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>Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there

should be changes from either into the other, while the subject

retains its identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a

constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it

is possible that that that which is healthy should become

diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot,

that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad man, if

he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may

make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve,

even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely,

or at any rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more

and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement

was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will

make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as

this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish

him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of

time. In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, however,

change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change

from possession to privation, but not from privation to

possession. The man who has become blind does not regain his

sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the

man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new set. (iv)

Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly

to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this case

only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the

other false.

 

Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of

correlatives, nor in the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, is

it necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and

disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false.

‘Double’ and ‘half’ are opposed to each other as correlatives:

neither of them is true or false. The case is the same, of

course, with regard to ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ such as

‘sight’ and ‘blindness’. In short, where there is no sort of

combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all

the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words.

 

At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed

statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of

opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic. ‘Socrates is

ill’ is the contrary of ‘Socrates is well’, but not even of such

composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must

always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one

will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both

will be false; for neither ‘Socrates is ill’ nor ‘Socrates is

well’ is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.

 

In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, if the subject does

not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the

subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and

the other false. For ‘Socrates has sight’ is the opposite of

‘Socrates is blind’ in the sense of the word ‘opposite’ which

applies to possession and privation. Now if Socrates exists, it

is not necessary that one should be true and the other false, for

when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are

false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent.

 

But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject

exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For

manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions

‘Socrates is ill’, ‘Socrates is not ill’, is true, and the other

false. This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he

does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is

not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites only,

which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with

reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good,

that one of the pair must be true and the other false.

Part 11

That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the

contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on.

But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an

evil. For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary,

this also being an evil, and the mean. which is a good, is

equally the contrary of the one and of the other. It is only in a

few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the

contrary of an evil is a good.

 

In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one

exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy

there will be health and no disease, and again, if everything

turns white, there will be white, but no black. Again, since the

fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that

Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain

in one and the same individual at the same time, both these

contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well

was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.

 

It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in

subjects which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and

health require as their subject the body of an animal; white and

black require a body, without further qualification; justice and

injustice require as their subject the human soul.

 

Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all

cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary

genera or be themselves genera. White and black belong to the

same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera,

virtue and vice; while good and evil do not belong to genera, but

are themselves actual genera, with terms under them.

Part 12

There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be

‘prior’ to another. Primarily and most properly the term has

reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate

that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the

expressions ‘older’ and ‘more ancient’ imply greater length of

time.

 

Secondly, one thing is said to be ‘prior’ to another when the

sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense ‘one’

is ‘prior’ to ‘two’. For if ‘two’ exists, it follows directly

that ‘one’ must exist, but if ‘one’ exists, it does not follow

necessarily that ‘two’ exists: thus the sequence subsisting

cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of

two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other

depends is called ‘prior’ to that other.

 

In the third place, the term ‘prior’ is used with reference to

any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in

sciences which use demonstration there is that which is prior and

that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are

prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of

the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case

of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative.

 

Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which

is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority.

In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love

as ‘coming first’ with them. This sense of the word is perhaps

the most far-fetched.

 

Such, then, are the different senses in which the term ‘prior’ is

used.

 

Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet

another. For in those things, the being of each of which implies

that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may

reasonably be said to be by nature ‘prior’ to the effect. It is

plain that there are instances of this. The fact of the being of

a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is,

and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the

proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if

the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is.

The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the

being of the man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem

somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the

truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the

man’s being or not being.

 

Thus the word ‘prior’ may be used in five senses.

Part 13

The term ‘simultaneous’ is primarily and most appropriately

applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is

simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is

prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be

simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are

‘simultaneous’ in point of nature, the being of each of which

involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the

cause of the other’s being. This is the case with regard to the

double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since,

if there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a

half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is

the cause of the being of the other.

 

Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and

opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be

‘simultaneous’ in nature. I mean those species which are

distinguished each from each by one and the same method of

division. Thus the ‘winged’ species is simultaneous with the

‘terrestrial’ and the ‘water’ species. These are distinguished

within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the

genus ‘animal’ has the ‘winged’, the ‘terrestrial’, and the

‘water’ species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to

another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be

‘simultaneous’ in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial,

the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into

subspecies. Those species, then, also will be ‘simultaneous’

point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are

distinguished each from each by one and the same method of

differentiation.

 

But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being

cannot be reversed. If there is the species ‘water-animal’, there

will be the genus ‘animal’, but granted the being of the genus

‘animal’, it does not follow necessarily that there will be the

species ‘water-animal’.

 

Those things, therefore, are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature,

the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at

the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other’s

being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from

each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover,

are ‘simultaneous’ in the unqualified sense of the word which

come into being at the same time.

Part 14

There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction,

increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.

 

It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of

movement are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from

destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so

on. But in

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