The Categories, Aristotle [best self help books to read .txt] 📗

if that to which they are related is

stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to

be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in

the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for

each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is

denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion,

but by one of irrelevant significance. The term ‘slave,’ if

defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or

anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in

relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact.

Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and

the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant

attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in

virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with

that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the

correlative of ‘the slave’ is said to be ‘the master’, then,

though all irrelevant attributes of the said ‘master’, such as

‘biped’, ‘receptive of knowledge’, ‘human’, should be removed,

and the attribute ‘master’ alone left, the stated correlation

existing between him and the slave will remain the same, for it

is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other

hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then,

when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in

virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated

correlation will be found to have disappeared.

 

For suppose the correlative of ‘the slave’ should be said to be

‘the man’, or the correlative of ‘the wing”the bird’; if the

attribute ‘master’ be withdrawn from’ the man’, the correlation

between ‘the man’ and ‘the slave’ will cease to exist, for if the

man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the

attribute ‘winged’ be withdrawn from ‘the bird’, ‘the wing’ will

no longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not

winged, it follows that ‘the wing’ has no correlative.

 

Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly

designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be

easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When

the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all

correlatives are interdependent.

 

Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously.

This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and

the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of

that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master

necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave

implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general

rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no

double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this

rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not

appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into

existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to

exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we

acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be

difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the

beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that

of its object.

 

Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist,

cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative,

the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object

of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there

will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that,

if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may

nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring

of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge,

though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the

knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all

animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there

might yet be many objects of knowledge.

 

This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the

object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of

perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also

will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not

cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a

body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if

that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the

body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if

the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases

to exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that

of perception.

 

But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the

perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that

perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body,

heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.

 

Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving

subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the

animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for

fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is

itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and

before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists

before perception.

 

It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is

relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be

made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to

primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such

possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances

are relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with

reference to something external. Similarly with the parts: a

particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or

head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a

particular person. It is true also, for the most part at least,

in the case of secondary substances; the species ‘man’ and the

species ‘ox’ are not defined with reference to anything outside

themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some

one’s property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then,

that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with

regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of

opinion; thus, such terms as ‘head’ and ‘hand’ are defined with

reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and

so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character.

Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete,

it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no

substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not

complete, if those things only are properly called relative in

the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary

condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma

may be found.

 

The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the

fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else

does not make it essentially relative.

 

>From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a

relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which

it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows

that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call

that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a

necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it

is related. For if he does not know at all that to which it is

related, he will not know whether or not it is relative. This is

clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows

definitely that such and such a thing is ‘double’, he will also

forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if

there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double,

he does not know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows

that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he

will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more

beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more

beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would

be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely

that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to

know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else

which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less

beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends

some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also

definitely to which it is related.

 

Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is

possible to know their essential character definitely, but it

does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which

they are related. It is not possible to know forthwith whose head

or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives, and, this being

the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative

in character. It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to

make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination,

but to have raised questions with regard to details is not

without advantage.