History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides [best free ebook reader TXT] 📗
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just where the trophy now stands; and he was no sooner within the
gates than the Plataeans engaged and defeated the nearest party of
Peloponnesians who had taken the alarm and come to the rescue, and
secured the gates for the approaching Athenian heavy infantry.
After this, each of the Athenians as fast as they entered went
against the wall. A few of the Peloponnesian garrison stood their
ground at first, and tried to repel the assault, and some of them were
killed; but the main body took fright and fled; the night attack and
the sight of the Megarian traitors in arms against them making them
think that all Megara had gone over to the enemy. It so happened
also that the Athenian herald of his own idea called out and invited
any of the Megarians that wished, to join the Athenian ranks; and this
was no sooner heard by the garrison than they gave way, and, convinced
that they were the victims of a concerted attack, took refuge in
Nisaea. By daybreak, the walls being now taken and the Megarians in
the city in great agitation, the persons who had negotiated with the
Athenians, supported by the rest of the popular party which was
privy to the plot, said that they ought to open the gates and march
out to battle. It had been concerted between them that the Athenians
should rush in, the moment that the gates were opened, while the
conspirators were to be distinguished from the rest by being
anointed with oil, and so to avoid being hurt. They could open the
gates with more security, as four thousand Athenian heavy infantry
from Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had marched all night, according
to agreement, and were now close at hand. The conspirators were all
ready anointed and at their posts by the gates, when one of their
accomplices denounced the plot to the opposite party, who gathered
together and came in a body, and roundly said that they must not march
out—a thing they had never yet ventured on even when in greater force
than at present—or wantonly compromise the safety of the town, and
that if what they said was not attended to, the battle would have to
be fought in Megara. For the rest, they gave no signs of their
knowledge of the intrigue, but stoutly maintained that their advice
was the best, and meanwhile kept close by and watched the gates,
making it impossible for the conspirators to effect their purpose.
The Athenian generals seeing that some obstacle had arisen, and that
the capture of the town by force was no longer practicable, at once
proceeded to invest Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it
before relief arrived, the surrender of Megara would soon follow.
Iron, stone-masons, and everything else required quickly coming up
from Athens, the Athenians started from the wall which they
occupied, and from this point built a cross wall looking towards
Megara down to the sea on either side of Nisaea; the ditch and the
walls being divided among the army, stones and bricks taken from the
suburb, and the fruit-trees and timber cut down to make a palisade
wherever this seemed necessary; the houses also in the suburb with the
addition of battlements sometimes entering into the fortification. The
whole of this day the work continued, and by the afternoon of the next
the wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea, alarmed
by the absolute want of provisions, which they used to take in for the
day from the upper town, not anticipating any speedy relief from the
Peloponnesians, and supposing Megara to be hostile, capitulated to the
Athenians on condition that they should give up their arms, and should
each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; their Lacedaemonian
commander, and any others of his countrymen in the place, being left
to the discretion of the Athenians. On these conditions they
surrendered and came out, and the Athenians broke down the long
walls at their point of junction with Megara, took possession of
Nisaea, and went on with their other preparations.
Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of Tellis,
happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, getting
ready an army for Thrace. As soon as he heard of the capture of the
walls, fearing for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and the safety of
Megara, he sent to the Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible at
Tripodiscus, a village so called of the Megarid, under Mount Geraneia,
and went himself, with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy
infantry, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such
troops of his own as he had already levied, expecting to find Nisaea
not yet taken. Hearing of its fall (he had marched out by night to
Tripodiscus), he took three hundred picked men from the army,
without waiting till his coming should be known, and came up to Megara
unobserved by the Athenians, who were down by the sea, ostensibly, and
really if possible, to attempt Nisaea, but above all to get into
Megara and secure the town. He accordingly invited the townspeople
to admit his party, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.
However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he might expel
them and restore the exiles; the other that the commons,
apprehensive of this very danger, might set upon them, and the city be
thus destroyed by a battle within its gates under the eyes of the
ambushed Athenians. He was accordingly refused admittance, both
parties electing to remain quiet and await the event; each expecting a
battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and thinking it
safer to see their friends victorious before declaring in their
favour.
Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the rest of the
army. At daybreak the Boeotians joined him. Having determined to
relieve Megara, whose danger they considered their own, even before
hearing from Brasidas, they were already in full force at Plataea,
when his messenger arrived to add spurs to their resolution; and
they at once sent on to him two thousand two hundred heavy infantry,
and six hundred horse, returning home with the main body. The whole
army thus assembled numbered six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian
heavy infantry were drawn up by Nisaea and the sea; but the light
troops being scattered over the plain were attacked by the Boeotian
horse and driven to the sea, being taken entirely by surprise, as on
previous occasions no relief had ever come to the Megarians from any
quarter. Here the Boeotians were in their turn charged and engaged
by the Athenian horse, and a cavalry action ensued which lasted a long
time, and in which both parties claimed the victory. The Athenians
killed and stripped the leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of
his comrades who had charged right up to Nisaea, and remaining masters
of the bodies gave them back under truce, and set up a trophy; but
regarding the action as a whole the forces separated without either
side having gained a decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to
their army and the Athenians to Nisaea.
After this Brasidas and the army came nearer to the sea and to
Megara, and taking up a convenient position, remained quiet in order
of battle, expecting to be attacked by the Athenians and knowing
that the Megarians were waiting to see which would be the victor. This
attitude seemed to present two advantages. Without taking the
offensive or willingly provoking the hazards of a battle, they
openly showed their readiness to fight, and thus without bearing the
burden of the day would fairly reap its honours; while at the same
time they effectually served their interests at Megara. For if they
had failed to show themselves they would not have had a chance, but
would have certainly been considered vanquished, and have lost the
town. As it was, the Athenians might possibly not be inclined to
accept their challenge, and their object would be attained without
fighting. And so it turned out. The Athenians formed outside the
long walls and, the enemy not attacking, there remained motionless;
their generals having decided that the risk was too unequal. In fact
most of their objects had been already attained; and they would have
to begin a battle against superior numbers, and if victorious could
only gain Megara, while a defeat would destroy the flower of their
heavy soldiery. For the enemy it was different; as even the states
actually represented in his army risked each only a part of its entire
force, he might well be more audacious. Accordingly, after waiting for
some time without either side attacking, the Athenians withdrew to
Nisaea, and the Peloponnesians after them to the point from which they
had set out. The friends of the Megarian exiles now threw aside
their hesitation, and opened the gates to Brasidas and the
commanders from the different states—looking upon him as the victor
and upon the Athenians as having declined the battle—and receiving
them into the town proceeded to discuss matters with them; the party
in correspondence with the Athenians being paralysed by the turn
things had taken.
Afterwards Brasidas let the allies go home, and himself went back to
Corinth, to prepare for his expedition to Thrace, his original
destination. The Athenians also returning home, the Megarians in the
city most implicated in the Athenian negotiation, knowing that they
had been detected, presently disappeared; while the rest conferred
binding them under solemn oaths to take no vengeance for the past, and
only to consult the real interests of the town. However, as soon as
they were in office, they held a review of the heavy infantry, and
separating the battalions, picked out about a hundred of their
enemies, and of those who were thought to be most involved in the
correspondence with the Athenians, brought them before the people, and
compelling the vote to be given openly, had them condemned and
executed, and established a close oligarchy in the town—a revolution
which lasted a very long while, although effected by a very few
partisans.
_Eighth and Ninth Years of the War - Invasion of Boeotia -
Fall of Amphipolis - Brilliant Successes of Brasidas_
The same summer the Mitylenians were about to fortify Antandrus,
as they had intended, when Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders
of the Athenian squadron engaged in levying subsidies, heard on the
Hellespont of what was being done to the place (Lamachus their
colleague having sailed with ten ships into the Pontus) and
conceived fears of its becoming a second Anaia-the place in which
the Samian exiles had established themselves to annoy Samos, helping
the Peloponnesians by sending pilots to their navy, and keeping the
city in agitation and receiving all its outlaws. They accordingly
got together a force from the allies and set sail, defeated in
battle the troops that met them from Antandrus, and retook the
place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus,
lost his ships at anchor in the river Calex, in the territory of
Heraclea, rain having fallen in the interior and the flood coming
suddenly down upon them; and himself and his troops passed by land
through the Bithynian Thracians on the Asiatic side, and arrived at
Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.
The same summer the Athenian general, Demosthenes, arrived at
Naupactus with forty ships immediately after the return from the
Megarid. Hippocrates and himself had had overtures made to them by
certain men in the cities in Boeotia, who wished to change the
constitution and introduce a democracy as at Athens; Ptoeodorus, a
Theban exile, being the chief mover in this intrigue. The seaport
town of Siphae, in the bay of Crisae, in the
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