Manual of Military Training, James A. Moss [books under 200 pages .TXT] 📗

the war game, except that you are dealing with real, live men whom you can not control perfectly, and there is, therefore, much greater chance for mistakes.

948. The battle. A battle is only a maneuver to which is added great physical danger and excitement.

General rules and principles that must be applied in map problems, terrain exercises, the war game and maneuvers

949. Everything that is done must conform in principle to what should be done in battle—otherwise your work is wasted—your time is thrown away.

In solving map problems and in the war game, always form in your mind a picture of the ground where the action is supposed to be taking place—imagine that you see the enemy, the various hills, streams, roads, etc., that he is firing at you, etc.—and don't do anything that you would not be able to do if you were really on the ground and really in a fight.

Whether it be a corporal in command of a squad or a general in command of an army, in the solution of a tactical problem, whether it be a map problem, a terrain exercise, a war game, maneuver or battle, he will have to go through the same operation:

1st. Estimate the situation; 2d. Decide what he will do; 3d. Give the necessary orders to carry out his decision.

At first these three steps of the operation may appear difficult and laborious, but after a little practice the mind, which always works with rapidity in accustomed channels, performs them with astonishing quickness.

The child beginning the study of arithmetic, for example, is very slow in determining the sum of 7 and 8, but later the answer is announced almost at sight. The same is true in tactical problems—the process may be slow at first, but with a little practice it becomes quick and easy.

950. Estimating the Situation. This is simply "sizing up the situation," finding out what you're "up against," and is always the first thing to be done. It is most important, and in doing it the first step is to determine your MISSION—what you are to do, what you are to accomplish—the most important consideration in any military situation.

Consider next your own forces and that of the enemy—that is, his probable strength and how it compares with yours.

Consider the enemy's probable MISSION[12] and what he will probably do to accomplish it.

Consider the geography of the country so far as it affects the problem—the valleys to cross, defiles to pass through, shortest road to follow, etc.

Now, consider the different courses open to you with the advantages and disadvantages of each.

You must, of course, in every case know what you're up against before you can decide intelligently what you're going to do.

In making your plan always bear in mind not only your own MISSION, but also the general mission of the command of which you form a part, and this is what nine men out of ten forget to do.

951. The Decision. It is important that you should come to a clear and correct decision—that you do so promptly and then execute it vigorously.

The new Japanese Field Service Regulations tell us that there are two things above all that should be avoided—inaction and hesitation. "To act resolutely even in an erroneous manner is better than to remain inactive and irresolute"—that is to say do something.

You are now ready to come to a decision, which is nothing more or less than a clear, concise determination of what you're going to do and how you're going to do it. Frederick the Great, expressed the same idea in fewer words: "Don't haggle."

Having settled on a plan, push it through—don't vacillate, don't waver. Make your plan simple. No other has much show. Complicated plans look well on paper, but in war they seldom work out. They require several people to do the right thing at the right time and this under conditions of excitement, danger and confusion, and, as a result, they generally fail.

952. The Order. Having completed your estimate of the situation and formed your plan, you are now ready to give the orders necessary to carry it out.

You must first give your subordinates sufficient information of the situation and your plan, so that they may clearly understand their mission.

The better everyone understands the whole situation the better he can play his part. Unexpected things are always happening in war—a subordinate can act intelligently only if he knows and understands what his superior wants to do.

Always make your instructions definite and positive—vague instructions are sometimes worse than none.

Your order, your instructions, must be clear, concise and definite—everyone should know just exactly what he is to do.

A Few General Principles

953. The man who hunts deer, moose, tigers and lions, is hunting big game, but the soldier operating in the enemy's territory is hunting bigger game—he's hunting for human beings—but you want to remember that the other fellow is out hunting for you, too; he's out "gunning" for you. So, don't fail to be on the alert, on the lookout, all the time, if you do he'll "get the drop" on you. Remember what Frederick the Great said: "It is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be taken by surprise."

Do not separate your force too much; if you do, you weaken yourself—you take the chance of being "defeated in detail"—that is, of one part being defeated after another. Remember the old saying: "In union there is strength." Undue extension of your line (a mistake, by the way, very often made) is only a form of separation and is equally as bad.

While too much importance can not be attached to the proper use of cover, you must not forget that sometimes there are other considerations that outweigh the advantages of cover. Good sense alone can determine. A certain direction of attack, for instance, may afford excellent cover but it may be so situated as to mean ruin if defeated, as where it puts an impassable obstacle directly in your rear. And don't forget that you should always think in advance of what you would do in case of defeat.

What is it, after all, that gives victory, whether it be armies or only squads engaged? It's just simply inflicting on the enemy a loss which he will not stand before he can do the same to you. Now, what is this loss that he will not stand? What is the loss that will cause him to break? Well, it varies; it is subject to many conditions—different bodies of troops, like different timbers, have different breaking points. However, whatever it may be in any particular case it would soon come if we could shoot on the battlefield as we do on the target range, but we can not approximate it.

There are many causes tending to drag down our score on the battlefield, one of the most potent being the effect of the enemy's fire. It is cited as a physiological fact that fear and great excitement cause the pupil of the eye to dilate and impair accuracy in vision and hence of shooting. It is well established that the effectiveness of the fire of one side reduced proportionately to the effectiveness of that of the other.

Bear in mind then these two points—we must get the enemy's breaking point before he gets ours, and the more effective we make our fire the less effective will be his.

Expressed in another way—to win you must gain and keep a fire superiority.

This generally means more rifles in action, yet a fire badly controlled and directed, though great in volume, may be less effective than a smaller volume better handled.

The firing line barring a few exceptional cases, then, should be as heavy as practicable consistent with the men's free use of their rifles.

This has been found to be about one man to the yard. In this way you get volume of fire and the companies do not cover so much ground that their commanders lose their power to direct and control.

If it becomes necessary to hold a line too long for the force available, it is then better to keep the men close together and leave gaps in the line. The men are so much better controlled, the fire better directed, the volume the same, and the gaps are closed by the cross fire of parties adjacent.