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to be numerically little inferior to

the Athenians, anchored off Erineus in Achaia in the Rhypic country.

The place off which they lay being in the form of a crescent, the land

forces furnished by the Corinthians and their allies on the spot

came up and ranged themselves upon the projecting headlands on

either side, while the fleet, under the command of Polyanthes, a

Corinthian, held the intervening space and blocked up the entrance.

The Athenians under Diphilus now sailed out against them with

thirty-three ships from Naupactus, and the Corinthians, at first not

moving, at length thought they saw their opportunity, raised the

signal, and advanced and engaged the Athenians. After an obstinate

struggle, the Corinthians lost three ships, and without sinking any

altogether, disabled seven of the enemy, which were struck prow to

prow and had their foreships stove in by the Corinthian vessels, whose

cheeks had been strengthened for this very purpose. After an action of

this even character, in which either party could claim the victory

(although the Athenians became masters of the wrecks through the

wind driving them out to sea, the Corinthians not putting out again to

meet them), the two combatants parted. No pursuit took place, and no

prisoners were made on either side; the Corinthians and Peloponnesians

who were fighting near the shore escaping with ease, and none of the

Athenian vessels having been sunk. The Athenians now sailed back to

Naupactus, and the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy as victors,

because they had disabled a greater number of the enemy’s ships.

Moreover they held that they had not been worsted, for the very same

reason that their opponent held that he had not been victorious; the

Corinthians considering that they were conquerors, if not decidedly

conquered, and the Athenians thinking themselves vanquished, because

not decidedly victorious. However, when the Peloponnesians sailed

off and their land forces had dispersed, the Athenians also set up a

trophy as victors in Achaia, about two miles and a quarter from

Erineus, the Corinthian station.

 

This was the termination of the action at Naupactus. To return to

Demosthenes and Eurymedon: the Thurians having now got ready to join

in the expedition with seven hundred heavy infantry and three

hundred darters, the two generals ordered the ships to sail along

the coast to the Crotonian territory, and meanwhile held a review of

all the land forces upon the river Sybaris, and then led them

through the Thurian country. Arrived at the river Hylias, they here

received a message from the Crotonians, saying that they would not

allow the army to pass through their country; upon which the Athenians

descended towards the shore, and bivouacked near the sea and the mouth

of the Hylias, where the fleet also met them, and the next day

embarked and sailed along the coast touching at all the cities

except Locri, until they came to Petra in the Rhegian territory.

 

Meanwhile the Syracusans hearing of their approach resolved to

make a second attempt with their fleet and their other forces on

shore, which they had been collecting for this very purpose in order

to do something before their arrival. In addition to other

improvements suggested by the former sea-fight which they now

adopted in the equipment of their navy, they cut down their prows to a

smaller compass to make them more solid and made their cheeks stouter,

and from these let stays into the vessels’ sides for a length of six

cubits within and without, in the same way as the Corinthians had

altered their prows before engaging the squadron at Naupactus. The

Syracusans thought that they would thus have an advantage over the

Athenian vessels, which were not constructed with equal strength,

but were slight in the bows, from their being more used to sail

round and charge the enemy’s side than to meet him prow to prow, and

that the battle being in the great harbour, with a great many ships in

not much room, was also a fact in their favour. Charging prow to prow,

they would stave in the enemy’s bows, by striking with solid and stout

beaks against hollow and weak ones; and secondly, the Athenians for

want of room would be unable to use their favourite manoeuvre of

breaking the line or of sailing round, as the Syracusans would do

their best not to let them do the one, and want of room would

prevent their doing the other. This charging prow to prow, which had

hitherto been thought want of skill in a helmsman, would be the

Syracusans’ chief manoeuvre, as being that which they should find most

useful, since the Athenians, if repulsed, would not be able to back

water in any direction except towards the shore, and that only for a

little way, and in the little space in front of their own camp. The

rest of the harbour would be commanded by the Syracusans; and the

Athenians, if hard pressed, by crowding together in a small space

and all to the same point, would run foul of one another and fall into

disorder, which was, in fact, the thing that did the Athenians most

harm in all the sea-fights, they not having, like the Syracusans,

the whole harbour to retreat over. As to their sailing round into

the open sea, this would be impossible, with the Syracusans in

possession of the way out and in, especially as Plemmyrium would be

hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbour was not large.

