. Some even engage in trade
themselves and prevail upon the captains to take Hyccaric slaves on
board in their place; thus they have ruined the efficiency of our
navy.
“Now I need not remind you that the time during which a crew is in
its prime is short, and that the number of sailors who can start a
ship on her way and keep the rowing in time is small. But by far my
greatest trouble is, that holding the post which I do, I am
prevented by the natural indocility of the Athenian seaman from
putting a stop to these evils; and that meanwhile we have no source
from which to recruit our crews, which the enemy can do from many
quarters, but are compelled to depend both for supplying the crews
in service and for making good our losses upon the men whom we brought
with us. For our present confederates, Naxos and Catana, are incapable
of supplying us. There is only one thing more wanting to our
opponents, I mean the defection of our Italian markets. If they were
to see you neglect to relieve us from our present condition, and
were to go over to the enemy, famine would compel us to evacuate,
and Syracuse would finish the war without a blow.
“I might, it is true, have written to you something different and
more agreeable than this, but nothing certainly more useful, if it
is desirable for you to know the real state of things here before
taking your measures. Besides I know that it is your nature to love to
be told the best side of things, and then to blame the teller if the
expectations which he has raised in your minds are not answered by the
result; and I therefore thought it safest to declare to you the truth.
“Now you are not to think that either your generals or your soldiers
have ceased to be a match for the forces originally opposed to them.
But you are to reflect that a general Sicilian coalition is being
formed against us; that a fresh army is expected from Peloponnese,
while the force we have here is unable to cope even with our present
antagonists; and you must promptly decide either to recall us or to
send out to us another fleet and army as numerous again, with a
large sum of money, and someone to succeed me, as a disease in the
kidneys unfits me for retaining my post. I have, I think, some claim
on your indulgence, as while I was in my prime I did you much good
service in my commands. But whatever you mean to do, do it at the
commencement of spring and without delay, as the enemy will obtain his
Sicilian reinforcements shortly, those from Peloponnese after a longer
interval; and unless you attend to the matter the former will be
here before you, while the latter will elude you as they have done
before.”
Such were the contents of Nicias’s letter. When the Athenians had
heard it they refused to accept his resignation, but chose him two
colleagues, naming Menander and Euthydemus, two of the officers at the
seat of war, to fill their places until their arrival, that Nicias
might not be left alone in his sickness to bear the whole weight of
affairs. They also voted to send out another army and navy, drawn
partly from the Athenians on the muster-roll, partly from the
allies. The colleagues chosen for Nicias were Demosthenes, son of
Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. Eurymedon was sent off
at once, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships, a
hundred and twenty talents of silver, and instructions to tell the
army that reinforcements would arrive, and that care would be taken of
them; but Demosthenes stayed behind to organize the expedition,
meaning to start as soon as it was spring, and sent for troops to
the allies, and meanwhile got together money, ships, and heavy
infantry at home.
The Athenians also sent twenty vessels round Peloponnese to
prevent any one crossing over to Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnese.
For the Corinthians, filled with confidence by the favourable
alteration in Sicilian affairs which had been reported by the envoys
upon their arrival, and convinced that the fleet which they had before
sent out had not been without its use, were now preparing to
dispatch a force of heavy infantry in merchant vessels to Sicily,
while the Lacedaemonians did the like for the rest of Peloponnese. The
Corinthians also manned a fleet of twenty-five vessels, intending to
try the result of a battle with the squadron on guard at Naupactus,
and meanwhile to make it less easy for the Athenians there to hinder
the departure of their merchantmen, by obliging them to keep an eye
upon the galleys thus arrayed against them.
In the meantime the Lacedaemonians prepared for their invasion of
Attica, in accordance with their own previous resolve, and at the
instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, who wished for an
invasion to arrest the reinforcements which they heard that Athens was
about to send to Sicily. Alcibiades also urgently advised the
fortification of Decelea, and a vigorous prosecution of the war. But
the Lacedaemonians derived most encouragement from the belief that
Athens, with two wars on her hands, against themselves and against the
Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction
that she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former
war, they considered, the offence had been more on their own side,
both on account of the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of
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