The Categories, Aristotle [best self help books to read .txt] 📗

or sickly: in fact

it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or

incapacity. Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue

of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or

incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any

kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in

virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn

capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called

healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to

those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy,

in virtue of the lack of this capacity. Similarly with regard to

softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated of a thing because

it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand

disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by

reason of the lack of that capacity.

 

A third class within this category is that of affective qualities

and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of

this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these;

heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective

qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those

things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such

by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it

contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains

whiteness; and so in all other cases.

 

The term ‘affective quality’ is not used as indicating that those

things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey

is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor

is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and

cold are called affective qualities, not because those things

which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said

qualities are capable of producing an ‘affection’ in the way of

perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of

taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these

qualities.

 

Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not

said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they

themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many

changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is

ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so

on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such

affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his

constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the

corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of

bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily

present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a

man’s natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding

colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions,

therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and

lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor

and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we

are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they

originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about

through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or

indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to

be such and such because of these.

 

Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may

easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called,

not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such

virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to

be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale

through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather

to have been affected.

 

Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities.

In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of

the soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its

origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I

mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for

people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these.

Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but

arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are

difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called

qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and

such.

 

Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered

ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a

man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a

bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper

somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are

therefore termed, not qualities, but affections.

 

The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs

to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any

other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as

being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a

thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it

is straight or curved; in fact a thing’s shape in every case

gives rise to a qualification of it.

 

Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms

indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to

a class different from that of quality. For it is rather a

certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus

qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms.

A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely

combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices

between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak,

evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others.

 

There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most

properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.

 

These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name

from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on

them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. In most,

indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified

is derived from that of the quality. Thus the terms ‘whiteness’,

‘grammar’, ‘justice’, give us the adjectives ‘white’,

‘grammatical’, ‘just’, and so on.

 

There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under

consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed

of it should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the

name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of

an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality; for

lob those capacities have no name assigned to them. In this, the

inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to

which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is

classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called ‘boxing’

or ‘wrestling’ as the case may be, and the name given to those

disposed in this way is derived from that of the science.

Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which

takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a

derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character

from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name

given him is not derived from the word ‘integrity’. Yet this does

not occur often.

 

We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed

of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of

the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent

on it.

 

One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the

contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The

things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of

these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that

which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is

white to that which is black. This, however, is not always the

case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no

contraries.

 

If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a

quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we

apply the names used to denote the other categories; for

instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and

justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality: neither

quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category

but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice. So

it is with all other contraries falling under the category of

quality.

 

Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated

of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is

also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the

same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did

before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter.

 

Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if

we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree,

difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all

those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed,

who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that

justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree

themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they

possess these qualities, and that this is the case with

grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as

dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact

that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be

what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for

one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy

or just, than another, and so on.

 

The qualities expressed by the terms ‘triangular’ and

‘quadrangular’ do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor

indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those things to

which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are

all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to

which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to

differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle

than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the

circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of the term

proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be

compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation

of degree.

 

Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar

to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be

predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category

its distinctive feature. One thing is like another only with

reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus

this forms the peculiar mark of quality.

 

We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though

proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in

it many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions

were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is

relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is

explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge

of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus

explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything

external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative

at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar

is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of

something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the

music of