 

With these contrivances to suit their skill and ability, and now

more confident after the previous sea-fight, the Syracusans attacked

by land and sea at once. The town force Gylippus led out a little

the first and brought them up to the wall of the Athenians, where it

looked towards the city, while the force from the Olympieum, that is

to say, the heavy infantry that were there with the horse and the

light troops of the Syracusans, advanced against the wall from the

opposite side; the ships of the Syracusans and allies sailing out

immediately afterwards. The Athenians at first fancied that they

were to be attacked by land only, and it was not without alarm that

they saw the fleet suddenly approaching as well; and while some were

forming upon the walls and in front of them against the advancing

enemy, and some marching out in haste against the numbers of horse and

darters coming from the Olympieum and from outside, others manned

the ships or rushed down to the beach to oppose the enemy, and when

the ships were manned put out with seventy-five sail against about

eighty of the Syracusans.

 

After spending a great part of the day in advancing and retreating

and skirmishing with each other, without either being able to gain any

advantage worth speaking of, except that the Syracusans sank one or

two of the Athenian vessels, they parted, the land force at the same

time retiring from the lines. The next day the Syracusans remained

quiet, and gave no signs of what they were going to do; but Nicias,

seeing that the battle had been a drawn one, and expecting that they

would attack again, compelled the captains to refit any of the ships

that had suffered, and moored merchant vessels before the stockade

which they had driven into the sea in front of their ships, to serve

instead of an enclosed harbour, at about two hundred feet from each

other, in order that any ship that was hard pressed might be able to

retreat in safety and sail out again at leisure. These preparations

occupied the Athenians all day until nightfall.

 

The next day the Syracusans began operations at an earlier hour, but

with the same plan of attack by land and sea. A great part of the

day the rivals spent as before, confronting and skirmishing with

each other; until at last Ariston, son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, the

ablest helmsman in the Syracusan service, persuaded their naval

commanders to send to the officials in the city, and tell them to move

the sale market as quickly as they could down to the sea, and oblige

every one to bring whatever eatables he had and sell them there,

thus enabling the commanders to land the crews and dine at once

close to the ships, and shortly afterwards, the selfsame day, to

attack the Athenians again when they were not expecting it.

 

In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent and the market

got ready, upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and

withdrew to the town, and at once landed and took their dinner upon

the spot; while the Athenians, supposing that they had returned to the

town because they felt they were beaten, disembarked at their

leisure and set about getting their dinners and about their other

occupations, under the idea that they done with fighting for that day.

Suddenly the Syracusans had manned their ships and again sailed

against them; and the Athenians, in great confusion and most of them

fasting, got on board, and with great difficulty put out to meet them.

For some time both parties remained on the defensive without engaging,

until the Athenians at last resolved not to let themselves be worn out

by waiting where they were, but to attack without delay, and giving

a cheer, went into action. The Syracusans received them, and

charging prow to prow as they had intended, stove in a great part of

the Athenian foreships by the strength of their beaks; the darters

on the decks also did great damage to the Athenians, but still greater

damage was done by the Syracusans who went about in small boats, ran

in upon the oars of the Athenian galleys, and sailed against their

sides, and discharged from thence their darts upon the sailors.

 

At last, fighting hard in this fashion, the Syracusans gained the

victory, and the Athenians turned and fled between the merchantmen

to their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the

merchantmen, where they were stopped by the beams armed with

dolphins suspended from those vessels over the passage. Two of the

Syracusan vessels went too near in the excitement of victory and

were destroyed, one of them being taken with its crew. After sinking

seven of the Athenian vessels and disabling many, and taking most of

the men prisoners and killing others, the Syracusans retired and set

up trophies for both the engagements, being now confident of having

a decided superiority by sea, and by no means despairing of equal

success by land.

CHAPTER XXII

_Nineteenth Year of the War - Arrival of Demosthenes - Defeat of

the Athenians at Epipolae - Folly and Obstinancy of Nicias_

 

In the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for a second

attack upon both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with

the succours from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships,

including the foreigners; nearly five thousand heavy infantry,

Athenian and allied; a large number of darters, Hellenic and

barbarian, and slingers and archers and everything else upon a

corresponding scale. The Syracusans and their allies were for the

moment not a little dismayed at the idea that there was to be no

term or ending to their dangers, seeing, in spite of the fortification

of Decelea, a new army arrive nearly equal to the former, and the

power of Athens proving so great in every quarter. On the other

hand, the first Athenian armament regained a certain confidence in the

midst of its misfortunes. Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood,

felt that he could not drag on and fare as Nicias had done, who by

wintering in Catana instead of at once attacking Syracuse had

allowed the terror of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt,

and had given time to Gylippus to arrive with a force from

Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would

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