The Categories, Aristotle [best self help books to read .txt] 📗
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ENDTHE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93END
The Categories
By Aristotle
Translated by E. M. Edghill
Section 1
Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have
a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs
for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay
claim to the name ‘animal’; yet these are equivocally so named,
for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding
with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what
sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be
appropriate to that case only.
On the other hand, things are said to be named ‘univocally’ which
have both the name and the definition answering to the name in
common. A man and an ox are both ‘animal’, and these are
univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the
definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state
in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case
would be identical with that in the other.
Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, which derive their
name from some other name, but differ from it in termination.
Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word ‘grammar’, and
the courageous man from the word ‘courage’.
Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the
latter are such expressions as ‘the man runs’, ‘the man wins’; of
the former ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’.
Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are
never present in a subject. Thus ‘man’ is predicable of the
individual man, and is never present in a subject.
By being ‘present in a subject’ I do not mean present as parts
are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart
from the said subject.
Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never
predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of
grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not
predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be
present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet
it is never predicable of anything.
Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present
in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind,
it is predicable of grammar.
There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in
a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man
or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which
is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable
of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such
being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical
knowledge is present in a subject.
When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is
predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the
subject. Thus, ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man; but
‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’; it will, therefore, be
predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is
both ‘man’ and ‘animal’.
If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are
themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus
‘animal’ and the genus ‘knowledge’. ‘With feet’, ‘two-footed’,
‘winged’, ‘aquatic’, are differentiae of ‘animal’; the species of
knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One
species of knowledge does not differ from another in being
‘two-footed’.
But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing
to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater
class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae
of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.
Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance,
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state,
action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of
substance are ‘man’ or ‘the horse’, of quantity, such terms as
‘two cubits long’ or ‘three cubits long’, of quality, such
attributes as ‘white’, ‘grammatical’. ‘Double’, ‘half’,
‘greater’, fall under the category of relation; ‘in a the market
place’, ‘in the Lyceum’, under that of place; ‘yesterday’, ‘last
year’, under that of time. ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’, are terms
indicating position, ‘shod’, ‘armed’, state; ‘to lance’, ‘to
cauterize’, action; ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized’,
affection.
No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation;
it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative
statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be
either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any
way composite such as ‘man’, ‘white’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’, cannot be
either true or false.
Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of
the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor
present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse.
But in a secondary sense those things are called substances
within which, as species, the primary substances are included;
also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance,
the individual man is included in the species ‘man’, and the
genus to which the species belongs is ‘animal’; these,
therefore-that is to say, the species ‘man’ and the genus
‘animal,-are termed secondary substances.
It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the
definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject.
For instance, ‘man’ is predicted of the individual man. Now in
this case the name of the species man’ is applied to the
individual, for we use the term ‘man’ in describing the
individual; and the definition of ‘man’ will also be predicated
of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and
animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are
predicable of the individual.
With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present
in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name
nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are
present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable,
there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used.
For instance, ‘white’ being present in a body is predicated of
that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the
definition, however, of the colour white’ is never predicable of
the body.
Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a
primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes
evident by reference to particular instances which occur.
‘Animal’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, therefore of the
individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it
could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species
‘man’ at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in
individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which
it was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus
everything except primary substances is either predicated of
primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did
not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.
Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than
the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if
any one should render an account of what a primary substance is,
he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper
to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus.
Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual
man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was
animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual
in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the
man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will
give a more instructive account by mentioning the species ‘tree’
than by mentioning the genus ‘plant’.
Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances
in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie
every. else, and that everything else is either predicated of
them or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists
between primary substance and everything else subsists also
between the species and the genus: for the species is to the
genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated
of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the
genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the
species is more truly substance than the genus.
Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera,
no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a
more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the
species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual
horse by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way,
of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than
another; an individual man is not more truly substance than an
individual ox.
It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we
exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera
alone the name ‘secondary substance’, for these alone of all the
predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by
stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any
individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by
stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things
that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on,
are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these
alone, apart from primary substances, should be called
substances.
Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because
they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the
same relation that subsists between primary substance and
everything else subsists also between the species and the genus
to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and
every attribute which is not included within these, on the other.
For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual
man ‘skilled in grammar’, the predicate is applicable also to the
species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good
in all cases.
It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never
present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in
a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to
secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments
(apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For
‘man’ is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in
any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man. In
the same way, ‘animal’ is also predicated of the individual man,
but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a
subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in
which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of
secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition,
applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the
species and that of the genus with reference to the individual
man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject.
Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case
that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The
characteristics ‘terrestrial’ and ‘two-footed’ are predicated of
the species ‘man’, but not present in it. For they are not in
man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be
predicated
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